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 Voorwoord/Preface 
 
Het voorliggende rapport Worldwide Cultural Differences in Socio-Ethical Views in Relation 
to Biotechnology (Mondiale cultuurverschillen in de ethisch maatschappelijke opvattingen 
i.v.m. biotechnologie) is samengesteld in opdracht van de Commissie Genetische Modificatie 
(COGEM). Het is mede bedoeld ter voorbereiding van de nieuwe Trendanalyse 
Biotechnologie die in 2007 zal worden uitgebracht. De onderzoekswerkzaamheden 
(voornamelijk ‘desk research’) zijn verricht door dr. Henk van den Belt onder directe 
supervisie van Prof. dr. Jozef Keulartz. De uitvoering van het project is begeleid door een 
begeleidingscommissie waarin Prof. dr. Frans Brom, dr. Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, ir. 
Huib de Vriend en dr. Ineke Widdershoven-Heerding zitting hadden. Voor hoofdstuk 3, dat 
over de Zuid-Koreaanse stamcelaffaire handelt, is commentaar ingewonnen van de kant van 
dr. Ingrid Schneider en dr. Phillan Joung, een Duitse onderzoekster van Koreaanse afkomst. 
Beiden hebben zich uitvoerig beziggehouden met de ethische aspecten van embryonaal 
stamcelonderzoek. Hun commentaar is in de uiteindelijke versie van het hoofdstuk verwerkt.  
 
De meningen die in het rapport worden weergegeven zijn die van de auteurs en weerspiegelen 
niet noodzakelijkerwijs de mening van de COGEM. 
 
 
 
The present report Worldwide Cultural Differences in Socio-Ethical Views in Relation to 
Biotechnology has been commissioned by the Netherlands Commission on Genetic 
Modification (COGEM). It is intended to help prepare the new Trend Analysis 
Biotechnology, which will be published in 2007. The work on this report, mainly desk 
research, was carried out by dr. Henk van den Belt under direct supervision of Prof. dr. Jozef 
Keulartz. The implementation of the research project was overseen by a supervisory 
committee consisting of Prof. dr. Frans Brom, dr. Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, ir. Huib de 
Vriend, and dr. Ineke Widdershoven-Heerding. For chapter 3, which deals with the South 
Korean stem cell affair, we solicited comments from Dr. Ingrid Schneider and Dr. Phillan 
Joung, a German researcher of Korean descent. Both are experts on the ethical aspects of 
embryonic stem cell research. Their comments have been incorporated into the final version 
of chapter 3.  
 
The views expressed in this report are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
the opinion of the COGEM.   
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 Chapter 1  
 
Worldwide Cultural Differences in Socio-Ethical Views in Relation to 
Biotechnology: 
Overview and summary 
 
“Culture is a notoriously slippery concept.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 22) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the original tender the aim of the research project reported here was formulated as follows: 
“Obtaining insight into the significance of global differences in culture for the weighing of 
utility and risk (proportionality) with regard to applications of biotechnology. The 
identification of dominant values and how they affect key choices in the process of 
developing and marketing biotechnological products.”  
The background for this research question is formed by the remarkable rise of several Asian 
countries in biotechnological research and the suspicion that these countries may not hold the 
same views as western countries on the ethical acceptability of developments in 
biotechnology. Europe and the US, by contrast, are held to share many norms and values, at 
least with regard to red biotechnology (see COGEM, 2004, p. 25-26). Where global 
differences in culture are the intended subject of inquiry, it thus seems that the main focus is 
to be on the differences between Europe and the US on the one hand and Asian countries on 
the other. Or as the COGEM Achtergrondstudies state: “After all, the cultural differences 
between Europe and the US on the one hand and Asia on the other are considerable” (ibid.).   
 
Answering the research question was far less simple than might seem at first sight. The main 
underlying reason is that there is strong disagreement, both within and between relevant 
academic disciplines, about the precise meaning of the concept of culture, the different ways 
in which ‘cultures’ may be distinguished, the depth and scope of cultural differences, the 
relative stability or instability of such differences over time and the role played by ‘culture’ as 
a factor in socio-economic and political affairs. For a proper understanding of the difficulties 
which confront any attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to our research question, we 
cannot ignore these varying views. Let us therefore first make a brief tour along some relevant 
academic disciplines.     
 
Academic contests about ‘culture’ 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, cultural anthropology was characterised by a 
sustained intellectual struggle to free itself from the massive, deterministic and monolithic 
view of culture that had dominated the previous period. The work of the American cultural 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz is a case in point. When he embarked on his anthropological 
career, the reigning view in his profession was that ‘culture’ was so diffuse and encompassing 
that it could offer a readymade explanation for everything people might do, think, say or 
believe. It was cause and effect simultaneously. Germans were authoritarian, Japanese shame-
driven and the Kwakiutl megalomaniac, and they were that way because their culture made 
them so. It took a lot of time and effort for Geertz to gradually detach himself from this 
‘panoptical’ idea of culture. In his view, studying other peoples’ cultures involves gaining 
some familiarity with the frames of meaning in which they enact their lives and which are 
embodied in various concrete rituals and everyday practices (Geertz, 1999). In this way the 
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concept of culture can be cut down to size. Other cultural anthropologists also display this 
same tendency to prune the notion of culture into a more manageable size. This tendency is 
obviously related to the rejection of essentialistic explanations and to the honest attempt to 
avoid all eurocentrism and ‘Orientalism’ in contemporary cultural anthropology.      
 
Let’s turn now to the study of international relations. In this area, Samuel Huntington’s book 
The Clash of Civiliations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) has been epoch-making. 
For many social anthropologists, however, his approach offers precisely an example of how 
not to go about when one has to probe the significance of cultural differences. Huntington’s 
thesis is that in the post-Cold War world the main international conflicts will follow cultural 
fault lines. On the basis of a classification criterion that is not entirely transparent, he 
distinguishes eight different ‘civilizations’: the western, the Orthodox-Slavic, the Islamic, the 
Confucian, the Hindu, the Latin-American, the Japanese and the Sub-Saharan African 
civilization. Thus the world map is partitioned into irreconcilable, sharply demarcated and 
largely self-enclosed blocks of different cultures or civilizations. According to Huntington, 
western civilization will be increasingly challenged by the Islamic and the Confucian (‘Sinic’) 
civilizations.  Backed by fast economic growth, East and Southeast Asian countries like South 
Korea, Cambodia and Vietnam will behave ever more assertively against the West and 
increasingly side with China because of a shared Confucian heritage which places hierarchical 
relations above the interests of individualism and pluralism. In Huntington’s view, faith in the 
universality of democracy and human rights is no more than a western illusion. Neither does 
he allow much room for the counter tendencies that exist within every religion and culture or 
properly estimate the interaction and cross-fertilization occurring between different cultures. 
In fact, he makes people into the prisoners of their own civilization. Critics point to the danger 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy that may occur when politicians make Huntington’s worldview 
their own and start to act according to his scenarios. Reportedly, the Iranian president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his generals have read Huntington’s book with more than normal 
interest.      
 
In economic history and in the comparative history of science and technology a fierce debate 
is also raging on the significance of the ‘culture’ factor. Here, the parameters are set by Max 
Weber’s classical study on the relation between the ‘Protestant ethic’ and the rise of modern 
capitalism in Western Europe and his comparative-sociological investigations into the 
influence of Confucianism and Taoism in China and of Hinduism and Buddhism in India. 
Each of these religions, according to Weber, is characterized by a specific basic attitude 
towards the world. In Puritan Protestantism, the attitude adopted was one of (rational) mastery 
of the world (Weltbeherrschung), in Confucianism it was (rational) adjustment to the world 
(Weltanpassung), and in Hinduism and Buddhism it was escape from or renunciation of the 
world (Weltflucht) (Weber, 1920-1921). These basic attitudes explain, in a rough and ready 
manner, why the breakthrough to modern capitalism occurred in Western Europe and why 
China and India were condemned to long-term stagnation. The British embryologist and 
historian of science, Joseph Needham, who made an intensive study of the development of 
science and technology in China, held a similar view. Despite China’s impressive 
achievements in both fields, the birth of modern science – in the methodical sense of a tight 
interaction between experimentation and mathematical reasoning – was in Needham’s view 
nonetheless unique to Western Europe. This birth had been made possible by the emergence 
of capitalism, which lowered the traditional social barriers between scholars and skilled 
artisans and thus helped to seal the marriage between mathematics and experiment. More 
recently, however, historians like Roy Bin Wong and Kenneth Pomeranz, who are specialists 
in the comparative economic history of Europe and Asia, distance themselves considerably 
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 from the views of Weber and Needham. They attempt to effect a paradigm shift from a 
‘eurocentric world history’ to a truly ‘global history’ (for a concise and illuminating 
overview, see Johannes, 2006). A first result of their investigations is that Western Europe 
only started to take an economic lead over China around the year 1800 rather than the year 
1500, as thought previously. With this temporal shift popular ‘cultural’ explanations for West-
European supremacy referring to the Renaissance, the Reformation or the Scientific 
Revolution are suddenly declared irrelevant. Moreover, Western Europe’s economic edge, 
which is largely attributed to ‘coal and colonies’, was only a temporary advantage. Viewed in 
the longer run, the period of the economic supremacy of Western Europe was no more than an 
intermezzo in a China-centred world economy. Thus, as a result of this new approach, 
Western Europe’s role in world history has been strongly ‘de-centred’, which accords well 
with the region’s peripheral geographic position on the Eurasian super-continent. A striking 
feature of the new economic historiography is that invoking cultural factors is virtually 
anathema – suggesting such factors for explanatory purposes seems automatically to invite the 
charge of eurocentrism. Not all historians, of course, have joined the bandwagon of this new 
tendency in historiography. Thus David Landes, in his well-known book The Wealth and 
Poverty of Nations, defiantly writes: “If we learn anything from the history of economic 
development, it is that culture makes all the difference. (Here Max Weber was right on.)” 
(Landes, 1998, p. 516).  
 
If this brief tour along a few relevant academic disciplines has taught us anything, it is that the 
study of worldwide cultural differences constitutes a field of inquiry that is full of pitfalls and 
snags. How can we operate cautiously and wisely here?  
 
Intermezzo: religion and bioethics 
 
At first sight it might seem possible to circumvent the problems and controversies 
surrounding the notion of culture as sketched above by focusing on differences between 
religions with regard to the socio-ethical assessment of new developments in biotechnology. 
After all, as the above discussion also shows, many authors spontaneously start to think about 
religious differences when the debate is about ‘worldwide cultural differences’. Why not then 
simply put the problematic concept of culture to one side and focus the attention instead on 
the diverse views of the various religions? Wouldn’t it then be much easier to identify 
dominant values which can be related to the ethical appreciation of particular technological 
developments? We know, for instance, that Catholicism and orthodox Protestantism assume 
the personal character and inherent dignity of human life from the moment of conception and 
for that reason oppose research with human embryonic stem cells. That is a very simple 
relationship. It wouldn’t seem to be too difficult to find similar relationships also with other 
religions like Buddhism and Hinduism. Francis Fukuyama is one who thinks there are indeed 
such relationships to be found. In his book Our Posthuman Future (2002) he suggests an 
important difference between eastern ‘religions’ and Christianity:  
“Asian traditions such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Shinto tend not to make as sharp an 
ethical distinction between mankind and the rest of natural creation as does Christianity. 
That these traditions perceive a continuity between human and nonhuman nature has 
allowed them to be […] more sympathetic to nonhuman animals. But it also implies a 
somewhat lower degree of regard for the sanctity of human life.” (Fukuyama, 2002, 192). 
 
Let us examine by way of example the attitude of Buddhism towards embryonic stem cell 
research.  
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When the New York Times asked Dr. Hwang Woo-Suk, an internationally acclaimed South 
Korean stem cell researcher before he fell from grace in December 2005, about his religious 
background, the latter answered: 
 “I am a Buddhist, and I have no philosophical problem with cloning. As you know, the 
basis of Buddhism is that life is recycled through reincarnation. In some ways, I think, 
therapeutic cloning restarts the cycle of life.” (Dreifus, 2004).  
In South Korea, Dr. Hwang’s research was supported by leading Buddhists like the Venerable 
Ji Kwan, director of the Chogye Order of Korean Buddhism. However, an internationally 
recognized authority on Buddhism, Damien Keown, holds that Hwang’s stem cell research 
conflicts with Buddhist ethics: “Since therapeutic cloning involves experimentation on 
immature human beings, it might be thought clearly contrary to Buddhist ethics” (quoted in 
Frazzetto, 2004). Keown bases his claim on the fact that most Buddhist commentators 
adopted the classical Hindu doctrine that the transmigration of consciousness occurs during 
conception, “and therefore that all abortion incurs the karmic burden of killing”. One would 
think that in the final analysis this is not that much different from the Catholic and orthodox 
Protestant positions on the inadmissibility of abortion and of embryonic stem cell research. 
But Hwang’s Buddhist supporters in South Korea clearly had a different view! 
 
Among Buddhist authorities there is apparently some disagreement about the question of 
whether or not embryonic stem cell research for therapeutic cloning is compatible with 
Buddhist doctrine. In the end, therefore, it may turn out to be far from simple to find an 
unambiguous relationship between a certain creed and a specific ethical standpoint with 
regard to a particular biotechnological development.   
 
On closer inspection the situation is not fundamentally different with regard to the ‘simple’ 
relationship that was claimed to hold between Catholic or orthodox Protestant doctrine and 
the rejection of embryonic stem cell research. Let us confine ourselves to Catholicism. While 
the Roman Catholic Church claims to have consistently opposed abortion from the first 
century, liberal Catholics point at the extensive historical documentation showing the changes 
and reversions in the Church’s vision throughout the centuries with regard to the question of 
when a foetus becomes a person. In the US the new Democratic Speaker of the House, Nancy 
Pelosi, is both Catholic and ‘pro-choice’. Recently she supported a bill aimed to enlarge the 
possibilities for conducting embryonic stem cell research. Thus, here too there is no ‘simple’ 
relationship either.1  
  
Narrowing the focus from cultural differences in a broader sense to differences between 
religions does not provide the desired solution. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In a comment on an earlier version, Huib de Vriend suggested that in the examples given here (and also further 
in the text) other motivations, to wit, (economic and political) interests, rather than different religious (or 
cultural) views are actually of overriding importance. However, we are hesitant to frame the issue in these terms, 
because it would introduce an untenable contrast between religion (culture) and interests. The English social 
historian Edward Thompson once objected strongly to the vulgar Marxist (and vulgar bourgeois) opposition 
between ‘morality’ and ‘interests’: “Historical and cultural materialism cannot explain ‘morality’ away as class 
interests in fancy dress, since the notion that all ‘interests’ can be subsumed in scientifically-determinable 
material objectives is nothing more than utilitarianism’s bad breath. Interests are what interests people, including 
what interests them nearest to heart” (Thompson, 1978, 368).  Seen in this light, interests are not something 
standing outside the sphere of culture, forming as it were the material basis for the ideological (cultural) 
superstructure supposedly resting above it. Hence our reluctance to go along with de Vriend’s suggestion.   
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 A contextual, discourse-analytical approach to ‘cultural differences’ 
 
In view of the huge difficulties with which the investigation of worldwide cultural differences 
is faced, we thought we could make a virtue out of necessity by applying a trick that is often 
used in the social sciences. The trick is that we use the notion ‘culture’, or ‘cultural 
difference’, not as a resource but as a topic. This means that we no longer directly aim at the 
(purported) differences in culture themselves, but turn the discourse about ‘Asian’ and 
‘western’ culture, as it is conducted by those involved, into the object of analysis. To avoid 
that such an exercise degenerates into a rather sterile discourse analysis, we decided to put 
this discourse as much as possible in its socio-economic and political context.  
 
Since the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, ‘Asian values’ are a much debated topic in many 
East and Southeast Asian countries. Out of this debate a long laundry list of purported ‘Asian’ 
(actually mostly Confucian) values can be extracted, such as: familism, filial piety, friendship, 
community spirit, orderliness, harmony and stability, thriftiness, diligence, the importance of 
education, discipline, obedience and respect for seniority and authority. Such a laundry list 
remains problematic, however, especially as a characterization of something as broad as 
‘Asian values’. Scientifically speaking, the whole notion is a non-starter, in view of the 
enormous ethnic, religious, economic and political diversity in Asia, even if we limit 
ourselves to East and Southeast Asia. Remarkably enough, this circumstance in no way 
prevents people from frequently invoking ‘Asian values’. A contextual, discourse-analytical 
approach shows that for the elites in the quickly advancing countries of East and Southeast 
Asia there are many reasons for invoking such values, or in other words that such invocation 
may serve various functions.2 First of all, appeal is made to ‘Asian’ values as a defence 
against the West, especially the US, and more specifically as a defence against western 
criticisms targeting the lack of democracy and violations of human rights. Appeal is also 
made to ‘Asian’ values in order to counter attempts made by international financial 
institutions to impose an Anglo-Saxon model of neo-liberalism and shareholder capitalism. 
Domestically, ‘Asian’ values are promoted as a counterweight to the much-feared increase of 
selfishness among the younger generation; in a few cases also to provide the needed cement 
for a multi-ethnic society (e.g. Malaysia). ‘Asian’ values could also serve as an ideological 
foundation for an enlarged regional economic block (‘ASEAN + 3’), which is currently under 
discussion – this would be comparable to the Jewish-Christian and humanist heritage that 
some Europeans would like to declare the common basis of the EU. Finally, it is striking that 
‘Asian’ values are also used to express an enhanced national confidence. This enhanced 
confidence is only partly based on the economic achievements that have been obtained in the 
past; it is based even more on the passionately held ambition to extensively invest in new 
areas of science and technology and thereby to challenge and compete with the West in 
strategically important fields (techno-nationalism).    
 
The People’s Republic of China occupies a remarkable position in the debate on ‘Asian 
values’, the more so as on closer examination these values are often specified as Confucian 
values. During Mao’s Cultural Revolution Confucius was considered a major enemy of the 
people, whose lingering influence had to be completely eradicated (even before the 
Communist takeover in 1949, however, various Chinese nationalists had already held 
                                                 
2 In a comment on an earlier version, Huib de Vriend remarked that here once again values are attributed or 
interpreted with a view to serving specific interests. We cannot deny that this seems to be the thrust of our 
approach, but nevertheless feel some misgivings about introducing the notion of ‘interests’ as an ultimate 
explanatory category. As theoretical debates in Science and Technology Studies (inter alia) have made clear, 
‘interests’ themselves can be malleable and are often imputed and modulated. See also the previous footnote.   
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Confucianism responsible for the stagnation and decline of the old China). In contemporary 
China, by contrast, the ancient sage has been fully rehabilitated. Recently President Hu Jintao 
proclaimed the ‘harmonious society’ – which is unmistakably a Confucian notion. Chinese 
schools once again pay attention to Confucian teachings and everywhere around the world 
branches of the Confucius Institute are erected to promote the teaching of Chinese language 
and literary studies. The vicissitudes in the official recognition of Confucius – from rejection 
to rehabilitation – raises the question whether Chinese culture has always essentially remained 
Confucian (‘deep down’, as it were) and the events of the Mao era were no more than stirrings 
on the surface, or whether the recent rehabilitation only exemplifies a ‘re-invention of 
tradition’ which actually does not go very deep.3 A discourse-analytical approach must 
withhold from answering this question, however.     
 
In the literature the debate on ‘Asian values’ is invariably related to the question whether they 
are conducive to modernisation and economic development. This seems immediately 
plausible for such values like thriftiness, diligence, the stress on education and discipline, 
which, on closer inspection, look quite similar to typical components of Max Weber’s 
Protestant ethic. Some of the values that are mentioned in the laundry list, however, might 
easily turn from virtues into vices, depending on the circumstances. (According to Keynes, in 
times of under-consumption even thriftiness could become an economic vice.)  During the 
financial crisis which affected Southeast Asia in 1997, for instance, such recognized moral 
pillars of the previous period of economic success like friendship and familism were suddenly 
unmasked as the trailblazers of nepotism and ‘crony capitalism’. The crisis largely passed 
China, but also in this country negative sides of (purportedly) Confucian values may be noted.  
For ancient China Max Weber already held that familism was too strong, in the sense that it 
prevented the formation of a rational bureaucracy. In contemporary China, the respect for 
seniority and authority that is traditionally demanded by Confucianism appears to be a serious 
obstacle for building a modern science system. ‘Peer review’ simply does not work if research 
proposals or manuscripts submitted by older researchers are expected not to be turned down. 
Chinese science failed miserably in 2003 with the identification of the SARS virus, despite 
the availability of the most advanced technical infrastructure. In fact, the corona virus that is 
responsible for SARS had been correctly identified by a young Chinese researcher, but the 
latter thought it ‘disrespectful’ to openly challenge the Chlamydia hypothesis that had been 
propounded by an older colleague. Thus in the end, to the chagrin of the Chinese authorities, 
foreign researchers took the credit for the discovery and the genome sequencing (Enserink, 
2003). Another striking case of a switch from positive to negative appreciation, finally, is 
provided by the hierarchical relations that obtained in Dr. Hwang’s laboratory in Seoul. In 
October 2005, journalist David Klotz considered these hierarchical relations as a key to 
explaining why South Korea had stolen a march in stem cell research on the rest of the world: 
“Confucianism teaches that workplaces should be run as benevolent hierarchies, with younger 
and junior people obediently taking guidance from seniors.” (Plotz, 2005). The report on the 
Hwang affair that the public prosecutor issued in 2006, however, argued that the hierarchy in 
Hwang’s lab was far from benevolent and had in fact proved disastrous in letting the rampant 
perpetration of scientific fraud go unchecked (Wohn and Normile, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 In a comment, Huib de Vriend suggested that such a re-invention of the Confucian tradition would serve a 
specific, political interest. For our reservations about introducing interests as final explanations, see the two 
previous notes.    
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 Cultural differences within ‘the West’ 
 
When global cultural differences in the socio-ethical assessment of biotechnology are the 
topic of discussion, most probably differences between ‘western’ countries on the one hand 
and ‘eastern’ countries on the other will first come to mind and one would be far less, or 
perhaps not all, inclined to think of possible cultural differences within the first group of 
countries. While the Achtergrondstudies Trendanalyse Biotechnologie 2004 does not fail to 
note that there are large differences between Europe and the US “with regard to the valuation 
of technology and most certainly with regard to the societal acceptance of genetic 
modification in agriculture” (COGEM, 2004, p. 26), the report also stresses that “there are 
however also many common values and norms, especially with regard to the ethical 
acceptability of developments in red biotechnology. The question is whether all Asian 
countries share those views. After all, the cultural differences between Europe and the US on 
the one hand and Asia on the other are considerable” (ibid.).  The dominant idea here seems 
to be that Europe and the US are part of a single culture, namely ‘western’ culture, and 
therefore share many norms and values with each other. Possibly, the noted difference with 
regard to the societal acceptance of biotechnology in agriculture is not even interpreted in this 
connection as (the result of) a ‘cultural’ difference.4 
 
In this study we also wanted to scrutinize the often tacit assumption that Europeans and 
Americans essentially share a single culture and that on a global scale the main cultural fault 
lines must be located between East and West. Such an inquiry wouldn’t make much sense if 
we took Huntington’s massive notion of culture as our starting-point – after all, he views 
‘western civilization’ as a fairly monolithic entity. It makes much more sense, however, if we 
take our bearings from the concept of culture with a small c, as it is used in recent cultural 
anthropology.  
 
In her path-breaking, popularly written book Medicine and Culture (1988), American medical 
correspondent Lynn Payer showed almost two decades ago that striking ‘cultural differences’ 
between highly advanced, western countries like the US, the United Kingdom and (West) 
Germany can even be found in a domain where they are least expected, to wit, in modern 
medical science and healthcare. It was notable, for instance, that doctors in the US performed 
six times as many cardiac bypass operations as their colleagues in Great Britain did; that low 
blood pressure was rewarded with reduced insurance rates in the US, whereas it was treated as 
a medical condition in Germany; that French doctors seldom performed hysterectomies, while 
they were one of the most common operations in the US; that German patients regularly 
suffered from ‘Kreislaufstörungen’, which were not even recognized in the other countries. A 
more recent study that also throws light on the role of cultural differences in modern 
healthcare is the publication of the American medical sociologist and bioethicist Raymond de 
Vries, A Pleasing Birth (2005). In this book de Vries, a descendant of Dutch immigrants to 
the US, investigates the cultural backgrounds of the Dutch practice of giving birth at home, 
which in the eyes of most American medical specialists is highly irresponsible and almost 
barbaric (some specialists even consider it a form of ‘child abuse’). While in most decently 
                                                 
4 In his comments on an earlier version of this text, Huib de Vriend once again emphasized the importance of 
distinguishing between ‘values’ and ‘interests’. He argues that what at first sight seems to be a difference in 
values may on closer examination turn out to be different ways of dealing with interests. De Vriend distinguishes 
between a typical American ‘hard-line’ approach and a typical European ‘soft-line’ approach. Our response is 
that differences in the way interests are dealt with may themselves be taken as (manifestations of) differences in 
(political) culture. In order not to prejudge the question of what are cultural differences, we try to avoid equating 
cultural differences a priori with supposedly deeply rooted differences in religious values. 
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developed countries around 99% of all births occur in hospitals, the Dutch still allow around 
30% of their births to take place at home. It seems that they consider the process of giving 
birth to be a natural physiological process rather than a risky medical affair demanding special 
facilities that can only be offered in a modern hospital. Oddly enough, the statistics on 
perinatal deaths do not seem to show a disturbing picture. In general the Dutch are also quite 
content with their practice of giving birth at home: in their eyes the preferred location for a 
birth is the familiar, homely environment. It is rather significant, finally, that the Dutch word 
bevallen both means ‘to give birth’ and ‘to please’. The examples provided by Payer’s and de 
Vries’s work illustrate that also among western countries notable cultural differences can be 
found. One must only be alert to them.     
 
The influence of cultural differences between the US, the UK and Germany and more 
indirectly also the EU on the regulation of (red and green) biotechnology has been explored in 
Sheila Jasanoff’s book Designs on Nature (2005). We therefore decided to devote an entire 
chapter to the analysis of her book. In comparing these different countries Jasanoff tried to 
find differences in political culture or, in other words, differences in national styles of 
regulation. In the area of agricultural biotechnology these national differences ultimately 
resulted in a worldwide polarisation between the ‘product-based’ US system and the ‘process-
based’ EU system. This is an international disagreement of no minor importance, which 
according to Ernestine Meijer and Richard Stewart has even given rise to a “GM Cold War” 
(Meijer and Stewart, 2004). It must be emphasized in this connection  that this is not a dispute 
between East and West, but a dispute within the West (in which ‘eastern’ countries like Japan 
and South Korea side with the EU), which is fought out on a global scale. This example 
shows that the main cultural differences in the assessment of biotechnology do not always 
coincide with the East-West axis. (Even if you don’t want to view the different regulatory 
regimes of the US and the EU as the outcome of different cultures, you would still have to 
admit that some major differences in the assessment of biotechnology do not follow the 
cultural fault lines between East and West.) We have devoted a separate chapter to an analysis 
of the “GM Cold War” in order to examine the tenability of the European regulatory system 
with regard to agricultural biotechnology, to assess the ethical merits of the American refusal 
to introduce mandatory labelling of GM crops and foods, and to inquire how Asian countries 
like India and (especially) China position themselves in this conflict and which considerations 
guide their positioning.  
 
Jasanoff also shows in her book that worlds of difference exist between two European 
countries, Great Britain and Germany, with regard to the regulation of red biotechnology. The 
British style is characterized by a cautious, pragmatic approach that proceeds from case to 
case and invests trust in the competent judgement of trustworthy and authoritative experts. A 
typical product of the British regulatory style is the so-called ‘pre-embryo’, a human foetus 
that is not older than 14 days and that may legally be used in scientific research (which for the 
rest is well-regulated).  The German style, by contrast, is much more strict and restrictive. The 
German constitution assigns full human dignity to the embryo from the moment of 
conception: a legal entity like a ‘pre-embryo’ could not exist in Germany. Prenatal diagnostics 
is also precluded. With IVF all embryos must be implanted into the womb of the woman who 
supplied the eggs (besides, no more than three embryos may be created.) It is therefore legally 
impossible in Germany to create entities with a contestable legal status such as frozen 
embryos. Or as Jasanoff states: “The law acts in effect as an ontological prohibition, keeping 
entities potentially disruptive of the moral order from ever coming into being” (Jasanoff, 
2005b). All this means that in the UK a relatively wide, legally protected niche exists for 
conducting embryonic stem cell research, while in Germany there is virtually no such niche 
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 (an exception has been made for research with imported embryonic stem cells, but this 
exception is once more liable to such restrictions as to be practically negligible).  
 
Different views on the ethical acceptability of embryonic stem cell research as exist between 
‘liberal’ Great Britain and ‘conservative’ Germany obviously affect the common EU policy 
with regard to stem cell research. It also appears that such differences give rise to 
inconsistencies between the various agencies that are involved in the implementation of the 
European Directive for the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, in particular those 
stipulations which exclude certain inventions from being patented on moral grounds, such as 
in article 6.2.c “the use of human embryos for commercial and industrial purposes” (see the 
extensive report by Plomer, 2006).5 There is a major disagreement on the precise scope of this 
stipulation. Please note that the European Union is not confronted here with deviant views on 
moral acceptability held in East Asian countries, but with major ethical differences within its 
own ranks! (In December 2003 China promulgated ethical guidelines for the conduct of 
research with human embryonic stem cells which essentially copy the British guidelines, 
including the age limit of 14 days.)  
 
Techno-nationalism 
 
Many rising countries in Asia strive to free themselves from their dependence on western 
technologies. By investing heavily in science and technology they try to catch up on and even 
outpace advanced countries in the West. A characteristic term that is often used in this 
connection is ‘leapfrogging’, expressing the idea that with a big jump one might become 
equal to or even surpass one’s biggest international rivals. “We are going to leapfrog you and 
you will miss out”, Indian biotechnologists told British Prime Minister Tony Blair when the 
latter visited Bangalore in January 2002. Some countries make a solemn pledge to become, 
within the foreseeable future, “a world leader” or even “the world leader” in particular areas 
of science and technology, e.g. in the domain of embryonic stem cell research or in bio-
nanotechnology. Naturally such ambitions are informed by the pursuit of enhanced national 
power and prestige and are accompanied by strong chauvinistic feelings. National pride will 
be gratified even more if the new technologies that are to be developed receive a specific 
national stamp. There seems to be a strong, as yet unfulfilled hunger after international 
recognition. Bookstores in the South Korean capital Seoul display portraits of previous Nobel 
Prize winners that are followed by a blank spot under a Korean flag and a question mark, 
asking the seemingly all-important question: “Who will be the first Korean winner?” (Kang 
and Segal, 2006). This entire complex of ideas and motives is commonly designated by 
various authors with the term techno-nationalism.   
 
Techno-nationalism is by no means unique for Asian countries. A clear historical example is 
the development of nuclear energy for both military and civilian purposes, by which France 
attempted to underline its independence, power, grandeur and ‘radiance’ (rayonnement) in the 
post-war, de-colonizing world. The special objects of national pride were the gas-graphite 
reactors, a uniquely French design deviating from the dominant American light-water 
reactors. However, when at the end of the 1960s France’s nuclear industry intended to play a 
                                                 
5 In his comments Huib de Vriend adds the observation that the European environmental directives for GMOs 
are also teeming with inconsistencies. Thus in Germany the national legislation implementing the EU directive 
for contained use excludes genetically modified organims obtained by homologous recombination from its 
scope. Furthermore, there are also major differences of interpretation with regard to reference standards for 
establishing the effects of environmental releases. De Vriend suggests that these differences reflect different 
politico-economic interests rather than different moral views.  
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greater commercial role in the world market, the French quietly switched from gas-graphite to 
light-water reactors (Hecht, 1998).6    
 
The strong tendency towards techno-nationalism, which can be observed in East and 
Southeast Asia, also has to do with the dirigiste role played by the government in the process 
of economic development during the post-war period (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore). After successfully building an industrial infrastructure, several Asian countries 
now take up the direct challenge of the West by trying to acquire leading positions in the new 
international knowledge economy. The nationalistic stakes of the game have been raised 
accordingly.  
 
The concept of ‘techno-nationalism’ also provides a key to understand the rise and fall of 
Hwang Woo-Suk and the course of the South Korean stem cell affair. Hwang could grow into 
a national hero, the ‘Pride of Korea’, in the years 2004 and 2005, partly because during his 
career he had always played strategically on patriotic motives. He was supposed to become 
the first Korean Nobel Prize winner for whom the country had already waited for so long. 
Hwang also emphasized on each occasion that specifically “Korean” techniques were applied 
in making cloned embryonic stem cells. Because the national prestige of South Korea was 
directly at stake in his research project, ethical doubts and objections of critical groups could 
be effectively marginalized. Foreigners wondering with amazement about the large number of 
egg cell donors, were being told that South Korean women were driven by altruistic and 
patriotic motives. When ethical and legal irregularities in the recruitment of oocyte donors 
came to light later, criticism was countered with the remark that these practices had to be 
judged by ‘eastern’ and not by ‘western’ criteria. Thus techno-nationalism tends to deploy 
‘Asian values’ instrumentally for the furtherance of its own innovation projects. 
 
The idea of techno-nationalism also sheds an illuminating light on the biotechnology policy of 
the People’s Republic of China. Despite the politics of reform and openness that is officially 
followed since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese political leaders are nonetheless concerned about the 
risk that the country may become too dependent on foreign technologies. Although China has 
invested heavily in science and technology during many years, these investments do not yet 
translate themselves into strong patent positions through which Chinese companies can 
conquer a share in the world market. More recently, a strategic re-emphasis on “independent 
innovation” (zizhu chuangxin) has been announced to enable China to escape from the 
“technology trap”. In the domain of agricultural biotechnology the somewhat paradoxical 
situation obtains that Chinese research institutes have developed many new transgenic crop 
varieties, but that since the approval of Bt cotton in 1997 no new species of transgenic crops 
(as distinct from new varieties of already approved crops, like new varieties of transgenic 
cotton) have been approved for commercial release. Thus, since 2000 several new varieties of 
GM rice are waiting in vain for the green light. China also introduced more strict rules for 
biosafety and for mandatory labelling of GM foods. It seems that the country has one foot on 
the accelerator (higher expenditures on research and development for agricultural 
biotechnology) and one foot on the brake (regulation). Some sceptical commentators explain 
this situation not just from the fears among Chinese leaders to lose possible export markets, 
but also from their alleged conviction that the Chinese biotech sector needs more time to 
                                                 
6 In his comments Huib de Vriend mentions the French scandal with AIDS-infected blood as another example of 
French techno-nationalism. In 1985 the French blood transfusion service refused to use an American AIDS test 
to screen the blood for haemophiliacs and waited until a French test would become available. The consequence 
was that many patients became infected with AIDS and hundreds of them died, according to estimations. These 
deaths could have been prevented if the American test had been used. See Anderson (1991) and Aldhous (1991).  
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 become equal to the challenge of competing with foreign rivals. In other words, regulation is 
claimed to be used as a means to thwart foreign biotech companies. In our view, however, this 
is only part of the explanation. There is also much uncertainty about the possible reaction of 
the Chinese population to the commercialisation of transgenic rice; moreover, there is also an 
increasingly weighty group of persons within the research and government apparatus who 
value a careful and strict assessment of the environmental and health risks of GMOs. The 
bureaucratic position of this group has been strengthened through bilateral and multilateral 
contacts with experts from the EU occurring within the framework of ‘capacity building’ that 
is provided by the Cartagena Protocol.   
 
In the age of globalization there is a permanent temptation to turn inwards and to strive even 
more vigorously for independence. Yet this may ultimately prove to be a self-defeating 
strategy. As Charles Leadbeater and James Wilsdon remark in their final report for the Atlas 
of Ideas project: 
 “Techno-nationalists see innovation as a means to promote independence. Yet investing 
more in science-based innovation – as Korea found through the Hwang affair – requires 
greater openness to foreign ideas and international scrutiny” (Leadbeater and Wilsdon, 
2007, 39). 
Leadbeater and Wilsdon argue that European countries should consider the scientific and 
technological advance of East and Southeast Asia as an opportunity rather than a threat, and 
should respond creatively rather than in a constrained manner by intensifying contacts with 
this region as much as possible, in order to prevent a reversion to an extreme techno-
nationalism on both sides. Innovation is not a ‘zero-sum’ game, in which the gains of one 
party are the losses of the other. The rise of China and other Asian countries therefore offers 
opportunities that may challenge European creativity and ingenuity. In this way a truly 
‘cosmopolitan innovation’ may be encouraged. 
 
The argument of the ‘Wild East’ 
 
Policy-makers in Europe and the US often look with some jealousy to the recent rise of 
biotechnological research in East and Southeast Asian countries. The suspicion is that these 
countries can steal a march on western countries precisely because they are less hindered by 
moral scruples or fears about the possible consequences of new technologies for society or the 
environment. The conclusion that is usually drawn from this diagnosis is that for competitive 
reasons western countries cannot avoid to lower their ethical, social and environmental 
standards. James Wilsdon and his colleagues of the Atlas of Ideas project coined the fitting 
expression ‘the argument of the Wild East’ for this type of argumentation. In their project 
description they paraphrased it as follows:  
 “The rise of Asian science is sometimes used as an argument for a more relaxed stance on 
social, ethical or environmental concerns in Europe – the suggestion being that squeamish 
Europeans may lose out at the expense of the ‘wild East’.” (Demos, 2006). 
A specific variety of this type of argument is that the lack of democracy and of an active ‘civil 
society’ in authoritarian states such as China will lead political leaders to quickly approve 
new transgenic crops without paying too much attention to possible environmental and health 
hazards. In this connection Jennifer Zhao and Peter Ho speak of the scenario of the 
‘developmental risk society’ (Zhao and Ho, 2005). 
 
The argument of the ‘Wild East’ is used in various guises in several areas of science and 
technology, like agricultural biotechnology (Zhao and Ho, 2005), embryonic stem cell 
research (Dennis, 2002) and nanotechnology (Jones, 2005). In 2002 Francis Fukuyama also 
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held that morally dubious developments in the area of the life sciences are expected to come 
first of all from Asia: 
 “If there is any region in the World that is likely to opt out of an emerging consensus on 
the regulation of biotechnology, it is Asia. A number of Asian countries either are not 
democracies or lack strong domestic constituencies opposed to certain types of 
biotechnology on moral grounds. Asian countries like Singapore and South Korea have the 
research infrastructure to compete in biomedicine, and strong economic incentives to gain 
market share in biotechnology at the expense of Europe and North America. In the future, 
biotechnology may become an important fracture line in world politics.” (Fukuyama, 2002, 
193).  
 
As James Wilsdon and his colleagues advocate “socially responsive and accountable forms of 
science and innovation” (the special hallmark of the British think tank Demos), they are 
bound to reject the conclusion that is usually drawn from the argument of the ‘Wild East’. 
They therefore go at some length to address this argument head-on. Their first counter 
argument states that the argument actually amounts to a counsel of despair and calls for a race 
to the bottom with regard to ethical or environmental standards and the protection of labour 
rights. Secondly, they contest the assumption that moral concerns or concerns about social 
and environmental consequences are unique to Europeans and Americans and foreign to 
Asians: “It is also misleading, not to mention deeply patronising, to pretend that people in 
India and China don’t share many of these same concerns – albeit expressed in a variety of 
ways” (Wilsdon et al., 2005, 59). Finally, they argue that moral concerns and social and 
environmental requirements are not necessarily obstacles to economic development; in fact, 
ethical ‘upgrading’ can sometimes deliberately be used as a promising innovation strategy 
(Demos, 2006).7  
 
Using the case of the South Korean Hwang affair described in chapter 3, we can add a few 
additional counter arguments. As a matter of fact, before Hwang’s humiliating downfall in 
mid-December 2005 and the full disclosure of the extent of his scientific fraud, the example 
of South Korean stem cell research was often cited in the international media to support some 
version of the ‘argument of the Wild East’. Thus in October 2005 journalist David Plotz 
raised the question “Why South Korea leads the world in stem-cell research”, and his first 
answer was: “For starters, the country is not preoccupied with moral questions about the 
beginning of life…” (Plotz, 2005). No later than December 1, 2005 (that is to say, after it had 
become clear that legal and ethical irregularities had occurred in the donation of egg cells, but 
before the exposure of Hwang’s scientific fraud), the British magazine The Economist still 
issued an editorial in which it broke a lance for South Korean stem cell research. The 
magazine dismissed the uproar over Hwang’s ethical lapses as overblown and exaggerated. 
Thanks to a more relaxed attitude of the Korean public, in contrast to the moral “agonizing” 
                                                 
7 In his comments to an earlier version of this text Huib de Vriend mentioned the example of the cooperative 
venture supported by the Innovation Network, TransForum, Agro & Groen and some Dutch firms to realize an 
agropark on Chongming island in the mouth of the Yangtze River near Shanghai, where sustainable agriculture, 
recreation and education will be combined. The critical question still to be answered is whether this project will 
abide by Dutch or (much lower) Chinese standards for animal welfare. The Advisory Societal Council 
(Maatschappelijke Adviesraad) of TransForum urges to follow the Dutch standards. Wilsdon and Keeley  notice 
the ethically questionable practice of some western pharmaceutical companies to ‘outsource’ their animal testing 
operations to China in response to attractive offers made by Chinese companies, in order to evade regulatory 
hurdles and public opposition at home. They seem to suggest that ‘socially responsible’ business companies will 
eventually rise to the challenge: “Global businesses are well used to the challenges of managing supply chains in 
a socially responsible way. As R & D networks become increasingly global, these same challenges will apply to 
the supply chain of research” (Wilsdon and Keeley, 2007, 51).  
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 about stem cells in the West, so the British magazine argued, Dr. Hwang had been able to 
forge ahead and to steal a decisive march on his western rivals. Americans and Europeans 
were subtly advised to set their moral objections aside for the sake of greater economic 
growth. It was at any event inappropriate for the West to attempt to impose its values on other 
cultures (The Economist, 2005).  
 
The wisdom of hindsight allows us to deal a devastating blow to this entire argumentation.  
What at first sight seemed an impressive headstart, ultimately turned out to be not a headstart 
at all! Hwang had led the entire world and his own country astray for hundreds of millions of 
dollars. With hindsight, ignoring ethical concerns does not seem to be the best recipe for 
achieving quick scientific successes either. Whoever is ready to cut ethical corners, the 
Hwang scandal suggests, might also be willing to compromise on the demands of scientific 
integrity and accuracy. Or as an editorial in Nature stated: “Sound ethics and good research 
practice go hand in hand” (Nature Editorial, 2006).  
 
It would be wide off the mark, moreover, to characterize South Korea as an “ethically 
undeveloped country” (Bogner and Menz, 2006). After the birth of cloned sheep Dolly was 
made public in 1997, an intense debate was held in South Korea about the ethical aspects of 
reproductive and therapeutic cloning in humans. Protestant and Catholic organisations, 
representing together about 12 million (9 and 3 million, respectively) out of a total of 48 
million inhabitants of South Korea (more than the 10 million Buddhists), urged a total ban on 
cloning. The Korean Bioethics Association was also active in this field, and special legislation 
was being prepared. In December 2003 the Bioethics and Biosafety Act was passed; with 
some delay it was to enter into force on January 1, 2005. However, thanks to support from 
leading politicians and privileged access to higher civil servants, Hwang was able to secure an 
exemption for his research team. The supposed national importance of his stem cell research 
and the inflated expectations about prospective clinical applications further helped to silence 
critics. Partly because of Hwang’s unassailable status as a national hero the legally required 
review of his research activities by medical-ethical committees was no more than a formality. 
On the occasion of the opening of the World Stem Cell Hub on October 19, 2005, South 
Korean President Roo Moo-hyun evinced a quite remarkable conception of his task: 
“Politicians have a responsibility to manage bioethical controversies not to get in the way of 
this outstanding research and progress”. In short, there were surely moral doubts and concerns 
about Hwang’s stem cell research in South Korea, but these were eventually marginalized 
under the influence of the rising (techno)nationalistic mood. This was not only true for 
principled objections against therapeutic cloning as such, but also for critical questions and 
doubts about the ways egg cell donors were being recruited and informed.  
 
When in the fall of 2005 Hwang’s research was criticized (once again) because of 
irregularities in the egg donation process, various South Korean researchers, bioethicists and 
authorities countered the international criticism almost instinctively by invoking their own 
‘Asian values’. The spokesperson of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Choi Hee-joo, 
declared that “the donations were made according to values consistent with Eastern culture, 
and shouldn’t be looked at from the standpoint of Western culture.” (The Hindu, 2005). We 
have found out that this strategy of “playing the culture card” was used remarkably often to 
ward off external criticism. Apparently, a strong techno-nationalism is easily tempted to use 
‘Asian values’ in a rather instrumental way. In the situation under consideration, however, 
this strategy was not very convincing. After all, also when judged by South Korean criteria, 
the recruitment of egg cell donors was morally dubious and in many respects illegal (e.g. in 
those cases where commercial remunerations were provided). The internationally recognized 
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principle of ‘informed consent’, which was regularly violated in the South Korean stem cell 
project, is also endorsed in the case law of the South Korean Supreme Court.  
 
The South Korean stem cell affair furthermore provides a graphic illustration of the 
contradictions in which an extreme techno-nationalism inevitably becomes entangled. The 
aim was to enhance the national power, competitive capacity and prestige of South Korea 
through embryonic stem cell research, but the aspiration also was to become the centre of 
worldwide stem cell research and thus to attract foreign researchers (through the so-called 
World Stem Cell Hub). It is hardly realistic, however, to expect that those same foreign 
researchers will still gleefully participate when it turns out that the rights of South Korean egg 
cell donors have not been fully respected. The alleged ‘Asian values’ do not provide a solid 
foundation for international scientific cooperation.   
 
In the aftermath of the Hwang scandal the rules around egg donation have been tightened and 
more precisely articulated, both internationally and within South Korea itself. The 
international scientific community dealing with embryonic stem cell research engaged in self-
regulation to establish the minimal ethical ground rules for those countries and regions that 
are sufficiently ‘permissive’ with regard to the moral status of the embryo to allow this kind 
of research (see Hinxton Group, 2006). The rules also call upon the editors of scientific 
journals to help enforce these minimal ethical rules.8 Thus, the level of the international 
playing field for conducting this type of research has been heightened. A race to the bottom 
has not occurred. 
 
Bioethics between relativism and universalism 
 
There is increasing attention on a worldwide scale to ‘bioethical’ issues in the life sciences. 
Everywhere committees are being installed which have to judge the acceptability of research 
projects and technological applications. American bioethics, especially the ‘principlist’ model 
of Beauchamp and Childress with its four principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, justice 
and respect for autonomy, has become an important export product in this connection. The 
adherents of this form of ethics claim its universal validity and hence its suitability to guide 
moral deliberation in different cultural contexts (Beauchamp, 2003; Gillon, 2003). However, 
this claim to universality has also earned a lot of criticism from the representatives of other 
ethical schools and from cultural anthropologists and other social scientists.   
 
As the four principles of Beauchamp and Childress have been formulated in fairly abstract 
terms and thus require further specification in order to be translated to concrete situations, 
their model offers a large measure of flexibility for application in widely different cultural 
                                                 
8 Nature’s chief editor Philip Campbell also signed the Consensus Statement of the Hinxton Group. This 
implicitly answers the question that was raised in the Achtergrondstudies Trendanalyse Biotechnologie 2004: 
“Are journals and editors allowed to impose their ethical views on others who from a different cultural 
background endorse an entirely different ethics? What would that mean for the development of science? 
However, it appears that these attempts are just rearguard actions. Given current global trends, the imposition of 
ethical values on other parts of the world is at any rate impossible” (COGEM, 2005, 26). It seems to us that the 
use of ethical standards by journal editors is described here rather tendentiously as the “imposition” of ethical 
values on other parts of the world. One would think that if South Koreans or Chinese want to publish their work 
in Nature or Science, they will have to conform to the standards (including ethical standards) employed by those 
journals, or else look for other publication outlets. It would therefore surely have some effect if leading 
international journals followed a strict ethical course. The COGEM Achtergrondstudies appear to depart from a 
hardly tenable cultural relativism, which condones the “entirely different ethics” which people are said to 
endorse “from their own cultural background”. Arguably, the case could be made that it is rather this view 
which, “given current global trends”, represents an atavism.    
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 contexts. While universalistic in tenor, it also offers wide scope for cultural variations in its 
concrete elaboration. According to Raanan Gillon, ‘principlist’ ethics thus steers clear from 
the Scylla of moral relativism (each form of ethics is equally good as every other) and the 
Charybdis of moral imperialism (this is the only correct way to do ethics) (Gillon, 2003).  
 
With some charity it is not too difficult to recognize in non-western cultural traditions the four 
basic moral principles of Beauchamp and Childress. Thus those principles can also be 
extracted, albeit with some effort, from traditional Confucian ethics (Tsai, 2005). However, 
the critical comment needs to be added here that in this ethics the principle of beneficence 
takes precedence, while in the practice of American bioethics a near-absolute priority is 
granted to the principle of respect for autonomy. This merely shows, according to the 
American communitarian ethicist Daniel Callahan, the individualist slant of ‘principlist’ 
bioethics: 
 “Autonomy is […] given a place of honour because the thrust of individualism, whether 
from the egalitarian left or the market-oriented right, is to give people maximum liberty in 
devising their own lives and values” (Callahan, 2003, 289) 
 
Some hold that it is precisely this individualist thrust which tends to make the idea of 
autonomy or self-determination less applicable to other cultures. The Taiwanese bioethicists 
Michael Cheng-tek Tai and Chung Seng Lin, for example, state that the principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence are by no means foreign to Confucian ethics, but that the 
latter has an entirely different view of the meaning of autonomy: 
 “Confucian ethics has a very different understanding of […] self determination. In a 
society where the family is the centre of all attention, autonomy becomes collective rather 
than individualistic. The centre of each person’s life is not himself or herself but the family. 
[…] Although a family is composed of many members, community starts not with the 
individual but with the unit of the family, which becomes the base of a macro-vision of 
Confucian tradition for a harmonious universe. Each person exists for the greater common 
good, for the greater good of the community of many different individuals.” (Tai and Lin, 
2001, 52).  
We wonder, however, whether this rather old-fashioned and conservative formulation is still 
in conformity with the moral views currently prevailing in Taiwan and other East Asian 
countries. Can individuals in a modern knowledge society plausibly be expected to efface 
themselves for the greater good of the family and ultimately of the community and the 
universe? It would also seem that such a view might easily be abused by authoritarian regimes 
to enforce obedience and conformity.   
 
A more sophisticated view on Confucianism can be found with Tu Wei-ming, professor of 
Chinese history and philosophy at Harvard University. Tu attempts to extract the core values 
from the Confucian tradition and to make them relevant for present-day debates on ethics and 
politics in both East and West. Confucianism, Tu argues, rejects the idea that man is a free 
and autonomous individual by nature, but rather starts from a relational conception of the 
human person. The ‘self’ is a centre of relationships and has to develop itself in and through 
these relationships. According to Tu, this view is eminently compatible with the recognition 
of human rights (Tu, 1998). What is at stake here is the recognition not only of ‘negative’ 
rights, but also of ‘positive’ rights. Tu reproaches libertarian philosophers like Robert Nozick 
to have such a one-sided image of man as to value only rights of the first kind. Confucianism 
gives pride of place to civil and political as well as to economic and social human rights 
(Hudelson, 2005-2006). Many contemporary East and Southeast Asian countries by contrast, 
while invoking their own ‘Asian values’, tend to play off the latter against the former.   
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A large part of the criticism on ‘principlist’ bioethics is not only addressed to the one-sided 
emphasis given to the principle of respect for autonomy, but also targets the way this principle 
is put into practice. In medical therapy and in medical research it is embodied in procedures 
for obtaining ‘informed consent’ from the patient or the research subject. Many social science 
studies point at the serious shortcomings and limitations of such procedures. Often patients 
are not adequately informed about possible effects of the proposed interventions or prove 
unable to correctly interpret the information offered (Corrigan, 2003). Of course, a defective 
practice does not in itself prove that the underlying principle is at fault. After all, ‘informed 
consent’ means more than that the patient simply puts his signature on the consent form. The 
observed shortcomings do however raise questions about the implementation of informed 
consent procedures in non-western countries. After all, if the application of these procedures 
turns out to be so problematic already in western countries, then how about their use in areas 
in which the basic ethical principle of respect for autonomy hardly had a chance until now to 
take root in the indigenous culture?  
 
Internationally, there is also discussion about the question of whether the notion of informed 
consent should be interpreted in strictly individualist terms or whether it may be stretched in 
such a way as to meet certain culturally anchored needs and practices. A pertinent example is 
the multi-staged procedure followed in a research project on malaria that was carried out in 
Mali. First the village elders were approached, then focus group discussions were held with 
the heads of families, next with the mothers of the children that were to be involved in the 
study, and finally oral consent was asked from individual families to participate (Doumbo, 
2005). It would seem that this is an acceptable, culturally adequate modification of the usual 
procedures of informed consent. 
 
Within the framework of the controversial Human Genome Diversity Project, the idea of 
group consent was developed in order to persuade ‘indigenous’ peoples all over the world 
into cooperation (Greely, 2001). The idea has even been elaborated into a detailed Model 
Ethical Protocol, but this proved not enough to save the international research project – 
largely because there was too much distrust and suspicion among the representatives of 
‘indigenous’ communities about the aims of the project (Reardon, 2005; Wasserloos, 2005; 
Van den Belt, 2006). The ethical innovation of group consent has triggered a fundamental 
debate about its legitimacy, which largely followed the familiar dividing lines between 
liberalism and communitarianism (Wasserloos, 2005). It is quite remarkable, by the way, that 
the Human Genome Diversity Project failed to take off almost everywhere except in China, 
where the first results of the genome diversity studies have already come in (Cavalli-Sforza, 
1998; Chu et al. 1998). We do not know the reasons for this contrast, but they may have to do 
with the stronger influence of the central government. The article by Chu et al. only contains 
the perfunctory remark in its conclusion that “[i]nformed consent was obtained for the newly 
collected Chinese samples” (Chu et al., 1998). 
 
In a certain sense, the debate on the alleged universal character of bioethics in general and the 
principle of respect for autonomy in particular has become largely ‘academic’. Pragmatically 
speaking, there is nowadays something like a ‘really existing bioethical universalism’, as 
various East Asian countries have committed themselves to international treaties like the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). The principle of ‘informed 
consent’ is also endorsed by the Chinese authorities.9 Moreover, they have formulated 
                                                 
9 In his comments on an earlier version of this text, Huib de Vriend expressed his doubts about the underlying 
motivation of the Chinese authorities. Did they endorse the principle of informed consent to meet the wishes of 
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guidelines for conducting embryonic stem cell research that closely resemble the official 
British guidelines (Salter et al., 2006).10 Good intentions are surely there when it comes to 
taking ethical principles in biomedical research seriously. However, the big problem concerns 
the implementation of these intentions (Hennig, 2006). In East and Southeast Asia, especially 
in China, a long learning process has still to be gone through, during which severe 
derailments and excesses cannot be excluded beforehand.   
 
Yet it would not be very productive to passively wait with agony in our hearts until morally 
dubious developments in the domain of biotechnology will arrive on our shores from the East. 
James Wilsdon and James Keeley of the British Atlas of Ideas project make a strong case for 
“a more proactive UK or European stance on issues of ethics and governance”, in line with 
their general plea for intensifying contacts (scientific and other) with East Asia (Wilsdon and 
Keeley, 2007, 50). Thus more and better alliances must be forged between scientists, ethicists 
and policy-makers from here and from over there. Of course, many things are already being 
done in this respect. Within the ‘capacity building’ framework provided by the Cartagena 
Protocol, European and Chinese experts cooperate on the regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology. There is also Chinese-European cooperation vis-à-vis the ‘ethical governance’ 
of biomedical research within the BIONET programme coordinated by Nikolas Rose. In 
September 2006, the Science and Development Network and the British Council organised a 
two-day workshop about ‘Reporting bioethics’ in Beijing for Chinese journalists. Such 
initiatives are very important if we want to prevent that East Asians take recourse to an 
intensified techno-nationalism and entrench themselves in the bulwark of their own ‘Asian 
values’. One thing that is notable is that the Netherlands does not lead the way or even 
participate in such initiatives. Has our traditionally outward-oriented country turned inward 
and secluded itself off from the rest of the world?      
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 Chapter 2 
 
Monsters, boundary work and framing: 
Biotechnology from an anthropological perspective 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sheila Jasanoff’s book Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United 
States (Jasanoff, 2005a) is a comparative study on biotechnology policy in the USA, the UK 
and Germany (and also the European Union) during the last three decades aimed at showing 
the enduring influence of some salient differences in political cultures between those 
countries. She herself calls it a “multi-sited ethnography”. The content of the book, however, 
is not easy to summarize, because its extensive argument moves on different levels and is 
rather complex. Part of the complexity derives from the difficulty of including the European 
Union, alongside the UK and Germany, into the comparison. But there is also a more 
analytical complexity engendered by the attempt to combine key concepts from a variety of 
approaches, like ‘framing’, ‘boundary-work’ and ‘co-production’. It is also notable that the 
reviews of her book do not attempt to reconstruct the full range of Jasanoff’s argument, but 
concentrate on a few specific issues that the reviewer deems most salient (Cantley, 2005; 
Kinderleder, 2005; Millstone, 2005).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a more extensive and thorough-going analysis of 
Jasanoff’s monograph. As Professor of Science and Technology Studies at Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and trained in law at Harvard Law 
School, she enjoys high standing among lawyers, sociologists and political scientists studying 
biotechnology policy in different countries. Getting to grips with Jasanoff’s work in this area, 
however, also entails that we have go somewhat deeper into the theoretical issues raised by 
her approach. This will make the character of the present chapter rather different from that of 
the chapters to follow. It is emphatically not our aim in this chapter to set out a theory that 
will serve as our framework in the next chapters. We are only interested in discussing 
Jasanoff’s comparative analysis of biotechnology policy and making it more accessible. It just 
so happens that her substantive contributions are wrapped up in a quite formidable theoretical 
garb.    
 
In order to get a stronger hold on Jasanoff’s complex and somewhat baroque argument, we 
piece it apart and pin it down on a number of more or less distinct ‘theses’. The following 
main ‘theses’ can be extracted from her book:  
• The co-production thesis: “Natural and social orders […] are produced at one and the 
same time – or, more precisely, coproduced” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 19). 
• The framing thesis: “[E]vents do not in and of themselves dictate the pathways along 
which public responses will move. [They] first have to be set within an interpretive 
context that allows them to function as a starting point for deliberation or concerted 
action” (Jasanoff, 2005ba, 24). 
• The ‘monster’ creation thesis: Modern biotechnology creates ‘ontological novelties’ 
or ‘monsters’ that challenge existing natural and social orders: “Genetic engineering 
threatens or calls into question many of the categories that have been accepted as 
foundational in the ordering of societies, both ancient and modern” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 
26). “[B]iological sciences and their applications have brought about ontological 
changes and reclassifications in the world, producing new entities and new ways of 
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understanding old ones. Such changes entail a fundamental rethinking of the identity 
of the human self and its place in larger natural, social, and political orders.” (Jasanoff, 
2005a, 6-7). 
• The ‘boundary-work’ thesis: New biotechnological entities require extensive work by 
legal institutions, ethics review boards and various other social agencies in order to fit 
them into existing classifications and give them a recognized and acceptable place in 
the natural and social orders: “A major function of policymaking for the life sciences 
is to create and maintain boundaries that correspond to people’s preexisting ethical 
and social sensibilities” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 26). 
• The thesis of enduring differences in national political cultures: The USA, Great 
Britain and Germany exhibit enduring differences in their policies of regulating 
biotechnology due to the relative ‘stickiness’ of early dominant framings or 
‘controlling narratives’ of biotechnology as product (USA), as process (UK), and as 
socio-political programme (Germany) (Jasanoff, 2005a, 42-67; 274-280). These 
different framings are closely correlated with varying degrees of tolerance for 
‘monsters’, ranging from encouragement (USA) through permission (UK) to 
prohibition (Germany) (Jasanoff, 2005b, 151).  
• The thesis of the political subservience of bioethics: “[T]he agendas of politics [shape] 
the use of bioethics more than the other way around.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 201)  
• The ‘nation-building’ thesis: “[P]olicies for the life sciences have been incorporated 
into ‘nation-building’ projects that seek to reimagine what the nation [or the European 
Union] stands for.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, back flap; compare Jasanoff 2005a, p. 7).   
• The ‘ civic epistemology’ thesis: “[D]emocratic theory in the era of the knowledge 
society must actively take on board the involvement of citizens in the production, use, 
and interpretation of knowledge for public purposes” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 41). 
 
Co-production 
 
In an earlier publication, Jasanoff presented the following ‘definition’ of ‘co-production’: 
“Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we 
know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in 
which we choose to live in it. Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once 
products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot function 
without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social supports. 
Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality. It both embeds 
and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments 
and institutions – in short, in all building blocks of what we term the social. The same can 
be said even more forcefully of technology.” (Jasanoff, 2004a, pp. 2-3) 
She is reluctant to speak of a theory of co-production, but prefers to refer to it as an idiom or 
framework (Jasanoff, 2004a, 3). In her opinion, it is a framework that is rapidly gaining 
ground in contemporary Science and Technology Studies (STS), particularly because it allows 
avoiding the one-sided positions of both social determinism on the one hand and natural 
determinism (or scientific and technological determinism) on the other.11 The co-production 
framework consistently refuses to grant causal primacy to either science/technology (or 
nature) or society. Other constructivist authors express the same idea in terms of the ‘mutual 
shaping’, ‘mutual constitution’ or ‘co-evolution’ of science/technology and society. 
                                                 
11 One of Jasanoff’s students, Jenny Reardon, used the co-production framework in her study on the vicissitudes 
of the Human Genome Diversity Project; see Reardon, 2005. For a critical review, see van den Belt (2006). 
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 There are different formulations of the co-production framework. Exactly what is said to be 
‘co-produced’ may vary: sometimes it is the natural and the social order (Jasanoff, 2005a, 19), 
or the natural and the moral order, sometimes it is nature and society, or nature and culture, or 
science and society (Jasanoff, 2004b, 17), or any elements belonging to the one or the other 
domain, such as “political practices, social norms, and ideas of nationhood”, on the one hand, 
and “new biological concepts and constructs”, on the other (Jasanoff, 2005b, 275). For STS 
researchers who follow the ‘co-production’ perspective, neither the natural nor the social 
world is a self-contained, ready-made world with fixed divisions and borders. Hence there is 
frequent use of phrases like “the interpenetration of science and technology with cultural 
expressions and social authority” (Jasanoff, 2004b, 18), “the complicated interplay of the 
cognitive, the institutional, the material and the normative dimensions of society” (Jasanoff, 
2004b, 17) or “complex entanglements among knowledge, technical capability, politics, and 
culture” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 290). 
One might think that the expression ‘natural order’ is crucially ambiguous: does it refer to our 
views and perceptions of the natural world, in other words to the ‘order’ that we ourselves 
construct through our classifications and theories, or to the external world to which such 
conceptual structures are thought to refer? The answer is that many (most?) STS researchers 
are not willing to make a distinction between knowledge and the external world. In STS 
analyses the two are most often conflated. When natural scientists succeed in getting their 
views and theories accepted among their colleagues, they ipso facto, according to this view, 
enrich the world with the new kinds of entities that are postulated in those theories, such as 
atoms, molecules, microbes, genes, black holes, quarks, gravity waves, global warming, or the 
hole in the ozone layer etcetera. STS students will say that science and technology (or 
‘technoscience’, for short) are engaged in ‘world-making’ and are continuously proliferating 
new ‘entities’. This is held to be true for natural entities like genes, viruses and bacteria as 
well as for human-made artifacts like electron tubes, transgenic organisms or cloned stem 
cells. (We have elsewhere criticized the refusal of ‘radical’ constructivists like Bruno Latour 
and Karin Knorr-Cetina to make a principled distinction here; see van den Belt, 2003).           
 
Loose talk of the ‘co-production’ of science and society, or the natural and the social order, 
might also suggest the idea that these two different spheres are each time (co)produced anew 
from scratch, as if history starts de novo on each new day of the calendar. This is obviously 
very implausible. Jasanoff therefore reminds us that in practice many STS researchers take for 
granted that “in most exercises of world-making, neither science nor society begins with a 
clean slate but operates always against the backdrop of an extant order […]” (Jasanoff, 2004b, 
19). Yet it remains tricky how much of an ‘extant’ order may be assumed by STS analysts as 
pre-given, precisely because of their ‘metaphysical’ commitment to a (natural and social) 
world that is not ready-made but always in flux. After all, a central criticism of the ‘co-
productionists’ vis-à-vis the social determinism of the adherents of the Strong Programme is 
that the latter presumes a pre-existing social world with a fixed cast of actors, each equipped 
with a fully formed identity and with obvious interests in the issues at stake. Take a large 
portion of the extant social world for granted, however, and you risk falling back to an 
allegedly obsolete social (or cultural) determinism!  
 
The dilemma manifests itself in the way Jasanoff takes issue with and distances herself from 
approaches in political science that focus on ‘national styles of regulation’ to explore and 
understand persistent differences in policymaking concerning environmental problems in 
various countries. In her view, “explanations based on variables such as national styles of 
regulation run into difficulty by failing to ask why some social structures or processes are 
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seen as more deterministic than others. […]. Social structures […] are not immutable; they 
change in the very process of enabling actors to use them” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 20). Jasanoff 
therefore opts for a “more fluid way of thinking about ‘social kinds’ such as the state” 
(Jasanoff, 2005a, 19). Yet in her own work she also sets out to highlight some persistent 
differences in biotech policy between the USA, Great Britain and Germany (and the European 
Union), which she attempts to understand in terms of the ‘stickiness’ of frames (Jasanoff, 
2005a, 274 ff).12 Why would her explanatory attempt be invulnerable to the type of criticism 
she levels at other policy analysts?   
 
Framing and monster creation 
 
Framing is a well-known theme in many disciplinary approaches. Jasanoff’s colleague 
Herbert Gottweis also adopts a ‘framing’ perspective in his comparative study of stem cell 
politics in the USA and Germany: 
“Phenomena such as human embryonic stem cells are not simply ‘objective data’ for 
regulatory decision making. Rather, for human embryonic stem cells to become relevant in 
the policy process, they need to be transformed from something that is ‘out there’ into 
something that is socially and politically signified.” (Gottweis, 2002, 446). 
Jasanoff gives the example of the birth of Dolly the sheep, the first cloned mammal, and the 
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York as events that first had to be ‘framed’ in a 
certain way before they could function as a trigger for collective action:  
“[S]o Dolly’s birth announcement became a challenge for ‘bioethics’, and the September 
11, 2001, attacks were cast as grounds for a ‘war on terror’” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 24). 
In Jasanoff’s view, frames are not free-floating; they are culturally conditioned and 
intersubjectively held and embed themselves in social behaviour and material culture. They 
thus strongly influence what people perceive as ‘real’ in the world around them. Frames are 
also discernable in the regulation of science and technology. They can be seen as “a kind of 
story-telling by communities situated in particular times and places who are attempting to 
deal with unsettling and disruptive changes in their environments” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 23).13 
 
Biotechnology (taken in a broad sense) can be seen as culturally ‘unsettling’ or ‘disruptive’. It 
is characteristic of this ‘technoscience’ that it continually places into the world new entities 
which from a cultural point of view may be described as ‘monsters’, that is to say, hybrids of 
nature and culture that have not yet found a recognized place within existing frames of 
reference and systems of classification.14 It is precisely because of its “zeal for hybridity”, 
according to Jasanoff, that biotechnology inevitably requires “ontological ordering” (Jasanoff, 
2005b, 151). Categories and classifications that are called into question by biotechnology 
“include the fundamental divisions between nature and culture, moral and immoral, safe and 
                                                 
12 Compare: “Public responses to biotechnology are […] shown to be embedded within robust and coherent 
political cultures rather than being ad hoc and contingent expressions of concern that vary unpredictably from 
issue to issue” (Jasanoff, 2005b, 141; my italics).  
13 Compare the following passage: “It is widely recognized by now that public problems do not simply appear on 
policy agendas, as if placed there through the direct imprint of exogenous events. Rather, they are framed in 
particular ways by cultural commitments that predispose societies, no less than the individuals within them, to fit 
their experiences into specific types of causal narratives.” (Jasanoff, 2005b, 141).   
14 The terminology of ‘monsters’ is not much used in the book Designs on Nature, but it is used in a later essay 
(Jasanoff, 2005b). Here “monsters” are defined as “entities that threaten disorder by crossing the settled 
boundaries of nature or society” (ibid., p. 151). This concept is also very prominent in the book, even if the term 
‘monsters’ may be conspicuously absent.  
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risky, god-given and human-made” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 26).15 Jasanoff uses the following set 
of examples to illustrate the idea: 
“We can import genes from spinach into pigs, from jellyfish into rabbits, and from fish into 
tomatoes; the technique of xenotransplantation allows cells from genetically altered pigs or 
chimpanzees to be inserted into biologically compatible humans. We can contemplate 
altering the human genome so as to produce enhanced human beings, with characteristic 
that today would be regarded as out of the ordinary, even superhuman. What, then, is nature 
and what is being human?” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 26).  
Elsewhere she elaborates the same theme with examples derived from assisted reproduction 
(IVF) and cloning (Jasanoff, 2005b).     
 
It must be emphasized that the term ‘monster’ does not necessarily convey a negative 
connotation. Admittedly, there are some authors who use the term in a pejorative sense, but 
they are the exception. An example is the Belgian philosopher Herman de Dijn, who can 
rightly be classified as a ‘bioconservative’ (Bostrom, 2005) because he really seems to abhor 
biotechnological ‘monsters’ (De Dijn, 2003). Many postmodernist writers, by contrast, are so 
excited by crossing borders and blurring distinctions that they almost seem to fall in love with 
any ‘hybrid’, ‘monster’ or ‘cyborg’ that comes along.16 Within STS, Bruno Latour (1993; 
2004) and Donna Haraway (1992) are obvious examples.17 Other authors use the notion of 
‘monsters’ in a more detached way as a conceptual instrument to study public responses to 
newly discovered or created  phenomena. The locus classicus for this approach is Mary 
Douglas’ anthropological study on Purity and Danger (1966). The Dutch philosopher of 
technology, Martijntje Smits, adopted and elaborated her approach to illuminate public 
controversies on plastics and on the release of genetically modified organisms (Smits, 2002). 
Jasanoff also treads in Douglas’s footsteps.  
 
There is a problem with the ‘monster creation’ thesis if it is taken as a specific claim about the 
culturally disruptive impact of modern biotechnology and the life sciences. After all, 
according to Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT), all new facts and artifacts produced by 
whatever ‘technoscience’ are to be considered as nature-culture hybrids or ‘monsters’. So then 
what, if anything, is so special about biotechnology? Interestingly, a similar criticism has been 
 
15 Compare the following passage: “Metaphysical disorder, or confusion about how to classify things, was an 
inevitable by-product of genetic modification, producing attendant confusion in the practices of governance. 
Biotechnology disrupted ancient classifications and transgressed boundaries that had for centuries been accepted 
as given in Western legal and political thought. Distinctions between nature and artifice, animate and inanimate, 
living and nonliving, body and property suddenly became problematic, and thus in principle political, in many 
areas of decision making.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 280-81).  
16 Salman Rushdie excellently captures the ‘postmodern’ pathos: “The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, 
impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, 
cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolution of the Pure. 
Mélange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world. It is the great possibility that 
mass migration gives to the world, and I have tried to embrace it. The Satanic Verses is for change-by-fusion, 
change-by-conjoining. It is a love song to our mongrel selves.” (Rushdie, 1991, 394). A similar dislike of 
‘Absolute Purity’ can be found in the work of the French author Michel Tournier.  
17 See how one reviewer, Michael Flower, characterizes the weird entities that inhabit the ‘political ecology’ of 
Bruno Latour’s recent book, The Politics of Nature: “The object of political ecology is not a mononature but 
human-nonhuman assemblages; not matters of fact, things-in-themselves, but what Latour calls matters of 
concern. These are tangled, risky imbroglios such as prions, genetically modified organisms, an endangered 
species, and cloned human embryos. They are each a human-nonhuman composite, each a politicoscientific 
association that we might see as res publica: political, moral, economic, social, and scientific concatenations that 
are also, increasingly, the stuff of surprising scandals that erupt in the midst of judicial bodies.” (Flower, 2005, 
140). 
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made by Noortje Marres with regard to Latour’s recent thesis that scientific and political 
institutions nowadays are faced predominantly with “hairy objects” (“the partly unknown 
entities that risk disturbing social life, from ‘BSE’ to ’GM food’”) as against the relatively 
simple “smooth objects” of earlier days (Latour, 2004, 24). This fact is thought to induce a 
major institutional crisis. Marres notes that Latour’s newly invented “hairy objects” take on 
many of the properties he earlier ascribed to all new entities leaving the laboratories of 
technoscience. So he too suggests a historical discontinuity that cannot be justified by the 
ANT approach (Marres, 2005, 102-104). On her part, Jasanoff acknowledges that questions 
about the ontological and moral status of new entities have arisen “in connection with other 
technological developments”, but “perhaps never with quite the urgency generated at the fast-
moving frontiers of biotechnology” (Jasanoff, 2005b, 151). In other words, what may be valid 
to some extent for the hybrids created by other forms of technoscience, is even more strongly 
applicable to the products of modern biotechnology. 
 
Another and related criticism might be that the STS analyst, by subscribing to the monster 
creation thesis, illegitimately prejudges the outcomes of the very process of framing he sets 
out to explore. Robin Williams has expressed similar reservations about how “the activist 
wing of the STS community” takes up the study of the impacts of genomics and 
nanotechnology, new technologies which in his view are “conceived from the outset as being 
challenging in terms of risks and social values” (Williams, 2006, 327). This goes against old 
constructivist tenets of agnosticism and impartiality:  
“These commitments seem to conflict with the emphasis in most STS academic analysis on 
the need to deconstruct the objects of study, and in particular to be sceptical about claims 
regarding the character and implications of technology” (ibid.). 
 
By endorsing the monster creation thesis, Jasanoff effectively abandons her impartiality as an 
STS analyst and implicitly opposes the framing of biotechnology as product, or what could 
also be called the ‘business-as-usual’ frame. This frame transpires in the review of Jasanoff’s 
book in Nature, written by the European top-level civil servant, Mark Cantley: 
“The perception – widespread in Europe – that biotechnology is something fundamentally 
new, like the discovery of electricity, or akin to black magic, is unfortunate. It has led to the 
assumption that there are technology-specific risks requiring ad hoc regulations and 
associated bureaucracies, and to consequent conflicts with sectoral regulations, as well as to 
international trade disputes. But not for the first time, perceptions, laws and the course of 
development may be driven by delusion.” (Cantley, 2005).  
Back in the 1980s, Cantley attempted in vain to align European biotech policy with the 
‘product’ frame adopted in the U.S. (Jasanoff, 2005a, 79 ff). It is, of course, ironic that he 
does not recognize his own view as reflecting a particular framing but sees it as simply based 
on objective science; the other frames, by contrast, are dismissed as “delusion”.  Here, 
however, we are concerned with the possible shortcomings of Jasanoff’s approach. What is 
problematic from a larger STS viewpoint is that she precludes the legitimacy of the ‘product’ 
or ‘business-as-usual’ frame by attributing a priori a particular character to biotechnology. 
This technology is seen as inherently disruptive because it inevitably challenges culturally 
entrenched categories and classifications, so anybody who merely sees it as business as usual 
must surely misjudge the issues.18  
 
                                                 
18 It is no coincidence that in the WTO dispute between the USA and the European Union, Jasanoff took the side 
of the latter. With two American and two British colleagues, she wrote an amicus brief for the WRO dispute 
panel. See Winickoff et al., 2005.  
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 A possible remedy might be to change the monster-creation thesis from an a-priori into an a-
posteriori judgment. In other words, it is not by any ‘inherent’ properties that biotechnology 
challenges existing categories and classifications. However, as a (contingent) matter of fact it 
turns out that many applications of biotechnology have indeed called into question many 
deep-rooted views and distinctions. The latter claim can hardly be disputed.   
 
This reformulation of the monster-creation thesis has an additional advantage. It makes clear 
that it depends not only on the properties of a particular technology whether or not that 
technology has a culturally disruptive or unsettling effect, but just as much on the prevailing 
categories and classifications that may be challenged or ‘offended’ by it. There are two 
variables in the equation.  
 
A widening of the scope of cross-cultural comparison might show this more clearly. Take as a 
particular application of modern biotechnology the case of human reproductive cloning. 
Assuming the cloning technique to be much more perfect than it is today, would it be 
admissible for humans to be cloned in the same way as Dolly the sheep was cloned? Given 
the world-wide ban on human reproductive cloning, one might presume that such a 
proposition would offend cultural sensitivities everywhere. Yet on closer inspection the 
situation is more complex. We are not thinking of such a weird sect like the Raelians who 
hope to attain immortality by cloning. We are thinking of Buddhist scholars of the Southern 
or Theravada School of Buddhism who write more seriously on this subject (Promta, 2004; 
Ratanakul, 2006). At present they object to human reproductive cloning (and also to animal 
reproductive cloning, for that matter) on fairly practical grounds. Reportedly, it took 277 
failures (sacrifices of embryonic animal lives!) before Dolly could be brought into being, and 
the poor creature also had a shortened lifespan for some still unexplained reason. These 
considerations militate against applying the technique in its present form. However, if these 
technical ‘imperfections’ could be remedied, Theravada Buddhist scholars say they would no 
longer oppose human reproductive cloning. For them it is not a problem that new human life 
is formed in an ‘asexual’ way rather than being the fruit of a union between a man and a 
woman, because Buddhism acknowledges many ways in which life can come into being. Nor 
would they consider it an offence against the individual identity of a clone to be a mere ‘copy’ 
of some ‘original’, for Buddhism views the belief in a well-defined identity of the individual 
ego as an illusion that has to be overcome in any case in order to reduce suffering.  So, if only 
the present technical imperfections of the cloning technique could be overcome (and that of 
course is a big ‘if’), then presumably many Buddhists would embrace human reproductive 
cloning and not feel offended by it as would the adherents of other worldviews who set great 
store by the idea of individual identity and/or by the God-given uniqueness of sexual 
reproduction. In short, it also depends on the culturally entrenched categories and 
classifications whether or not a particular technology is seen as unsettling.  
 
‘Boundary-work’ 
 
The term ‘boundary-work’ was originally coined by the American sociologist Thomas Gieryn 
to suggest a sociological approach to the long-standing problem of the demarcation between 
science and non-science (Gieryn, 1983). Philosophers had sought for a rigorous criterion with 
which to separate the scientific wheat from the non-scientific chaff, but never succeeded in 
finding one that was generally accepted. Gieryn concluded that the search for such a criterion 
was hopeless but that for those who engaged in debates about the demarcation between 
science and other forms of activity (say, religion) apparently something very important was at 
stake. He therefore proposed to change focus and to study the rhetorical resources that are 
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deployed by the parties to the dispute in question to establish and maintain or contest a 
particular demarcation.  
 
The notion of ‘boundary-work’ has since been generalized and extended to the study of other 
‘boundary disputes’ beyond the demarcation between science and non-science. For Jasanoff, 
“boundaries are everywhere at play in the world” and the task of boundary-work involves the 
“creation and maintenance of essential social demarcations” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 26). In fact, 
boundary work tends to be equated with “ontological (re)ordering”. She also notes that an 
important part of boundary work in contemporary societies is done by legal institutions as 
they classify new instances under a finite set of categories. Thus the US Supreme Court 
decided in the well-known Diamond v.Chakrabarty case of 1980 that a modified bacterium 
capable of consuming oil spills was to be considered a man-made ‘invention’ for the purposes 
of patent law. A similar decision was reached 8 years later in the case of the famous Harvard 
oncomouse. Remarkably enough, however, the Canadian Supreme Court reached the opposite 
conclusion in 2002: it judged that higher organisms like transgenic mice were not to be 
considered patentable inventions (Jasanoff, 2005a, 210-213). Given that the U.S. and 
Canadian patent laws are quite similar, the example also shows that the outcome of legal 
boundary-work is not pre-ordained by the nature of the case. Another example of legal 
boundary work is the notorious case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California. At 
stake was the question whether people still have property rights in their tissues and cells after 
scientists have extracted them and converted them into ‘immortal’ cell lines. The answer of 
the Supreme Court of California was ‘no’, even though the researchers had made big profits 
out of John Moore’s extremely valuable cells and tissues (Jasanoff, 2005a, 213-15).  
 
Boundary-work is not only performed by the courts of law or other legal institutions. A 
fascinating example can be found in the successful British attempt to carve out a space for 
legitimate embryo research. In 1984 the Warnock Report to the British Parliament, named 
after the Cambridge ethicist Dame (later Baroness) Mary Warnock who chaired the 
committee, recommended the formation of a body to license embryo research within strict 
guidelines and to permit research only on embryos aged less than 14 days. The drawing of 
this particular age limit was justified with the biological argument that at this time the so-
called primitive streak appears and cells begin to differentiate. A human conceptus before that 
age was termed a ‘pre-embryo’. But it was not only biology that helped create this new entity; 
it owed its durable existence also to a carefully orchestrated parliamentary procedure, the 
deployment of secular and religious authority, the setting up of an accountable agency (the 
Human Fertility and Embryology Authority, created in 1990 by the Human Fertility and 
Embryology Act), and the typically British trust in experts.19 Mary Warnock concentrated in 
her own person “the combined authority of scholarship (Cambridge University), state power 
(the House of Lords), and established religion” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 155); she became “virtually 
synonymous with British bioethics” (ibid., 152).20 The introduction of the term ‘pre-embryo’ 
was meant to counter the argument of pro-life groups that embryo research involved killing 
                                                 
19 Compare the following passage: “[…] a mutually reinforcing alliance of social and scientific authority kept the 
barely visible, les than fourteen-day-old pre-embryo firmly demarcated from the embryo proper, allowing the 
former to be treated as unproblematically devoid of human traits, and hence as a suitable object of research. In a 
coproductionist turn, however, this splitting of the developing human embryo into two distinctive legal and 
biosocial entities was feasible only with the full mobilization of the state as an agent of biopolitics. The line of 
demarcation had to be made morally and scientifically tenable, and this in turn meant that the state had to call 
upon all of the reserves of authority that allow a government to construct reality on behalf of its citizens.” 
(Jasanoff, 2005a, 278).  
20 Elsewhere, Jasanoff remarks that, arguably, the whole process necessitated “the emergence of a new social 
kind – the ethics expert – originally exemplified in the person of Mary Warnock” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 278).  
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“unborn children”. As Jasanoff concludes about the ‘pre-embryo’: “Its ontological and 
political reality was not a product of biological knowledge alone but was created (or 
coproduced) out of a complex mix of pragmatism, empiricism, and trust in experts” (Jasanoff, 
2005a, 155). The figure of the ‘pre-embryo’ did not make its appearance in Germany, where 
other social and political conditions obtained and hence an extremely restrictive regime was 
chosen. The British arrangement that was crafted in the 1980s would also provide the starting 
point and foundation for the relatively permissive regime for stem-cell research that was later 
developed (Jasanoff, 2005a, 198-200). Thus the creation of the ‘pre-embryo’ and the 
concomitant carving out of a niche for embryo research (or rather, ‘pre-embryo’ research) was 
an instance of successful boundary-work with durable effects.        
  
Boundary-work is virtually everywhere. Who looks for instances of it, will surely find them. 
It is done in parliamentary bodies, courts of law, expert advisory commissions, ethics review 
boards, NGOs, and a variety of other forums (Jasanoff, 2005a, 27). 
 
Enduring differences in national political cultures 
 
In 1995 Jasanoff published an article in which she distinguished between three different ways 
to conceptualize or frame agricultural biotechnology in the regulatory cultures of the USA, 
Great Britain and Germany (Jasanoff, 1995). In those countries biotechnology was 
respectively framed as a product, as a process, and as a socio-political programme.  
 
The American framing of biotechnology as a ‘product’, which was officially adopted in 1986, 
entailed that the risks of biotechnology were not specific to this technology and that its 
products should not be treated differently from similar products created by traditional 
agricultural or chemical processes. Hence biotechnology was to be regulated under existing 
rules and laws and supervised by existing agencies like the FDA, EPA and USDA. In the UK 
the government decided in 1990 that releases of genetically modified organisms into the 
environment had to be subject to regulatory scrutiny, at least provisionally, thereby 
recognizing that the process of genetic modification was a relevant criterion for regulation. 
The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) was charged with 
overseeing GMO releases. The British policy was in line with a 1990 EC Directive on the 
deliberate release of GMOs.   
 
The German framing of biotechnology as a programme was more radical and far-reaching and 
reflected in particular the growing political influence of the Green Party since 1983 when they 
were first elected to the Bundestag:  
“The Greens and the Social Democrats argued that the risks of biotechnology were 
sufficiently unsettling – uncertain, potentially catastrophic, perhaps irreversible – to require 
a new political order for their management and control. Key to this new order would be a 
more pronounced voice for the public, institutionalized through new forms of public 
participation.” (Jasanoff, 1995, 322).21  
 
21 In her book Jasanoff gives the following description of Germany’s framing of biotechnology: “Germany took 
precaution yet one step further [than the UK] by highlighting political and ethical as well as scientific unknowns 
– in particular, the possibility of a programmatic alliance between science and the state that might lead to abuses 
of power unless the development of biotechnology was tightly controlled. These fears were reflected in 
numerous German legislative and regulatory enactments that sought to create categorical bright lines and guard 
against ambiguous or conceptually messy situations” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 275). In all this, memories to the Nazi 
past and the wish to position the German state as a true Rechtsstaat surely played a role. Yet, Jasanoff could not 
deny having been repeatedly struck by “an apparent yearning for moral and legal absolutes” among the Germans 
(ibid., 278).   
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The Gentechnikgesetz or Genetic Engineering Law that was enacted in 1990 represented a 
compromise between such views and the more conservative views of the Christian 
Democrats. The law combined the functions of protection (‘Schutz’) and promotion 
(‘Forderung’). It opened up participation on the government’s advisory committee for 
environmentalists and established public hearings for deliberate release applications. 
However, after some highly polarized confrontations the German government decided in 1993 
to rescind the right to a hearing. Participation on the advisory committee also became 
bureaucratized.  
 
In 1995 even Jasanoff could not have foreseen that agricultural biotechnology would become 
a hot spot of citizen unrest and political contestation in various European countries in the run-
up to the end of the millennium. In her article she argued that the observed cross-national 
variations were in agreement with generally recognized differences in regulatory styles; but 
she also noted that  
“the divergent forms of political accommodation worked out in each country were similar 
in result  – in each case, the selected policy initiative blocked significant avenues of public 
dissent and smoothed the way for a relatively untroubled further development of 
biotechnology.” (Jasanoff, 1995, 324). 
In the concluding sentence of her article Jasanoff hinted at another explanation for this 
apparent convergence: 
“Explanations for this ultimate convergence lie in all probability in the theatre of 
international relations, where national protest politics confronted, and eventually 
succumbed to, the rhetoric and politics of global competitiveness” (Jasanoff, 1995, 328).  
We can be quite sure that she no longer holds this view! 
 
In her book Jasanoff picks up the analysis from her 1995 article and continues the story 
beyond where she had left it. Looking back she now interprets the old story (until 1995) as 
one of normalization, which was to be followed, rather unexpectedly, by a “less common 
story of denormalization” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 95): 
“The manner in which [national controversies on the deliberate release of GMOs] were 
framed reflected, and in a sense reaffirmed, each nation’s particular style of controlling 
risk. In the United States, regulators claimed the authority of science to support their 
conclusions with regard to product safety; in Britain, by contrast, regulators relied on the 
more embodied concept of expert judgment to certify the safety of GM as a process; and in 
Germany, legitimacy was sought through targeted institutional and procedural reforms 
establishing new forms of dialogue between citizens and the programmatic state. But it was 
the fragility of each accommodation that proved in the end to be most unexpected. By the 
late 1990s debates reopened on issues that industry and government hoped had been 
definitively laid to rest.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 95; my italics).  
 
We will not try to retell and reconstruct this “less common story of denormalization”, because 
following all the historical twists and turns would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say that 
in the present confrontation between the USA and the European Union the different framings 
of agricultural biotechnology as ‘product’ and ‘process’ are still prominently active, with one 
side claiming the support of ‘sound science’ and the other invoking the Precautionary 
Principle. It is also obvious that a regime of labelling, coexistence and traceability would be 
utterly incompatible with the US ‘product’ frame. The recent reopening of the European 
market for American GM products, Jasanoff holds, is not a victory for Free Trade, but a 
capitulation of the ‘product’ frame: 
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 “[…] the GM foods that Europe seemed ready to take into its territorial jurisdiction were not 
the same GM foods that U.S. authorities and producers had originally hoped to distribute in 
global trade. They were now clearly marked as GM, the products of an agricultural process 
that U.S. policy had firmly sought to naturalize and render invisible. The trade barrier 
against GM foods was lifting, but only on condition that U.S. manufacturers accepted 
Europe’s framing of GM as a process that has social and legal meaning. Economic victory 
was premised, in other words, on ontological capitulation” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 145)22 
 
Jasanoff sees enduring differences in the political cultures of the USA, Britain and Germany, 
not just with regard to ‘green’ biotechnology (agriculture, food) but also with regard to ‘red’ 
or biomedical biotechnology. In a later article (Jasanoff, 2005b, 151) she gives the following 
schematic overview that may be helpful to the discussion:             
 
National strategies of normalization 
                   US                    UK             GERMANY 
Monsters encouraged 
Market-regulated innovation 
Decentralized norms 
Winner-take-all settlement of 
   controversy 
Judicial accountability 
    
Monsters permitted 
Expert-regulated innovation 
Centralized norms 
Consensual settlement of 
   controversy 
Parliamentary and 
administrative accountability 
Monsters forbidden 
Law-regulated innovation 
Centralized norms 
Reasoned (principled) 
   settlement of controversy 
Legislative accountability 
 
 
A striking feature of this Table is the prominent role it accords to the degree of tolerance for 
monsters as a basic element in the political cultures of the three countries (to repeat, 
‘monsters’ are described here as “entities that threaten disorder by crossing the settled 
boundaries of nature or society”). Remarkably enough, Jasanoff does not directly refer here to 
Mary Douglas’s theory or the extensive body of literature on the various strategies for dealing 
with monsters. The US strategy of ‘encouraging monsters’ could be compared to what Smits 
calls monster embracement; the UK strategy of ‘permitting monsters’ could be likened to 
monster assimilation; the German approach of ‘forbidding monsters’ shows similarity with 
monster exorcism (Smits, 2002), except that rather than expelling the monster once it is there, 
the German approach aims at preventing the monster to show up in the first place.  
 
Jasanoff illustrates her typology of normalization strategies with examples drawn from 
assisted reproduction (IVF and embryos), stem cell research, and GM crops and food. In 
general, the US approach encourages risk-taking and innovation regulated by the market; any 
adverse effects, should they occur, have to be redressed afterwards by the courts of law 
(judicial accountability). The new types of ‘entities’ that are created along the way are readily 
accepted, such as the new family and kinship structures that are enabled by assisted 
reproduction. Some U.S. states, like California, offer prospective parents (even non-genetic 
‘parents’) plenty of possibilities to make legally recognized arrangements for having their 
‘own’ children through IVF and gestational surrogacy. The ‘natural’ mother is no longer the 
woman who brings the child to term. In most U.S. states, moreover, prenatal diagnostic 
services are offered by largely unregulated, private clinics allowing would-be parents to select 
children with the desired sex or other desired characteristics (like tissue compatibility with a 
                                                 
22 Javier Lezaun (2006) argues that the EU effort to make GMOs traceable would actually create a novel bio-
legal entity or a new object of government.  
37 
diseased sibling). The only apparent exception to the predominant U.S. pattern is President 
Bush’s aversion to embryonic stem cell research, but Jasanoff dismisses his posture as a form 
of presidential rhetoric aimed at placating the Religious Right as a vital component of the 
current power coalition. His veto covers federal funding of embryonic stem cell research with 
taxpayers’ money, but leaves the private sector free to pursue this line of research. Recently, 
some U.S. states like California and New Jersey have set up their own stem cell initiatives in 
defiance of the President’s veto, thus once more confirming the typical decentralized 
American approach: 
“Decentralized decisionmaking and a market-based approach to testing have produced in 
the United States a particularly hospitable climate for trying things out, with boundary-
testing actions preceding, and provoking, the making of normative judgments.” (Jasanoff, 
2005b, 146)     
 
In many ways the German approach is the exact opposite of the U.S. approach. The German 
Constitution accords full human dignity to the embryo from the moment of conception, so 
there can be no ‘pre-embryo’ as in the United Kingdom. Prenatal genetic diagnosis is also 
banned by law. The very strict legislation on assisted reproduction that was enacted in 1990 
bans surrogacy and requires that all IVF embryos must be implanted in the woman who 
supplied the ova (besides, no more than three embryos may be created): 
“Hence, the kinds of disputes that have erupted in other countries over the ownership, use 
and moral status of embryos are essentially precluded from occurring in Germany. The law 
acts in effect as an ontological prohibition, keeping entities potentially disruptive of the 
moral order from ever coming into being.” (Jasanoff, 2005b, 146) 
In other words, monsters or potential monsters like frozen embryos are simply forbidden. 
Jasanoff recognizes the same approach in Germany’s GM policy, especially in the new Gene 
Technology Act (Gentechnikgesetz) that was passed in December 2004 under the former Red-
Green coalition government. Ostensibly created to implement European guidelines on the 
coexistence of GM and non-GM agriculture, the law went much further and imposed highly 
restrictive conditions on the cultivation of GMOs in terms of liability, the area to be planted, 
and notification for a national register to keep track of these crops. Some critics have even 
dubbed the new law the ‘Gentechnikverhinderungsgesetz’ (Gene Technology Prevention Act). 
As Jasanoff comments: 
“On this issue as in others relating to biotechnology, Germany sought to avoid controversy 
by opting for a legislative framework that reduced the risk of ontological mixing or 
impurity – thereby also minimizing the possibility of normative conflicts” (Jasanoff, 2005b, 
150). 
 
The typical British approach steers a middle course between the American and German 
strategies of normalization. Like Germany, Great Britain allows innovation to proceed within 
a normative framework arrived at by law, rather than relying on a largely unregulated market. 
But whereas Germany has crafted strictly enforceable legal norms that leave no room for any 
deviation or discretion, Britain tolerates more ambiguity. The UK strategy preferably relies on 
empiricism, pragmatism and a cautious case-by-case approach where remaining uncertainties 
are gradually clarified by a body of trusted experts. This approach seems to have worked at its 
best in the British policy with regard to assisted reproduction and stem cells. The UK record 
in the area of GM crops and food is less impressive. It is not entirely clear to us whether the 
typical British normalization strategy, in Jasanoff’s opinion, also fits the country’s GM policy 
after 1996, when the BSE affair created a huge crisis of confidence among the British 
population. The response of the policymakers was to open up the decision-making process to 
a wider range of voices and opinions beyond the narrow circle of (no longer trusted) experts, 
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 but Jasanoff also notes that the large-scale GM Nation? debate that was conducted in 2003 
remains an ad hoc experiment in public participation. Perhaps an episode of 
‘denormalization’ cannot be expected to fit into a classification of normalization strategies. 
 
Despite such loose ends and unanswered questions, Jasanoff’s typology of normalization 
strategies for coping with monsters is surely valuable and heuristically useful, precisely 
because it suggests how public responses to biotechnology are embedded within “robust and 
coherent political cultures” and reflect durable institutional frameworks. The questions that 
are still open may stimulate further inquiry.   
 
The political subservience of bioethics 
 
Jasanoff extends her co-production framework also to the study of bioethics. She points out 
that when policy-makers enlisted the services of bioethicists in their attempt to address the 
public concerns raised by biotechnology, bioethics was itself in flux: “the effort to extend 
bioethics into the new fields of genetics and genomics proved to be in salient ways 
constitutive of the discourse itself” (172). In other words, the very content of ‘bioethics’ was 
to a large extent defined in the various attempts to ‘apply’ it, allowing for different 
specifications depending on the different contexts of application. 
 
We can recognize here the rudiments of a sociological approach to bioethics, which currently 
seems to be gaining ground (Kelly, 2003; Hoeyer, 2005; Bosk, 1999; Salter and Jones, 2005; 
DeVries and Subedi, 1998). This new approach can be broadly characterized as social-
constructivist. A typical social-constructivist approach toward the problem of how public 
concerns come to be framed as ethical issues would be to take a completely agnostic stand 
with regard to the contents of the term ‘ethics’ (and ‘ethical’) and leave it to the societal actors 
involved to define the term in their own different ways. The social-constructivist researcher 
would just “follow the actors” and try to document what power effects are produced by their 
different framings and definitions. However, Jasanoff follows this line of inquiry only to 
some extent, because she does not take a fully agnostic stand with regard to the concept of 
ethics; nor does she carry the social-constructivist type of analysis through to the end. 
Jasanoff notes that (bio)ethics is not the same thing everywhere and that it is understood 
differently in different political and cultural environments. Her way to deal with this problem 
is to adopt “an actor-centered comparative strategy” (Jasanoff 2005a, 172): “The task then 
becomes to show how each state [the United States, Great Britain and Germany] sought to 
institutionalize bioethical discourse for particular functions, and how civil society actors in 
each country understood and strategically intervened in national bioethics debates” (ibid.). 
 
Scholars like Brian Wynne, Les Levidow and Susan Carr have criticized the constraining 
effect of bioethical discourse (Wynne, 2001; Levidow and Carr, 1997). They lament that 
public concerns are being ‘pre-judged’ when they are framed as ethical issues and that a new 
category of ‘experts’, bioethicists, rather than the public itself are allowed to voice and 
articulate the latter’s concerns. Jasanoff endorses this type of criticism, but only with regard to 
what she calls “official bioethics”. She also recognizes the existence of something she calls 
“unofficial bioethics”, i.e. all the initiatives seized by civil-society organizations to promote 
their normative goals with respect to biotechnology by “speaking bioethics to power”. In her 
view the entry threshold for engaging in this type of activity, compared to established fields 
like science and law, is still relatively low:  
 “As bioethics became a powerful instrument for framing policy choices around 
biotechnology, numerous social actors saw the advantages of participating in the 
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development of the discourse, thereby challenging the state’s (or, in Britain, the 
professional elite’s) monopolistic control of the formal analysis of values. In some cases, 
groups formed to broaden or reshape the agenda of bioethics, pressing for ethical analysis 
of particular issues and developments; in others they fought for standing to insert their own 
ethical perspectives into policy debates. In each country, a major goal of nonstate actors 
seemed to be to use the rubric of ethics to create new deliberative spaces, and to some 
extent new languages, supplementing those offered by official policymakers. The politics 
of bioethics was a politics of diversification: bringing new issues on the agenda, new voices 
to speak for them, and new forums in which to engage with them. Bioethics, no matter how 
construed or where deployed, seemed in this way to overflow institutional attempts to 
contain it.” (Jasanoff 2005a, 188).  
If this is so, it would seem that there is little reason to deplore the framing power or 
disciplinary force of bioethics. 
 
Comparing the discourse on bioethics, ‘official’ as well as ‘unofficial’, in the United States, 
Germany and the UK, Jasanoff once again notes significant differences that are closely related 
to the differences in the initial framing of biotechnology across the three countries in terms of 
‘product’, ‘programme’ and ‘process’, respectively. Hence she draws the following 
conclusion: 
“In each country […] it was not so much ethical deliberation that clarified the choices for 
politics as the dynamics of politics that shaped the discussion of bioethics.”  (Jasanoff 
2005a, 193) 
 
In the final chapter of her book, however, Jasanoff expresses her own dissatisfaction with 
what she sees as the limitations of the debate on biotechnology: 
“Across all three countries and in almost all issue areas surveyed in this book, we are struck 
by the dearth of meaningful debate on the metaphysical aspects of biotechnology: that is, 
the debate about the kinds of entities, and associated forms of life, that the technology has 
sought to, or should seek to, create. Genetic modification is at its core, a means of bringing 
novel entities into the world, and an engaged deliberative politics might have been expected 
to focus in the first instance on the desirability of these new productions. How should we 
use the power to intervene in nature’s processes? Yet time after time the official discourses 
of policymaking channeled debate toward looking only at the impacts of technologically 
generated things whose existence, purpose, and value were barely questioned in public or 
private forums.” (Jasanoff 2005a, 287-288). 
We can see the limitations of a consequentialist discourse merely focusing on ‘impacts’ of 
biotechnology, but we must admit that we are somewhat at a loss to imagine what a debate 
about the ‘metaphysical’ aspects of biotechnology or about the ‘kinds of entities’ we bring 
into the world would look like. Is this type of debate any different from the various forms of 
‘boundary work’ and the taming of a great variety of ‘monsters’ which Jasanoff described in 
her book? It is a pity that she does not clarify and illuminate the type of debate she would 
favour any further.     
 
A note on ‘nation-building’ and the European Union 
 
In her comparative analysis of divergent political cultures in biotechnology policy across the 
US, Great Britain and Germany, Jasanoff ran up against a major methodological problem: 
what to do about the role of the European Union? Over the time period studied in her 
monograph (roughly 1980-2004), the EU was in the process of forming itself into a 
formidable supranational entity with a major role in science and technology policy, including 
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biotechnology policy. But how to study the policies of an agent that lacks a stable identity? 
Jasanoff decided to make a virtue out of necessity by putting her co-production framework to 
use once again:  
“[T]he formation of European biotechnology policy is a story of coproduction. It is at once 
about the evolutionary transformation of Europe as an economic, political, and cultural 
union and about the consolidation, within Europe, of the technoscientific sector known as 
biotechnology.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 69) 
 
Although the EU does not represent a ‘nation’, this process can be compared to the project of 
‘nation-building’ in so far as the EU as an ‘imagined community’ (Benedict Anderson) has to 
re-imagine where it stands for on a host of issues, including policies concerning the life 
sciences (Jasanoff, 2005a, 7). 
 
A political entity that seems to correspond to “no well-defined niche in democratic theory” 
(Jasanoff, 2005a, 74), the EU is notoriously plagued with serious legitimacy problems and 
haunted by the ghost of the ‘democratic deficit’.23 The White Paper on Governance, issued by 
the European Commission in 2001, attempts to address these problems, but succeeds only to a 
limited degree. Referring to food crises and public scepticism with regard to biotechnology, 
the White Paper argued for more transparency in expert advice and the need to solicit a wider 
range of inputs into the policy-making process. In actual fact, however, participation is largely 
restricted to “organized sectoral actors” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 76).  
 
Compounding the problematic legitimacy of EU decision-making is the fact that as yet there 
is no European demos or public. Jasanoff holds, however, that in the field of biotechnology 
policy such a European public is already being constituted through polls like Eurobarometer: 
“These instruments are not merely objective tools of policy and politics. They are 
ontological ordering devices: in sampling European opinion they help to constitute the very 
thing that they seek to represent – a united European polity, even though its component 
parts can be accessed, sampled, and surveyed only through the constituent nation-states.” 
(Jasanoff 2005a, 85). 
It does not matter that the portrait of the European public depicted by the Eurobarometer 
polls as ignorant, suspicious and risk-averse is contested by other studies like PABE (Public 
Perceptions of Agricultural Biotechnologies in Europe), which convey a more favourable 
picture of reflective, questioning and engaged European citizens (Marris et al., 2001). Both 
types of studies jointly contribute to the making of new European identities (Jasanoff 2005a, 
89).  
 
The European framing of biotechnology as a ‘process’ rather than a ‘product’, which was first 
solidified in 1990 in Council Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release of genetically 
modified organisms, also had to do with the constitutive structure of the EU.  Jasanoff 
describes how during the mid-1980s attempts were made by DG XII, the Directorate-General 
for Science, Research and Development, to opt for a ‘product’ frame comparable to the US 
regime, and explains why such attempts were bound to fail in the European context (Jasanoff 
2005a, 78-84). There was a power struggle with other directorates about how to promote and 
regulate the new field of biotechnology, especially with DG XI (Environment). Unlike in the 
US, such interagency rivalries could not be contained by more powerful coordinative agencies 
(such as the Office of Science and Technology Policy dominated by the White House); 
moreover, European directives and regulations also had to take the positions of the Member 
 
23 Jasanoff quotes a British journalist commenting on the low voter turnout in European elections: “When a 
reality TV show attracts more votes than an election, democracy is in trouble.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 7).  
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States into account – in this case, countries like Great Britain and Germany had already 
moved away from the ‘product’ frame. In the following decade, the initial European ‘process’ 
frame was to have a kind of path effect as it was further entrenched during the 1990s, when 
the European Parliament was to have more influence (due to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty) and 
Green political parties were relatively prominent. It was at this time that the ‘process’ frame 
became more closely linked with the Precautionary Principle as its ultimate justification.  
 
A recurrent question for the EU is whether it will adopt an “active-integrationist” or a 
“passive-preservationist” approach in its regulatory policy, or in other words whether it will 
attempt to eliminate cross-country divergences in policy framings or instead aim to maintain 
and protect ethical/cultural differences across Member States (Jasanoff 2005a, 71 and 91-92). 
This is a key question in discussions on European-funded research programmes for the life 
sciences: 
“The Commission’s ultimate goal in science policy is to create a single European Research 
Area, permitting the free movement of researchers, projects, fund, materials, and topics 
across national boundaries. An important barrier, however, is the discrepant regulation on 
ethical grounds of certain types of research among the member states.” (Jasanoff 2005a, 90) 
Using European stem cell research policy as an illustration, Jasanoff shows that cumbersome 
compromises have to be hammered out, so that often no more than a “passive-preservationist” 
stance can be reached – even with the input of advisory bodies like the Group of Advisers on 
the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology (GAEIB) or its successor since 1997, the European 
Group on Ethics (EGE) on Science and New Technologies. Such outcomes affirm Europe’s 
status as a work in progress (Jasanoff 2005a, 91).     
 
Democracy and globalization      
 
“Varying national approaches to regulation and control,” Jasanoff holds, “carry specific, non-
negligible consequences for democratic politics” (Jasanoff, 2005b, 153). They also carry 
implications for globalization and international trade.   
 
The cross-national comparison of biotechnology politics in the USA, Great Britain and 
Germany shows that even Western countries may differ quite fundamentally in their 
responses to science and technology. It is simply not true that the combined forces of 
economic competition and scientific rationality inexorably drive the various national states 
and regions towards convergence of policies. As Jasanoff writes about the US-EU dispute 
about GMOs before the World Trade Organization:  
“Few starker reminders could be found that the global march of biotechnology had not 
automatically brought policy convergence in its wake. Indeed, in this case regulatory 
polarization seemed, to some, a more fitting description of what had occurred [ref.]. Here 
were two of the world’s economic superpowers disagreeing not only about whether and 
how to promote biotechnology in agriculture, but, even more astoundingly, about what 
counts as science for regulatory purposes and how that science should be deployed in 
controlling the fruits of biotechnology.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 274).    
Needless to say that, as an STS analyst, Jasanoff does not support her country’s claim to the 
high ground of ‘sound science’ in this dispute (Jasanoff, 2005a, 107-08 and 266; see also the 
amicus brief for the WTO panel that she co-authored: Winickoff et al., 2005). Nor does she 
subscribe to the view which attributes the European position simply to protectionism 
(Jasanoff, 2005a, 10).  
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Actually, what type of international order is to govern the mutual relations between nation 
states is not settled either, but rather an issue that is contested by what in STS-jargon are 
called “competing ways of worldmaking”:   
“The world occupied by nation states never was a single place, but always work in 
progress, represented and fought for according to different normative conceptions of the 
appropriate kinds of economic, political, social and technological integration to be attained. 
Globalization has not resolved the tensions; it has if anything made the problems of 
coexistence more self-evident. Whose vision of the world should be naturalized or made 
‘real’ under these circumstances is of the utmost political and epistemological 
consequence.” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 10; our italics).   
 
The existence of culturally entrenched differences in policy automatically raises the question 
if there are possibilities of cross-cultural learning. Jasanoff’s answer is affirmative, but she 
immediately lowers the expectations by saying that she will not deliver a how-to manual for 
better risk assessment or better standard operating procedures for public consultation. The 
learning effects to be expected from cross-cultural comparison, it seems, are greater cultural 
self-awareness and better mutual understanding. However, Jasanoff is rather averse to the idea 
of grafting the well-functioning parts of another country’s political culture to one’s own to 
make up for a manifest shortcoming. In theory, comparative study could help “assess the 
texture and quality of democracy in contemporary industrial societies” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 273). 
In practice, however, there seem to be many impediments to fulfill this promise. One 
complicating factor is that, for Jasanoff, democracy itself is also expressed in different 
cultural forms: 
“Democracy, too, is not a singular form of life but a common human urge to self-rule that 
finds expression in many different institutional and cultural arrangements.” (Jasanoff, 
2005a, 290). 
That makes it difficult to develop a common yardstick for assessing the democratic quality of 
various policy approaches in different countries. 
 
This caution may seem somewhat surprising in view of Jasanoff’s rather strongly worded 
claim (which we earlier dubbed the ‘civic epistemology’ thesis) that “democratic theory [...] 
must actively take on board the involvement of citizens in the production, use and 
interpretation of knowledge for public purposes” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 41).24 What she describes 
under the rubric of ‘civic epistemologies’, however, are just “culturally specific, historically 
and politically grounded, public knowledge-ways” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 249). The results of her 
brief inventory of these ‘public knowledge-ways’ are descriptively interesting (to summarize 
her analysis: “the civic epistemologies of Britain, Germany, and the United States can be 
stylized, respectively, as communitarian, consensus-seeking, and contentious” – Jasanoff, 
2005a, 250), but they do not help us in the evaluative task of finding a normative yardstick or 
criterion transcending these different political cultures. 
 
If we are to draw up an overall balance-sheet of the relative merits and weaknesses of the 
American, British and German policy cultures, we could start from the premise that all three 
countries see themselves as deliberative democracies and derive from this fact some very 
general criteria in terms of representation, participation and deliberation. Indeed, this is what 
Jasanoff herself does in chapter 11 of her book.  
 
 
24 Compare: “any democratic theory worth its salt must take note of the human capacity for knowing things in 
common” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 270).     
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One such criterion is supplied by the framing function of representation: “the presentation by 
the public to [governing institutions] of matters that are seen to be of collective significance” 
(Jasanoff, 2005a, 281). Using this criterion, Jasanoff arrives at a rather negative assessment of 
the American policy culture: 
“[T]he rapidly achieved focus on products in the United States foreclosed wide debate on 
the social and ethical implications of GM technologies, particularly in agriculture, and 
blocked public notification, through labeling, of the production history of GM foods.” 
(Jasanoff, 2005a, 283).  
Using this same criterion, the German ‘programme’ frame, which invited public debate on the 
physical, social and political risks of biotechnology, would look much more attractive. 
However, we know that the resulting restrictive regime, perhaps due to the irony of history or 
some mysterious defect in the German mentality, was far from attractive: 
“The resulting morally charged political environment was inhospitable to experimentation, 
scientific, social, or political. It discouraged risk-taking, whether in labeling food, forming 
novel forms of kinship, or creating borderline biological entities such as pre-embryos and 
stem cells” (Jasanoff, 2005a, 283).  
The Germans were just a little bit too rigorous in forbidding all monsters. It appears that you 
cannot have your cake and eat it too. If you choose a certain political culture for its ‘positive’ 
elements, you also have to accept its ‘negative’ elements. Hence, in all likelihood, Jasanoff’s 
strictures on transplanting components from one political culture to another.  
 
It is not difficult to guess that Jasanoff’s personal sympathy is largely with the British 
political culture.25 It preserves the happy mean between the U.S. and the German 
normalization strategies. If she no longer feels at home in God’s own country, she should 
consider transplanting herself to the other side of the Atlantic.               
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Chapter 3 
 
Hwang Woo Suk and the Korean stem cell debacle: 
Scientific fraud, techno-nationalism and the ‘Wild East’ 
 
Introduction 
 
The Hwang affair is a spectacular case of scientific fraud. Throughout the years 2004 and 
(most of) 2005, Dr. Hwang Woo Suk26 was an internationally renowned investigator in the 
field of human embryonic stem cell research. With two landmark papers in Science magazine, 
his Seoul-based team was the first and only group to show that embryonic stem cell lines 
could be obtained by transferring the nuclear genetic material from patient-derived somatic 
cells into the denucleated eggs from female donors. This would be an important step towards 
therapeutic cloning, with highly alluring prospects for regenerative medicine. However, in 
December 2005 the results of Hwang’s team were shown to have been faked. This ultimate 
exposure was the dramatic sequel to critical investigations into egg donor recruitment 
practices that were initiated after allegations about legal and ethical lapses had been aired.  
 
The South Korean stem cell debacle raises lots of questions. For the scientific community and 
the editors of scientific journals the main question is how the process of peer review could 
have failed so egregiously and how in future such a failure can be prevented. We are also 
interested to see how, given the apparent failure of more regular procedures, the full extent of 
the fraud was eventually exposed. But there are other questions. The whole field of 
therapeutic cloning, or human embryonic stem cell research, is fairly controversial – though 
less so than reproductive cloning, which is almost universally condemned. Before Hwang’s 
humiliating fall from grace, the apparent success of South Korean stem cell research was 
often cited by the adherents of the so-called ‘Wild East argument’ (Demos, 2006) to argue for 
the relaxation of moral standards in the West in order to keep pace with East Asian countries. 
Needless to say, the outcome of the Hwang affair sheds an unfavourable light on this type of 
argument. Still, the case presents us with an opportunity to inquire more deeply into the socio-
ethical aspects of stem cell research in East Asia and their cultural backgrounds. Was South 
Korea, as some have asserted, indeed an ethically underdeveloped country? If not, how then 
to explain that Hwang’s team was initially able to flout standing legal and ethical rules with 
impunity? What was the role of ‘Asian values’ and different religious backgrounds in this 
 
26 A note on the transcription of Korean names: Han (2006, p. 4, footnote) provides useful background 
information about the different ways Korean names can be rendered into English. According to the Guidelines 
for Romanization of Korean, issued in July 7, 2000 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of 
Korea, in Romanizing Korean names, the surname should go first, and the given name, generally composed of 
two syllables, should be spelled as a single word (e.g., Han Aera). But putting a hyphen between the two 
syllables of the given name is permitted (e.g., Han Ae-ra). In case a person had already made and used a 
Romanized name prior to current Guidelines, she is permitted to continue to use it. Thus Dr. Hwang’s name can 
be Romanized as (1) Hwang Useog (in accordance with current Guidelines), (2) Hwang Woo Suk (in accordance 
with the continuous use exception), or (3) Woo Suk Hwang or Woo-suk Hwang (putting the surname last to 
conform to English usage, e.g. in English papers). In this chapter, we attempt to follow the rule of putting the 
Korean surname first. However, it will be difficult to attain full consistency, because it is precisely the tendency 
among Korean authors to conform to the English usage of putting the surname last which may create confusion. 
When we are confronted with a name like ‘John Johnson’, we have the cultural background to know that 
‘Johnson’ and not ‘John’ is the surname. We lack this cultural background knowledge when we are confronted 
with a name like ‘Ja Min Koo’. In those cases in which we have to refer to an American of Korean descent, like 
the bioethicist Insoo Hyun, we will put the surname last. In the list of bibliographic references we have indicated 
Korean surnames with capital letters.  
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entire affair? We will also have to look more closely into the role bioethicists played in the 
unfolding of this episode. 
 
The Hwang affair can also be connected with another overarching theme of this report: 
techno-nationalism. We think that this concept may shed an illuminating light on Hwang’s 
remarkable rise to power as well as on his ultimate downfall. It also helps to understand how 
moral doubts and objections could be effectively marginalized.  
 
We will also pay attention to the international aspects and repercussions. A central problem 
for any strong techno-nationalist innovation strategy is that in this age of globalization the 
international interdependency of scientific research will usually reassert itself with a 
vengeance, as South Korea also was to find out the hard way. We will finally look at the 
national and international fall-out after the debacle to see how the stem cell research 
community made attempts to ethically tidy up its field of research.        
 
The rise and fall of Hwang Woo Suk 
 
In the spring of 2004 the team led by Dr. Hwang Woo Suk at Seoul National University 
achieved world renown when they published an article in Science in which they claimed to 
have derived a pluripotent human embryonic cell line from a cloned blastocyst (Hwang et al., 
2004). Several research groups around the world had been working on this challenging task, 
but the South Korean team (the article had 14 Korean authors and one American, Jose 
Cibelli27) was apparently the first to succeed. To achieve this result, the researchers declared 
that they had collected 242 eggs from 16 women, allegedly all unpaid volunteers who had 
signed informed-consent forms (see the ‘Supplementary Material’ that was published online 
along with the article). After removal of the nucleus, the eggs were fused with somatic cells 
taken from the same donor. The ultimate yield of one embryonic stem cell line showed that 
the efficiency of the entire process (1 cell line in 242 tries) left much to be desired, but at least 
there was ‘proof of principle’ that it could be done. Or so it seemed.  
 
The next breakthrough occurred a year later and was reported in another landmark paper in 
Science (Hwang et al., 2005; published online on 19 May and in print on 17 June). This time 
25 names appeared above the article, including the name of Gerald Schatten from the 
University of Pittsburgh as the only non-Korean author (he was the ‘corresponding author’ 
who communicated between the editors and the other authors).28 Hwang and his team claimed 
to have produced 11 different stem cell lines, obtained by transferring the nuclear genetic 
material from the somatic cells of patients suffering from spinal cord injury and other diseases 
into the nucleus-free eggs from female donors. This time the somatic cells and donated 
oocytes were from different persons, with one exception. The obvious importance of deriving 
‘patient-specific’ stem-cell lines is that such cells are immunologically compatible with the 
patient and do not trigger rejection when transplanted. The authors declared that the donations 
had been obtained in full accordance with Korean regulations and law and donors had signed 
informed-consent forms. Compared to the earlier study, they reported a more than tenfold 
                                                 
27 “J.B. Cibelli made intellectual contributions to the manuscript and the RNA analysis of nonhuman primate 
cells. All human experiments were performed in Korea by Korean scientists.” (Hwang et al. 2004, p. 1674, note 
30). 
28 However, note 32 of the article stated the following: “All experiments were performed in Korea by Korean 
scientists, and all results were obtained in Korea using Korean equipment and Korean sponsorship.” (Hwang et 
al. , 2005, p. 1783).  After publication of the article, some Korean scientists complained that Hwang had given 
too much credit to Schatten by designating the latter as corresponding author, thereby enhancing the likelihood 
that a possible future Nobel Prize had to be shared with a non-Korean (see Kim Tae-gyu, 2005e).    
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 increase in efficiency, claiming to be able to derive a cell line in 20 tries. This alleged 
advance would mean that the ultimate aim of therapeutic cloning had been brought a big step 
closer (compare Vogel, 2005a).       
 
In the wake of his international successes, Hwang’s star rose to heights undreamt of. The 
South Korean government granted him the title of Supreme Scientist (Hwang was the first and 
until now only recipient of this title) in June 2005. In October 2005 he was appointed director 
of the newly created World Stem Cell Hub, launched to symbolize and exploit Korea’s 
leading role in this field of research. Gerald Schatten was to chair the board of trustees of this 
international network for exchanging embryonic stem-cell lines and cloning technology 
(Dennis, 2005). Satellite laboratories were being planned in California and Great Britain. 
Incidentally, the venture could also be seen as an attempt to accelerate progress in the field by 
bypassing ethical and regulatory constraints in the United States (Okie, 2005). For William 
Hurlbut, a medical scientist on the President’s Council on Bioethics favouring alternatives to 
the use of human embryonic stem cells, the whole construction amounted to an “outsourcing 
of ethics” (Smith, 2005). However, many American researchers were enthusiastic about the 
possibilities the ‘hub’ would offer them. The magazine Scientific American, finally, chose 
Hwang as ‘Research Leader of the Year’ (Cunningham, 2005).  
 
Then the downfall occurred as in a Greek tragedy until the King of Cloning was finally 
dethroned. It started with rumours about ethical lapses in the procurement of oocytes. Egg 
donors were said to have received payment for their donations and two donors were found to 
be members of Hwang’s team and thus in a dependent position. For Gerald Schatten, who had 
been co-author on the second Science paper and on the ‘Snuppy’ paper in Nature, these 
rumours were the avowed reason to suspend on 12 November 2005 his collaboration with 
Hwang (Cyranovski and Check, 2005a). The unresolved ethical issues also burdened the 
future of the newly launched World Stem Cell Hub, as many non-Korean stem-cell 
researchers put their participation on hold (ibid.). After a series of accusations, denials and 
partial admissions on ethical irregularities, the controversy in South Korea shifted to the 
validity of the results reported in the Science papers (Cyranoski, 2005c). Indications that a 
large part of the data might have been manipulated and fabricated grew stronger. Some former 
members of Hwang’s team defected and made incriminating revelations. By mid-December 
2005 Hwang had virtually lost most of his academic credibility, but the tragedy continued to 
unfold. Subsequently, his two Science papers were officially retracted (12 January 2006) and 
an investigative committee installed by Seoul National University concluded on 10 January 
2006 that Hwang’s team had not been able to produce any cloned human embryonic stem cell 
line at all. The whole thing had been a massive fraud (an English summary of the findings of 
the committee has been published as an appendix to International Herald Tribune, 2006, and 
to Jean, 2006). Only Hwang’s Afghan hound Snuppy, whose creation had been reported in an 
article in Nature (Lee et al., 2005), proved to be a genuinely cloned creature. In 2006 the 
Korean public prosecutor took over with criminal investigations into embezzlement, bribery 
and other illegal practices.        
 
Ethical agonizing about reproductive and therapeutic cloning 
 
It was not South Korea but Scotland that had originally taken the lead in cloning. In 1997, Ian 
Wilmut, Keith Campbell and other researchers at the Roslin Institute near Edinburgh had 
surprised the international community by announcing the first successful attempt to create a 
cloned mammal, Dolly the sheep (Wilmut et al., 1997). In the wake of the ensuing global 
debate that was focused on the technical possibility of cloning humans, governments 
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everywhere took legislative steps to outlaw the cloning of human beings. There is virtually a 
worldwide consensus about the moral undesirability of ‘reproductive cloning’, but the same 
cannot be said of what is called ‘therapeutic cloning’ (Dickson, 2005a). The same technique 
that had been used by the Scottish researchers to create Dolly, somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT), can also be used for purposes of therapeutic cloning. In the latter case the cloned 
embryo that has been obtained through fusion of an enucleated oocyte (egg cell) with a 
somatic cell drawn from an adult person will not be placed into the womb of a surrogate 
mother and allowed to grow into a full-fledged organism. Instead, the cloned embryo will at 
an early stage (that is, as a blastocyst) be harvested for stem cells. Such stem cells are still 
relatively unspecialized (‘pluripotent’) and can be stimulated to develop into various tissue 
cells. They can thus be used as a ‘repair kit’ for treating all kinds of degenerative diseases, 
such as Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, diabetes or spinal cord injury. Therapeutic cloning is also 
controversial, but the moral objections against this set of techniques follow lines that are 
familiar from earlier debates about abortion. The Roman Catholic Church and several 
orthodox Protestant denominations officially reject the use of human embryonic stem cells 
because they date the beginning of human life (or personhood) at the moment of conception. 
As the technique involves killing an embryo, it would in their view be tantamount to 
‘murder’, even if this were done to save the life of a desperate patient (for an exposition of the 
strict Catholic viewpoint, see Doerflinger, 1999). Many others who do not share this ‘pro-life’ 
stance, however, set high hopes on the prospect of therapeutic cloning.            
 
For the opponents of human embryonic stem cell research, Hwang’s apparent successes with 
therapeutic cloning also brought the possibility of reproductive cloning so much closer within 
reach. Dr. Leon Kass, the conservative chairman of the US President’s Council on Bioethics, 
used a slippery-slope argument to express his worries when he heard from the results of the 
first Science study:  
“The age of human cloning has apparently arrived: today, cloned blastocysts for research, 
tomorrow cloned blastocysts for babymaking” (Kolata, 2004).  
His reaction to the second Science study was an expanded version of this reply:  
“[W]hatever its technical merit, this research is morally troubling: it creates human 
embryos solely for research, makes it much easier to produce cloned babies, and exploits 
women as egg donors not for their benefit” (Kolata, 2005).  
Now the slippery-slope argument was slightly weaker and the last point introduced a new 
element in the discussion. It may address the feminist critique that by concentrating ethical 
debate on the moral status of the embryo, the women behind the donated eggs are lost from 
view (Dickenson, 2002). However, bioethicist Arthur Caplan accuses his conservative 
colleagues and the religious leaders in the US of following a scare tactics: 
“There are no agreed-upon rules governing issues such as how and when you get consent 
from women who donate their eggs to be used in cloning experiments to create human 
embryos. Can or should those whose DNA or eggs are used have a say in what researchers 
can do with anything they create from them? How long can South Korean researchers keep 
stem cells made from cloned human embryos? Can they sell them to others inside or 
outside their country? None of these questions have answers because many politicians and 
religious leaders who oppose stem cell research don’t want these questions answered. They 
want to win their argument by keeping cloning in a moral Catch-22. […] So the critics 
prefer to continue to leave cloning for research unregulated so that you will stay scared and 
cloning will stay banned.” (Caplan, 2005) 
Thus the wholesale rejection of all forms of cloning by the Religious Right in the US led to a 
failure to properly regulate egg donation procedures for the sake of therapeutic cloning. It was 
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only after the fall-out of the Hwang affair that some American states (e.g. California) 
undertook an effort to remedy this situation.  
 
Ethical misconduct and scientific misconduct 
 
It was Hwang’s perpetration of scientific fraud (that is, his falsification and fabrication of 
data), rather than his ethically dubious practices of procuring eggs from vulnerable, paid and 
insufficiently informed donors, that angered many of his fellow scientists. Already on 15 
December 2005, less than a month after choosing Hwang as ‘Research Leader of the Year’, 
the editors of Scientific American decided to remove him from this honoured position. Their 
motivation is quite revealing: 
“The allegations of ethical misconduct were very troubling, but Scientific American’s 
editors felt it was important to give Dr. Hwang the benefit of the doubt until their veracity 
could be determined. Even when those charges were borne out, we respected that the ethics 
of accepted practice in this area were still somewhat murky, and we declined to judge him 
too quickly, although his cover-up of those problems was clearly wrong. However, 
scientific fraud is an unforgivable offense against the enterprise of research, and in this 
case, it completely invalidates the selection of Dr. Hwang for inclusion in the Scientific 
American 50” (Scientific American, 2005).   
Ethical misconduct might be excusable, but ‘scientific misconduct’ (or ‘fraud’) constitutes an 
unforgivable offence! The same mindset made many stem-cell researchers suspect the reasons 
Schatten had mentioned in November 2005 for suspending his collaboration with Hwang. 
Ethical transgressions were hardly deemed a convincing reason.29 In this connection we 
should remember that American scientists have waged a successful campaign for a narrow 
definition of scientific ‘misconduct’ in terms of the three specific acts of fabrication, 
falsification and plagiarism (FFP), against Congressional attempts to stretch the definition so 
as to include “other serious deviations” from accepted practice (Kaiser, 1999). The narrow 
FFP-definition of scientific misconduct was also the starting point of the investigative panel 
that was installed by the University of Pittsburgh to inquire into Gerald Schatten’s role in the 
whole affair (University of Pittsburgh, 2006; Marris and Check, 2006; Holden, 2006). 
Because Schatten was far removed from the actual work done in the Seoul laboratory, he 
could not be charged with falsification and fabrication. His main misdemeanour was claiming 
senior authorship for the second Science paper for which his contribution had been editorial.30 
Although he enjoyed the benefits deriving from his being a senior author, he had not fulfilled 
the accompanying responsibilities for the manuscript as a whole, ensuring approval of the 
manuscript by all co-authors, and checking on the veracity of the reported data. Still, he got 
off the hook:  
“Dr. Schatten shirked these responsibilities, a serious failure that facilitated the publication 
of falsified experiments in Science magazine. While this failure would not strictly 
constitute research misconduct as narrowly defined by University of Pittsburgh policies 
[and by federal guidelines – HvdB], it would be an example of research misbehavior.” 
(University of Pittsburgh, 2006, p. 9; our italics).  
 
29 “As soon as his main US collaborator, Gerald Schatten of the University of Pittsburgh, announced in 
November that he was bailing out of his collaboration with Hwang [..], people began to speculate that Schatten 
must know there was a problem with the result of the seminal 2004 paper. After all, they inferred, no one would 
leave a wildly successful research group over ethical transgressions. Or would they?” (Nature Editorial, 2006).  
30 The panel’s report is highly cynical about Schatten’s co-authorship for the ‘Snuppy’ paper in Nature: “As for 
the brief communication to Nature about the cloning of the dog Snuppy, for which Dr. Schatten was a listed co-
author, we have no reason to doubt Schatten’s statement to us that his major contribution to the paper was a 
suggestion that a professional photographer be engaged so that Snuppy would appear with greater visual appeal. 
It is less clear that this contribution fully justifies co-authorship.” (University of Pittburgh, 2006, p. 8).     
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In a reaction, Science editor-in-chief Donald Kennedy remarked: “Nobody I know knows 
what ‘research misbehaviour’ is” (Marris and Check, 2006).31 The Hwang scandal shows that 
the path between unethical behaviour and outright research misconduct may be rather short 
(Nature Editorial, 2006). The researcher who cuts ‘ethical’ corners may not shrink from 
deliberate falsification of evidence either. As Nature remarks, “sound ethics and good 
research practice go hand in hand” (Nature Editorial, 2006).      
  
Ethics, culture, and religion 
 
The story of Hwang’s rise and fall contains many lessons about research ethics, the 
limitations of peer review and the governance of science (e.g., Resnik et al., 2006; Dickson, 
2005; Nature Editorial, 2006; Wade, 2005; Oldaker, 2006; Gottweis and Triendl, 2006). Our 
special interest here, however, is the possible influence of cultural differences in the socio-
ethical assessment of biotechnology against the backdrop of the globalization of scientific 
research and technology development. From this specific angle the Hwang case is also 
especially relevant and instructive. In this connection, we have to bear in mind that the 
appreciation of Hwang’s stem-cell work and its international significance will inevitably be 
strongly coloured by our awareness of its fraudulent character. Opinions may therefore vary 
considerably, depending on whether they were formulated before or after mid-December 
2005.   
  
A case in point is an editorial commentary published in The Economist on 1 December 2005, 
at a time when Hwang had already admitted to violating ethical rules in egg procurement but 
before the fraudulent character of his stem-cell work had become manifest. The commentary 
dismisses the ethical concerns raised by the irregularities in egg procurement as overblown 
and exaggerated. It condemns western “agonizing” about stem cell research and recommends 
the allegedly prevailing Korean view to “just get on with it” as a much healthier attitude. 
Thanks to this more relaxed attitude of the Korean people, Dr. Hwang had been able to forge 
ahead and “had stolen a march” on his western rivals. Despite his ethical lapses, he still 
enjoyed strong support from the Korean public and the government:  
“The strong public support for Dr Hwang is mirrored in government policy. The 
administration has already cleared him of substantial wrongdoing and has promised to 
continue its financial support for his work. Besides playing to the gallery of public opinion, 
it is hoping that, in the long-term, stem-cell technology could become an important engine 
of growth. And that sort of belief has the advantage that you can put it in the bank” (The 
Economist, 2005; our italics).  
                                                 
31 There is also much resentment among Korean biologists about the light punishment meted out to Schatten. As 
one anonymous Korean embryologist declared: “I think he [Schatten] is the biggest beneficiary of the stem cell 
scandal while the loser is, as you know, Hwang and Korea” (Kim Tae-gyu, 2006c). An important part of the 
complaint is that Schatten has stolen ‘intellectual property’ from Hwang and Seoul National University (SNU). 
As a matter of fact, both Schatten and Hwang/SNU have each filed for patents on the creation of human 
embryonic stem cell lines in several countries. It may appear strange that these patent applications have not been 
withdrawn after the stem-cell work turned out to be a fraud. Lawrence Smith-Higgins, an official at the UK 
Patent Office, explains: “European patent examiners are not interested in whether something will work or not. 
The commercial world, which is where patents belong, will judge” (quoted in Fox, 2006). So even if it does not 
work you can still patent it! It remains to be seen whether any of these patents will be granted. The investigative 
panel of the University of Pittsburgh obliquely noted that Schatten’s position as senior author of the second 
Science paper gave him “enhanced positioning for pending patent applications” (University of Pittsburgh, 2006, 
p. 9). How he can claim the intellectual property of an alleged invention while his authorship role was only 
editorial remains a mystery.    
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Americans and Europeans are subtly advised to follow the (presumed) example of the 
Koreans and set their ethical objections aside for the sake of economic growth. They are also 
asked not to meddle with Korean affairs:  
“Nobody likes outsiders telling him what to do, and in the wake of the controversy, many 
South Koreans have called on the West not to impose its values on those of other cultures” 
(ibid.).  
Remarkably, The Economist slides back into cultural relativism here.  
 
Invoking cultural differences may be tricky, however, especially when the precise nature of 
the differences is left rather vague. One would have liked to see The Economist’s commentary 
much more specific on this point. Are “outsiders” really telling “Koreans” what to do? 
Exactly what values is “the West” trying to impose on Korean culture that are foreign to it? 
Does the journal refer to the Catholic (or orthodox Protestant) view of the earliest human 
embryo as a full person that needs to be protected or to the importance of voluntary and 
informed consent in egg donation? It is hardly plausible to assert that “the West” tries to 
impose the former view on Korea, unless one would be willing to dismiss the Korean Catholic 
Church and some of the Protestant denominations as mere vehicles of foreign cultural powers. 
But that would call into question the multi-religious character of South Korean society.32 
Presumably, Catholicism and orthodox Protestantism are also part of Korean culture.33 The 
religious leaders of the Catholic Church and of the Protestant denominations united in the 
Christian Council of Korea (as against the more liberal Protestants united in the National 
Council of Churches in Korea) are indeed firmly opposed to human embryonic stem-cell 
research. It is also true that there is often a considerable gap between the views of the 
religious leaders and those of the followers. As a Catholic clergyman, the Rev. Lemigio Lee 
Dong-ik, explained in December 2005: 
“Laypeople are not aware of the (negative) implications of the research and the media 
spread (positive) information that focuses only on national wealth and being the world’s 
No. 1 (in this field)” (Kim Ki-tae, 2005).  
The cleric was thus fully aware that his Church’s message went against the united force of the 
strong currents of economic policy and national chauvinism, as expressed by the Korean 
media. He added that the Catholic Church would step up its efforts to educate the local priests 
and the laypersons on the implications of human embryonic stem-cell research. The Korean 
Catholic Church also pledged financial support for adult stem-cell research as an acceptable 
alternative.  
 
Among Korea’s major religions, only Buddhism supported Hwang’s stem-cell research, albeit 
not without significant exceptions. Hwang himself, though raised as a Catholic, had converted 
to Buddhism in 1987. He regularly visits the famous Chondung-sa temple (Kim Tae-gyu, 
2005a), and several Buddhist leaders in their turn have paid visits to his laboratory in Seoul. 
Hwang had also found a way to reconcile his stem-cell work with his Buddhist faith. Asked 
about his religious background in an interview with The New York Times held at the time of 
his first Science paper, he declared:  
 
32 “Among the 48 million Korean inhabitants, about 10 million are Buddhist, 9 million Protestant and 3 million 
Catholic. About 210.000 people are adherents of Confucianism, and a smaller number follow Shamanism, a 
nature religion making contacts with deceased spirits.” (Yoo, 2006).  
33 However, even some Korean Christians seem to have doubts whether their religion is fully part of Korean 
culture. “My family is Christian,” explained one prominent bioethicist to Pete Shanks, “But that’s only been a 
hundred years.” (Shanks, 2006).    
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“I am a Buddhist, and I have no philosophical problem with cloning. As you know, the 
basis of Buddhism is that life is recycled through reincarnation. In some ways, I think, 
therapeutic cloning restarts the cycle of life.” (Dreifus, 2004).34 
The executive director of the Chogye Order of Korean Buddhism, the Venerable Ji Kwan, 
also provided an interpretation of Buddhist doctrine that would justify Hwang’s research:  
“Buddha taught us to give everything to the sick, whether it costs an arm and a leg. If we 
say nothing for Hwang, our Buddhism is dead.” (Kim Ki-tae, 2005).35 
The Korea Times went on reporting how the Buddhist leader invoked the difference between 
East and West to oppose the other religions, especially Protestantism: 
“The monk even went so far as to criticize other religions, which is rare from an adherent to 
a religion which avoids such provocations. ‘It is nonsense for some to insist that only the 
embryonic stem cell, (not the adult stem cell), is living.’ He went so far as to claim that 
Western and Eastern ethics are different but that Protestants are excessively trying to apply 
Western ethics here.” (Kim Ki-tae, 2005).    
It is not entirely clear why the Venerable Ji Kwan targeted Protestants rather than Catholics, 
but a possible strategic reason is that Korean Protestants were least loyal to their orthodox 
leaders on this issue (a survey showed that 6 out of 10 Protestants supported Hwang’s 
research and only 2 out of 10 were opposed; ibid.). In any case, playing the culture card is a 
dangerous game, inside and outside Korea. Within Korea, the use of this strategic ploy can be 
linked to an atmosphere of intense nationalism in which the defence of Hwang as the ‘Pride of 
Korea’ became almost a patriotic duty.36   
 
When saying that the West should not impose its values on other cultures, The Economist may 
also have referred to procedures of informed consent as an expression of the principle of 
                                                 
34 On a 2004 conference in Seattle, Hwang’s co-author Moon Shin-Yong declared in a similar vein: “[C]loning is 
a different way of thinking about the recycling of life. It’s a Buddhist way of thinking.” (quoted in Frazzetto, 
2004). However, Damien Keown, an internationally recognized authority on Buddhism, disagrees with this 
view: “I’m afraid I have to disagree with [Dr. Moon’s] comments. Since therapeutic cloning involves 
experimentation on immature human beings, it might be thought clearly contrary to Buddhist ethics.” (ibid.). In 
an earlier article written with James Hughes, Keown stated that “most Buddhist commentators have adopted 
classical Hindu teachings that the transmigration of consciousness occurs at conception, and therefore that all 
abortion incurs the karmic burden of killing” (Hughes and Keown, 1995). See also Keown’s comments in 2004: 
“It would therefore be immoral for stem cell researchers to use either surplus, unwanted or frozen embryos 
created for IVF treatment – regardless of whether they would eventually be destroyed – or cloned human 
embryos specifically created for research purposes, such as the 30 blastocysts recently created in South Korea 
from which one new stem cell line was derived” (Keown, 2004). Keown’s opinion is contrary to the widespread 
support Korean Buddhist leaders have given to Hwang’s research (Kim Ki-tae, 2005). Jens Schlieter points out 
that “Korean Buddhist critics of cloning-for-research play an important role in the movement ‘People’s 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy’, a fact seldom mentioned in Western reports.” (Schlieter, 2006, pp. 181-
82).      
35 At least one leading Korean Buddhist, Do Beop, the former head of Silsang Buddhist Temple in the southern 
city of Namwon, takes a different view: “[Hwang’s research] runs against the Buddhism’s view of the world and 
its philosophy. The attempts to extend the human life will only magnify the crisis of the modern world, which 
stems from the egoistic desire of human beings.” (quoted from a radio interview in Coolscience, 2006).    
36 “Dr Hwang’s cult-like following was fuelled by nationalism, and has proved remarkably resilient despite 
evidence that he fabricated research and then lied about it” (Scanlon, 2006). Even after Hwang’s official 
downfall, many Buddhists continued to support him and insisted that the government keep funding his research. 
On 3 January 2006, the same Venerable Ji Kwan declared: “I don’t sympathize with Dr. Hwang because he is a 
Buddhist. Dr. Hwang is Korean and we need to give a Korean some applause if he or she is a leader in a certain 
sector” (quoted in Bae, 2006). His belief in Hwang’s scientific capability was unscathed, but he once again 
insisted that the research “should not be influenced by Western ethics” (ibid.). In May 2006, after the public 
prosecutors had published a list of indictments against Hwang, a Buddhist leader and two Buddhist businessmen 
offered more than $60 million to allow the disgraced stem-cell expert to resume his research (Wohn and 
Normile, 2006; Coolscience, 2006). 
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respect for individual autonomy. Would the journal want to suggest that this ethical principle 
is unimportant to ordinary Koreans?37 Moreover, if South Korea aspires to play a leading role 
in international stem-cell research and invites foreign researchers to participate through the 
World Stem Cell Hub, shouldn’t the country expect those researchers to be concerned about 
the procedures that have been followed in procuring eggs from donors?   
 
With hindsight, we now know that the “march” that Hwang had allegedly stolen on his 
western rivals did not amount to a real head start, so in the end the Korean advantage may 
have been illusionary. But what about the suggested cultural differences? Are Koreans really 
less concerned about ethical questions? And how should we deal with such cultural 
differences in the context of increasing globalization of scientific research? What does the 
Hwang affair teach us about these questions?  
 
Hwang’s rise to power and Korean nationalism 
 
Many commentators, Korean as well as foreign, hold that Korean nationalism forms an 
important key for understanding the Hwang affair (McCurry, 2006; Kim Tae-Ho, 2006; 
Scanlon, 2006; Iglauer, 2005; Stollorz, 2005; Faiola, 2006; Huer, 2006; Yoon, 2005; Onishi, 
2006, Saunders, 2006; Wikipedia, 2006). In 2004 and until the end of 2005, Hwang was a 
scientific superstar and the ‘Pride of Korea’: 
“If there is such a thing as the Korean Dream, then Hwang Woo-suk was surely its 
embodiment. At the height of his popularity he was regarded as a national hero. Colleagues 
feted him as a pioneer in his field; politicians rewarded his achievements with cash and 
citations; thousands signed up to an online group devoted to his genius; some even said he 
was performing the work of God” (McCurry, 2006).  
Some authors speculate that Koreans feel a desperate need to overcome their national 
inferiority complex, born of a painful history of modernisation  − 36 years of Japanese 
occupation, the Korean War and territorial division, forty years of dictatorship until 1987, and 
the economic crisis of the late 1990s (Kim Tae-Ho, 2006; Yoon, 2005). This nationalistic 
sentiment is projected on ‘cutting-edge’ science and technology of ‘world-class’ quality. It is 
not just that Korea is scrambling for a prominent position in what is seen as an economically 
important, biology-based industry of the future. Koreans are also anxious for tokens of 
international recognition and collectively yearned for a Nobel Prize to be awarded to their 
‘world-class’ scientist. It would have given them reassurance that as a nation they are ‘on the 
right track again’ (Kim Tae-Ho, 2006). This entire complex of ideas and motives is often 
referred to as techno-nationalism (Kang and Segal, 2006).   
 
It is understandable that Hwang’s alleged breakthroughs in stem-cell research (internationally 
recognized in the Science papers of 2004 and 2005) helped him achieve national fame as a 
superstar and an almost unassailable position in Korean biomedical science. But how did he 
manage to muster support for embarking on this line of research in the first place? It seems 
that nationalism also played a prominent part as a rhetorical resource in his rise to power.  
 
 
37 Aera Han expounds that the principle of ‘informed consent’ is recognized by the Supreme Court of South 
Korea: “Medical malpractice suits have increased rapidly, and the notion of ‘informed consent’ has been adopted 
in contracts and torts through the interpretation of the Civil Code of South Korea. Since the late 1980s, the 
Supreme Court of Korea began to apply the principle vigorously [ref.]. Informed consent is now an established 
doctrine, and even if the plaintiff cannot prove the causality between the lack of informed consent and the actual 
harm, if she proves the lack of informed consent itself in the medical treatment in question, she may be awarded 
at least compensatory damages for the emotional distress caused by the deprivation of self-determination or loss 
of the right to choose.” (Han, 2006, p. 10-11)  
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Hwang, born in 1953 as the son of humble peasants, had trained as a veterinarian. In 1999 he 
first attracted nation-wide public attention with his claim to have cloned two calves, a 
Holstein breed and an indigenous cattle breed, by using the technique of SCNT or somatic 
cell nuclear transfer (APBN, 1999). In the eyes of the public, these claimed achievements 
turned Hwang from an ordinary professor in veterinary medicine into a ‘cloning expert’. 
Following debates on ‘Dolly’, cloning was equated with cutting-edge, ‘world-class’ science 
and technology. “In the case of science, the word ‘world-class’ matters to the Koreans; it acts 
like a magic spell” (Kim Tae-Ho, 2006). To underscore the world-class quality of his 
achievement, Hwang named his first cloned calf “Young Rong” – which means the world’s 
fifth cloned animal (APBN, 1999). By cloning a native cattle breed too, he raised economic 
expectations and also played to Korean nationalistic sentiment: 
“He [Hwang] said the success of cloning of Korean cattle would have a major economic 
impact in the Korean cow industry, as many Koreans prefer beef of the Korean breed to 
imported beef.” (ibid.)  
There was, however, one dubious aspect to Hwang’s first forays into cloning: 
“Hwang failed to provide scientifically verifiable data for the research, giving only media 
sessions and photo-ops.” (Wikipedia, 2006) 
Despite this lack of proper scientific substantiation, his claims enjoyed a favourable reception 
in the Korean media. Hwang may indeed have succeeded in cloning cows (as he later was 
able to clone ‘Snuppy’ the dog), but he did not publish his findings in the scientific literature 
and thus submit his claims to the usual peer review. That did not prevent government officials 
and politicians from lavishly funding his research. In fiscal year September 1999 - August 
2000, the Ministry of Science and Technology provided $1.6 million for a project seeking to 
mass-produce high-capacity dairy cows by SCNT (Han, 2006). “Though the project failed 
completely, Dr. Hwang’s reputation remained intact.” (ibid., p. 18).    
 
Other research plans before 2004 involved the creation of BSE-resistant cows and aseptic 
piglets, for which he received $4.3 million and $5.5 million in government funds. Although 
Hwang claimed success for these projects, he once again did not submit any papers on the 
results (ibid.). A remarkable announcement was his plan to clone the virtually extinct Korean 
tiger (or Mount Paektu tiger), a subspecies of the Siberian tiger. According to Korean legend, 
this tiger is the sacred guardian of towns; it is a national symbol that was used in the 1988 
Olympics of Seoul (Torchia, 2001). Hwang took cells from the ears of the female Korean 
tiger in the zoo at the outskirts of Seoul (a gift from North Korea and the only Korean tiger 
available in South Korea), employed a lioness as surrogate mother, but alas, the ovum died 
(ibid.). He is supposed to have said: “I’ll spread the Korean people’s spirit by cloning the 
Mount Paektu tiger” (Onishi, 2006).    
 
Hwang was a master of public relations and networking. He was accessible to journalists and 
a great communicator.38 Although presumably a ‘world-class’ scientist, he presented himself 
as an ordinary citizen and stressed his ‘commonness’ and humble origins. Contrary to the 
cosmopolitan orientation of many Korean scientists, he always struck a patriotic note in his 
public presentations. He was fond of varying on one of Louis Pasteur’s famous statements, 
saying “although science has no borders, a scientist does have a nationality”.  His tireless 
efforts, underpinned by a rigorous work ethic, were devoted to the aim of putting Korea on 
                                                 
38 However, he also knew how to ‘use’ journalists: “He carefully managed his connection to journalists, and even 
‘hired’ some ex-journalists to his private team for dealing with the press […]” (Kim Tae-Ho, 2006). But perhaps 
this statement refers to the later period of human embryonic stem cell research. For the relations between Hwang 
and journalists, see also Kim Hee Won (2006).  
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the scientific world map.39 He also regularly met with patients suffering from incurable 
diseases and shared his hopeful expectation with them that in the not too remote future stem-
cell research would offer a cure to their ailments.40       
 
Hwang also established relationships with government officials and politicians, including 
President Roh Moo-hyun, who grasped the opportunity to boost the waning popularity of his 
government by associating himself with the popular scientist. Hwang’s close ties with a select 
group of high-ranking officials within the government bureaucracy allowed him to get 
generous funding for his research projects but also helped to clear away any regulatory 
hurdles that might otherwise have blocked these projects. (Of especially strategic importance 
to Hwang was Park Ky-young, who became the President’s advisor for Science and 
Technology Policy in early 2004. In 2003 she played a prominent role in the drafting of new 
legislation regulating human embryonic stem-cell research and other areas of biomedical 
research). Policy analysts Herbert Gottweis and Robert Triendl describe the Korean system of 
science governance as one that lacks financial and political accountability, transparency and 
solid Chinese walls against corruption and cronyism: 
“South Korean science remains characterized by networks of a few individual scientists 
with privileged connections and access to politicians, administrators and elites. The 
distribution of grants and financial support is strongly based on government decisions and 
strategies rather than on review, competition, hearings and applications.” (Gottweis and 
Triendl, 2006, p. 143). 
Hwang was to take advantage of this system to the fullest extent. 
 
“After achieving cloning successes with animals”, according to an article in The Korea Times 
of 31 May 2005, “Professor Hwang Woo-suk jumped to human stem cell research in 2001 
based on 4 billion won [roughly $4 million] in government funds.” (Kim Tae-gyu, 2005c).41 
At that time political debates on the proper legal and regulatory framework for such research 
were still far from settled. There was a stalemate because no choice could be made between 
two different drafts for a new Bioethics and Biosafety Act, the one proposed  by the Ministry 
of Science and Technology and backed by biotech researchers and industry and the other by 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare and backed by bioethicists and NGOs (Han, 2006, 14). 
However, after the commotion aroused by (false) rumours in 2002 about a South Korean 
woman having made pregnant with a cloned human embryo by an affiliate of Clonaid, a 
company linked to the sect of the Raelians (BBC News, 2002), the need to arrive at a single 
draft for the new law became more urgent. On 29 December 2003 the Bioethics and Biosafety 
Act passed the National Assembly; it was promulgated on 29 January 2004 and would take 
effect on 1 January 2005 (for an English version of the text of the law, see South Korea, 
2005).42 Hwang’s stem cell research that was reported in the first Science paper thus occurred 
 
39 In Hwang’s view, effort is more important than talent: “The only road (to a success) is diligence. Even a fool 
can do everything if he is diligent enough to move the heart of the sky.” (quoted in Kim Tae-gyu, 2005c). 
40 The canonical story is that of a 9-year-old boy, Kim Hyeoni, who had been paralyzed through a car accident 
and who would become ‘[Somatic Cell] Donor 2’ in Hwang’s second Science study. When Hwang visited 
Hyeoni in the hospital in April 2003, the boy reportedly asked him: “Sir, will I be able to stand up and walk 
again?”, to which Hwang allegedly replied: “I will make you walk, I promise” (see Demick, 2006a). Later, South 
Korea issued post stamps dedicated to Hwang that depicted a paralyzed man in a wheelchair regaining full 
movement. (For a picture of the stamp, see Wikipedia, 2006).  
41 Hwang’s laboratory at the College of Veterinary Medicine of Seoul National University continued with its 
many projects involving cloning animals even after the research on human embryonic stem cells had been 
initiated. In May 2004, Nature’s correspondent David Cyranovski described Hwang’s laboratory as a “cloning 
factory” (Cyranovski, 2004b).  
42 The Korean Bioethics Association was not happy with this law. In a declaration of 22 May 2004 the 
Association stated: “We regret the fact that the new Bioethics and Safety Act will be effective beginning January 
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before the law took effect. The law provides, among other things, for the establishment of the 
National Bioethics Committee, under the President, to deliberate on matters concerning the 
establishment of major policies respecting bioethics and safety in biotechnology (articles 6 to 
10); prohibits human cloning (articles 11 and 12); prohibits trading in human sperm or eggs 
(article 13.3); allows the use of residual embryos for stem cell research under certain 
conditions (article 17); and allows somatic cell nuclear transfer and the use of the resulting 
embryo clones for the purpose of conducting research aimed at curing rare or currently 
incurable diseases, under the review of the National Bioethics Committee and the approval of 
the Minister of Health and Welfare (articles 22 and 23).  
 
However, the Bioethics and Biosafety Act contains a very odd Additional Provision 3 
(‘Interim Measures on Embryonic Stem Cell Research’), which had been specifically inserted 
to serve Hwang’s interests.43 His team was the only research team in South Korea that could 
meet the requirement of Additional Provision 3 when the law took effect. His stem-cell 
research would thus enjoy a de facto monopoly and be exempt from review by the National 
Bioethics Committee (Han, 2006, p. 44). Hwang got approval to conduct stem cell research 
directly from the Minister of Health and Welfare and thus bypassed the need for review from 
the National Bioethics Committee, which, by the way, was only formed on 7 April 2005, 
more than three months after the new law took effect. The Committee would issue review 
guidelines only after the Korean stem-cell scandal erupted. Many Koreans suspected that the 
insertion of Additional Provision 3 in the Act, to make it more favourable to Hwang’s stem 
cell research, had been the work of Park Ky-young. She was rewarded in 2004 by being made 
one of the 15 co-authors on the first Science paper. After a Korean professor in the history of 
science, Lee Pilryeol, raised critical questions about her contribution to the stem-cell work, 
“Park [said] that she had played an important role in Hwang’s research over the years by 
advising him on public attitudes to his work with transgenic livestock, but she told Nature that 
she had no specific involvement with the therapeutic-cloning paper” (Cyranovski, 2004a; see 
also Han, 2006, p. 39). 
 
There were other laws and regulatory guidelines beside the Bioethics and Biosafety Act that 
were relevant to Hwang’s stem-cell work, such as the Guidelines for Korean Good Clinical 
Practice. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) at several hospitals and infertility clinics were 
supposed to oversee the egg retrieval that took place at these locations. However, they were 
not properly informed by the researchers about the consent procedures, risks, funding sources 
and other relevant aspects relating to these activities and generally discharged their 
supervisory duties in a formalistic and uncritical way (for a detailed analysis, see Han, 2006). 
Under the new bioethics law the actual creation of stem cells through somatic cell nuclear 
transfer needed review through the local IRB at the College of Veterinary Medicine of Seoul 
                                                                                                                                                        
1, 2005. This act has not received the support of the scientists, doctors, ethicists, lawyers, religious leaders, and 
other members of the Bioethics Advisory Committee, which was overseen by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology between 2000 and 2001.” (Korean Bioethics Association, n.d.). The Association also noted to its 
dismay that “it seems that our government is irresponsibly encouraging scientists to engage in this sort of 
research [i.e. research involving the cloning of human embryos]” before a proper regulatory framework was in 
place. See also the letter on ‘Stem Cell Research on Korea’ that the president of the Korean Bioethics 
Association sent to Science (Song, 2004) and the response by Hwang and Moon Shin-Yong. The latter declared: 
“The Korean Bioethics Association (KBA) is, in our opinion, not neutral and advocates restricting the pace of 
biomedical advancements, viewing new techniques as threats to society” (Hwang and Moon, 2004, p. 945).     
43 “Anyone who is engaged in embryonic stem cell research for the purposes mentioned in Article 17-2 at the 
time this Act takes effect may continue his or her research, with the approval of the Minister of Health and 
Welfare on either of the following conditions: (1) The researcher has been engaged in embryonic stem cell 
research for at least 3 years; or (2) The researcher has published at least one research paper on embryonic stem 
cell research in a related academic periodical.”  
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 National University. Such a body was duly created but its independence from the researchers 
was not secured:  
“As Dr. Hwang was a superstar in the College, he could choose anyone he liked as an IRB 
member. The members he chose mostly did not know what the IRB should review, and 
assumed the IRB was simply a formality.” (Han, 2006, 52-53).  
In short, due to Hwang’s influence and prestige, the ethical review procedures surrounding his 
research including the review procedures for egg donation and retrieval were no more than 
empty formalities.          
 
Criticizing a national hero 
 
Criticism is essential to the scientific enterprise, yet through his landmark papers in Science 
Hwang acquired such a superstar status that he became “almost invincible to any criticism” 
(Han 2006, 42). In fact, criticizing Korea’s national hero was regarded as an infamous and 
unpatriotic act.  
 
It was already difficult to get a hearing for the ethical concerns that were voiced in 2004 after 
the publication of the first Science paper. As a senior biologist at Seoul National University 
was quoted as saying in May 2004, “No one wants to debate the ethics because the 
government is so excited about [Hwang’s research]” (Cyranovski, 2004b).  
 
The concerns were serious enough. Immediately after the appearance of the first Science 
paper, Hwang’s team elicited amazement among foreign stem cell researchers for having been 
able to assemble so many egg cells, 242 in total, from 16 allegedly unpaid donors. It is known 
that egg retrieval, which involves injection with hormones to stimulate hyperovulation, 
ultrasound monitoring and surgical egg extraction with a thin needle, is an invasive and 
painful procedure with many risks and side effects. Jose Cibelli, the American co-author on 
the 2004 paper, declared: “It would never fly in the United States” (Cyranovski, 2004a). In 
that country, the company Advanced Cell Technology had offered donors a fee of $4.000 and 
had managed to recruit “just a few donors” and to assemble only 19 eggs (Kolata, 2004).  
 
No wonder, then, that suspicions were raised. Korean bioethicists and citizens-rights activists 
urged Hwang’s team and the relevant IRBs to be more transparent and demonstrate that 
ethical procedures had been followed in recruiting donors (see on the website of Korean 
Bioethics Association, n.d.). In an interview with Nature held in April 2004, a PhD student on 
Hwang’s team, Ja Min Koo, initially declared that she and another woman in the lab had been 
among the donors. She later retracted her declaration, blaming the ‘misunderstanding’ on her 
poor English. The retraction was not really convincing, however, as she had also mentioned 
the hospital where the egg retrieval had taken place (Cyranovski, 2004a). Hwang denied that 
anybody on his team had donated eggs.  
 
Cultural differences, and Korean nationalism, were also suggested to explain the success of 
Hwang’s team in recruiting donors: 
“By contrast [to Advanced Cell Technology’s use of paid donors], Hwang says Korean egg 
donors were not paid, and were motivated by a desire to help people, and through national 
pride. Cultural differences may also partly explain the Korean team’s success in recruiting 
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willing volunteers: in Asian societies a greater stress is placed on serving the common 
good” (Cyranovski, 2004b).44 
 
In any case, President Roh Moo-hyun left no doubt that the Korean government would not let 
ethical objections stand in the way of scientific progress. When he awarded Hwang a medal 
on 18 June 2004, he declared: 
“[I]t is not possible nor desirable to prohibit research, just because there are concerns that it 
may lead to a direction that is deemed unethical.” (Wikipedia, 2006) 
 
Ethical concerns resurfaced with the publication of the second Science study, which had 
allegedly used 185 eggs from an undisclosed number of Korean women. In a parallel 
contribution to Science’s ‘Policy Forum’, the American bioethicists David Magnus and 
Mildred Cho criticized the incompleteness of the informed-consent forms, which failed to 
elaborate on the risks and side-effects of egg retrieval. They also pointed out that Hwang and 
his colleagues had not taken precautions against the so-called ‘therapeutic misconception’, 
engendering in the donors the false belief that their contributions might have direct clinical 
benefits for their diseased relatives or loved ones. Finally, one should also be alert to the 
possibility that oocyte donors feel coerced by their family situations into donating (Magnus 
and Cho, 2005). These concerns were also voiced by South Korean bioethicists (Kim Tae-
gyu, 2005d). 
 
By now, however, Hwang’s position appeared even more unassailable. He was assured of 
high-level political support. At the opening of the World Stem Cell Hub on 19 October 2005, 
President Roh declared:  
“[P]oliticians have a responsibility to manage bioethical controversies not to get in the way 
of this outstanding research and progress.” (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
On 1 June 2005 the producer of the investigative journalism programme ‘PD Notebook’ (PD 
Su-cheop), a TV magazine broadcast by the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), the 
second largest TV station in Korea, received a tip-off from a former insider on Hwang’s team 
that egg donors had been paid and that there was also a possibility that the evidence for the 
2005 paper was fabricated. The name of the ‘whistleblower’ was later revealed to be Ryu 
Young June, the second author on the 2004 paper: “When Ryu heard the news of the 2005 
paper, he immediately suspected fabrication, because according to his expertise and 
knowledge, such a quick achievement was technically impossible” (Han, 2006, 55-56). A PD 
Notebook team was formed to investigate the matter. They tried to work in secret but could 
not prevent the spread of rumours on ethical transgressions committed by the Hwang team. 
These rumours also reached Gerald Schatten (he had two of Hwang’s PhD students working 
with him in Pittsburgh45) before he publicly broke all ties with Hwang on 12 November 2005. 
On 21 November another co-author on the 2005 paper, Roh Sung Il, a fertility expert at the 
MizMedi hospital in Seoul, gave a press conference in which he declared to have paid for the 
oocytes used in the 2004 study – allegedly without Hwang’s knowledge (Cyranovski, 2005a). 
On 22 November 2005, MBC’s PD Notebook broadcast the first instalment of a planned 
                                                 
44 Cyranovski notes that the motivations of Ja Min Koo given in the original interview with Nature “fit with this 
picture of altruism and intense patriotism”. She had mentioned “a desire to help sick children, and her love for 
Korea” (Cyanovski, 2004b).   
45 In October 2005, the PD Notebook investigative team interviewed Hwang’s former junior researcher, Dr. Kim 
Sun Jong, at Pittsburgh University. “At that time, PD Su-cheop [PD Notebook] heard an important testimony 
from Kim that Hwang ordered him to multiply the number of stem cells from 2 to 11 by manipulating data” 
(Hong, 2006, 6). If Schatten became acquainted with the content of Kim’s testimony, which was not made public 
at that time, it would of course cast doubt on his avowed motive to break with Hwang. 
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series of four programmes, ‘The Myth of Hwang Woo Suk and the Suspicion over Eggs’, 
which focused on charges of egg trading and donations by female research team members. 
The producer of the programme also indicated that his newsmagazine team had conducted 
DNA tests through a DNA testing firm to compare the somatic cells of the patients used in the 
2005 study with the corresponding patient-specific stem cells.  
 
On 24 November 2005, at 2 p.m. Korean time, Hwang admitted, live on television, that he 
had used eggs from paid donors and from two junior members of his team in his 2004 study. 
He asserted that it became only known to him that two researchers from his staff had donated 
ova when Nature first reported about it in May 2004. His earlier denials were said to be 
motivated by the wish to protect the privacy of his researchers (Cyranovski, 2005b; 
Cyranovski, 2005c). Nor had the junior researchers in any way been coerced to donate.46 
Hwang explained his team’s resorting to somewhat questionable practices from a desperate 
shortage of donors. He also announced his resignation as director of the World Stem Cell 
Hub. After Hwang’s confession, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was quick to declare that 
the egg donations did not involve a violation of ethical guidelines because they were made 
voluntarily.  
 
When the issue of egg donation emerged, or rather resurfaced in November 2005, many 
Koreans tried to diminish its importance by playing the culture card. On 16 November 2006, 
Ahn Curie, a co-author on the 2005 paper and often Hwang’s spokeswoman, “attributed the 
ethical controversy over obtaining the eggs to ‘different standards’ between Koreans and 
foreigners.” (Kim Ji Soo, 2005). She said that “some medical practices that are accepted in 
Korea can be received sensitively by those abroad” (ibid.). Similarly, when the IRB of the 
College of Veterinary Medicine had to revisit the issue, it “conducted a very formalistic 
investigation and concluded that there had not been any major ethical violations in Dr. 
Hwang’s research” and “attributed most controversies to the cultural differences between the 
Eastern tradition and Western ethics codes” (Han, 2006, p. 54). After Hwang’s confessions, 
theologian Kim Heup Young of Kangnam University declared to American journalists: 
“Korean bioscientists have opened a new area of cutting-edge technology, but I don’t think 
there is any bioethics relevant to that at this moment here. We have our different social and 
cultural context, so we have to formulate our own bioethics” (Vergano and Grossman, 2005). 
In a similar vein, Choi Hee-joo, the spokesman of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
declared that there was “no violation of ethics guidelines” because the two scientists at 
Hwang’s lab donated their eggs “voluntarily for the success of the research by sacrificing 
themselves [sic]” (The Hindu, 2005). “He said the donations were made according to values 
consistent with Eastern culture, and shouldn’t be looked at from the standpoint of Western 
culture” (ibid.).47 
 
46 In an interview with Nature, Roh Sung Il told that one of the female assistants “felt obliged to donate after 
making mistakes early in the experiment that wasted eggs and set the team back by months” (Cyranovski and 
Check, 2005b). Bioethicist Insoo Hyun from Cleveland, Ohio, provided an interpretation of this purported 
motivation in terms of Korean culture: “To some degree, in Korean society, if you make a mistake you must 
make good on it somehow.” (ibid.). That would make the definition of ‘coercion’ into “a grey area” (ibid.).    
47 Playing the culture card is similar to what the Korean American ‘Jodi’ referred to on her weblog of 15 
December 2005 as ‘the Korean Way’ defence: “Don’t whine to us, the ‘rest of the world’ about what is right or 
wrong. You can’t possibly define the standards for us. You aren’t Korean! How can you understand anything we 
do here? This is the ‘Korean Way’!” (Jodi, 2005).  Reflecting on the Hwang affair, she further wrote: “In my 
opinion [...], Korea tends to operate on an ‘us vs. the rest of the world’ mentality. An ‘international mindset’ 
exists but it’s not very strong here, if you ask me. I have often encountered Koreans who believe that if the ‘rest 
of the world’ can’t accept what Korea does, they can go to hell because how can they be expected to understand 
anything about Korea anyway? It is this attitude that I find disturbing. I believe the concept of ethics in Korea 
falls into this ‘fuck the rest of them’ thinking.” (ibid.). A Korean engineer, Ho-Seon, responded in the following 
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Remarkably enough, one American (Korean-born) bioethicist, Insoo Hyun, who had visited 
Hwang’s laboratory in the summer of 2005 on a Fullbright research fellowship, did not play 
the culture card but suggested that Korea’s ethical standards for egg donation were even 
stricter than those of the US: 
“One irony of Hwang’s resignation [as director of the World Stem Cell Hub] is that South 
Korea’s egg donation standards, and those of Hwang’s lab, are now stricter than U.S. 
standards, says bioethicist Insoo Hyun of Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. 
The lab requires consent forms and psychological evaluations for donors. And earlier this 
year [when the Bioethics and Biosafety Act took effect on 1 January 2005], South Korea 
outlawed paying for eggs, which is legal in the USA.” (Vergano and Grossman, 2005). 
Insoo Hyun was to co-chair, with his Korean colleague Kyu Won Jung, the ethics working 
group of the World Stem Cell Hub (Godfrey, 2005). Perhaps as a would-be “embedded 
bioethicist” (Elliott, 2005), Hyun was so much taken in by Hwang’s achievements that he 
altogether lost his critical sense. As he said in an interview held in October 2005: “In all, I’ve 
been quite impressed by Dr. Hwang and his team as well as with their willingness to accept 
the need for ethical discussion” (Godfrey, 2005).48      
 
After PD Notebook’s first broadcast on 22 November and Hwang’s public confessions on 24 
November, many Koreans sided with Hwang and directed their furies at the TV station: “On 
26 November, demonstrators gathered outside the Munhwa Broadcasting Company in Seoul 
to decry the firm’s lack of patriotism after it aired evidence that Hwang had lied” (Cyranovski 
and Check, 2005b). Eleven of the twelve companies advertising on the TV station decided to 
pull out (Brooke and Choe, 2005). “Two Seoul newspapers reported that angry viewers had 
posted photos of family members of the show’s producers on the Internet, threatening to kill 
                                                                                                                                                        
way: “The Korean people have their ways and customs. Caucasian Americans have theirs. I can sit here and 
write pages on pages of the faults of Caucasian Americans ... and so probably a lot of other races. […]  I guess 
when in Korea, do as the Koreans. When in Rome, do as the Romans. When in the U.S., do as the Americans 
[..]” (ibid.). Jodi’s reply to this was: “[…] I think the adage of ‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do’ has 
become a clutch too many people like to rely on. Does that mean that if the Romans kill, rape and steal, it’s OK 
for us to do the same while in Rome? […]  Some cultural differences do not have to be ‘respected’ […]” (ibid.). 
48 In early 2005, the Korean bioethicist Kyu Won Jung designed donation consent procedures (both for egg 
donation and for somatic cell donation) for Hwang’s team. These procedures were described in an article co-
authored with Insoo Hyun that was to appear in the January/February 2006 issue of the American Journal of 
Bioethics, and online in December 2005, just when the Hwang scandal broke. On paper, the consent procedures 
looked quite impressive and ethically rigorous, but in the article the two authors claimed they were actually put 
into practice by Hwang’s team: “These guidelines were closely followed in the Korean research protocol that 
resulted in the recent derivation of eleven patient-specific pluripotent stem cell lines […]” (Jung and Hyun, 
2006). When the full scale of Hwang’s deception, not just with regard to the data but also with regard to egg 
donation procedures, became clear, the article was editorially retracted (McGee, 2006). Against Hyun’s 
complaint that he was the victim of ‘guilt by association’ because the editors did not allow him to submit a 
modified version of the article, the latter pointed out to Hyun “that a modified manuscript would have to explain 
the abject failure of the authors’ methods for observing, interacting with and reporting the conduct of scientists, 
[rather than] defend a system whose only effect to date appears to have been to provide Hwang with the 
appearance of close collaboration with ethicists and ethics centers while he flagrantly defied their standard” 
(AJOB editors, 2006; my italics). Their experience was an object lesson not in how to do good bioethics, but in 
what may happen when bioethicists are admitted into the ‘inner circle’ and become the ‘lap dogs’ (Carl Elliott) 
of the principal researcher: “Scientists in the lab disclosed their concerns about what would later prove to be 
violations of ethics in procurement, but not to the ethicists in the lab. The authors, working by their own report 
very intensively on site and claiming as the great advantage of their report their access to the lab, and at the 
invitation of Hwang, not only were unable to detect any abnormality prior to the creation of their process, nor 
later any failing in its implementation. [..] [T]he authors – and by extension AJOB – became the symbol Hwang 
would use to defray criticism that any impropriety had occurred” (ibid.). As is apparent from the last sentence, 
the editors also wanted to clean up their own blazon.      
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 them” (ibid.). MBC received more than 500,000 angry e-mails (Demick, 2006b). Rival 
broadcasting companies accused the producers of the programme of having used unethical 
methods of journalism by exercising pressure on Hwang’s assistants in order to elicit 
incriminating statements from them about their boss (Mitchell, 2005). MBC was forced to 
make a public apology for these ‘ethical violations’ on 4 December and decided to cancel the 
remaining broadcasts of the scheduled series on Hwang.   
 
The public outpouring of nationalistic fervour and sympathy with Hwang (who in early 
December 2005 was hospitalized due to ‘stress-related fatigue’) could be channelled into 
demonstrations, candlelight vigils, and the “I love Hwang Woo Suk” website of the online 
fan-club café that was especially created for expressing moral support to Hwang’s research 
projects (it had been set up by the ex-journalist who worked for Hwang’s team, see Kim Tae-
Ho, 2006). Within a week after its creation, more than 1,000 women had pledged to donate 
eggs to help overcome the donor shortage to which Hwang had alluded on television (Kim 
Rahn, 2005). A special organization, the People’s Foundation for the Donation of Ova for 
Research and Therapeutic Purposes, was created to process and select the applications (ibid.). 
On the ‘I love Hwang Woo Suk’ website, the donors were celebrated as “angels in the 
patriotic army”. The list of would-be donors was said to include “an entire high school class 
of 33 girls” (Brooke and Choe, 2005). The Web site also approvingly cited the comment of a 
man saying he “fought” with his wife because she refused to sign up. This one example 
appears to have been indicative of a certain numerical disparity in enthusiasm for the cause 
between the two genders: 
“At the height of the Hwang hysteria, a poll showed 30 percent of women wanted to donate 
their eggs to facilitate the research. And 45 percent of the men said that they would try to 
persuade their wives or girlfriends to donate.” (Weisbart, 2006) 
The purportedly ‘spontaneous’ rush to donate eggs raises serious questions about gender 
relations in Korea (Jinhee Park, 2006) and about the ethical issue of voluntary and informed 
consent. As the Korean-American weblogger ‘Jodi’ stated in her blog of 15 December 2005: 
“One has to wonder how much the people are being educated about the health risks of such 
a process. Do those school girls know what happens to their bodies? Quite disgusting how 
some laud even the young Hwang fans as heroes instead of doing more to protect them and 
educate them” (Jodi, 2005). 
Can consent to egg donation really be voluntary and informed when there is such an intense 
nationalistic pressure to donate?    
 
“The show must go on” 
 
The cancellation of the scheduled follow-up broadcasts of PD Notebook might have been the 
end of the controversy. To many Koreans it seemed that the producer of the programme, not 
Hwang, was at fault.  
 
South Korea is the most wired nation of the world. The Internet not only gave Hwang’s 
adherents the opportunity to mobilize massive popular support, it also enabled young 
scientists anonymously to carry on the critical scrutiny of Hwang’s research after PD 
Notebook had been forced into silence. 
 
On 5 December 2005, an anonymous writer (whose ID was ‘Anonymous’) posted a message 
on the Internet bulletin board of the Biological Research Information Center (BRIC) with the 
sarcastic title (in English!) ‘The show must go on’ (Hong, 2006). He urged his readers to look 
for duplicated photos of the 11 stem cells printed in the supporting online material 
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accompanying Hwang’s 2005 Science paper. At the end of his message he triumphantly 
exclaimed: “I found two! There are rumours that there are more …” (Chong and Normile, 
2006, 23). More than 200 postings followed from other anonymous persons also claiming to 
have found duplications. On 6 December 2006, yet another anonymous posting on the BRIC 
website revealed serious problems in the DNA fingerprinting data of the 2005 paper. The 
DNA data for the patient’s somatic cells and the patient-specific stem cells indeed matched, 
but they matched a little bit too closely. Not just the locations of the peaks were the same (as 
they should), but also their heights and the background noise signals – which is virtually 
impossible if the data refer to different, though genetically identical cells (Hong, 2006, 14). 
On 7 December, an anonymous poster with the ID ‘Freeman’ made an appeal to Occam’s 
razor: anyone who wanted to believe in Hwang’s sincerity had to account for several odd 
facts, which could be explained in a simple way if you assumed that he and his team had 
committed fraud. The likelihood that Hwang had told the truth was, in his calculation, an 
infinitesimal chance of one in a thousand billion (Hong, 2006, 15). 
 
On 8 December, a group of young biology professors at Seoul National University (SNU), 
aware of the intense flow of critical messages on the BRIC bulletin board and other websites, 
called on the university to start an internal investigation to re-examine the work done by 
Hwang’s team. Members of the team (Hwang was still hospitalized) were willing to cooperate 
only if the official investigation would have a limited mandate: 
“But [the representative of Hwang’s team] reiterated the team would not re-verify its stem 
cell research paper itself, but would in the natural process of research prove its results in 
follow-up papers. The team believes yielding to pressure to verify its results would set a 
bad precedent and harm the credibility of Korean scientists in the international 
community.” (Chosun Ilbo, 2005b; our italics). 
Hwang’s scientific supporters deliberately blurred the distinction between replication of DNA 
testing and replication of scientific experiments. Any request for replication or verification (of 
the DNA testing or the veracity of the stem cells) was repudiated as unnecessary, since in the 
further course of scientific research other scientists would naturally replicate the results 
obtained. The rather arrogant suggestion was that those who demanded replication of the 
DNA tests thereby simply showed their own scientific illiteracy (Hong, 2006).      
 
On 11 December, despite resistance from senior researchers, the president of Seoul National 
University decided to install an official investigation committee. From that day on, 
developments moved quickly. On 13 December, Schatten asked his name to be removed from 
the list of authors on the 2005 Science paper. On 15 December, Roh Sung Il, the fertility 
expert from MizMedi Hospital, declared that Hwang had admitted to him that data were 
fabricated and that there were no cloned embryonic stem cells (Cyranovski, 2005d). And the 
rest is, as they say, history.  
 
The Hwang affair confirms the general rule that cases of scientific fraud are seldom detected 
by peer review; “rather it is usually insiders and whistleblowers who first raise concerns and 
get an investigation started” (Gottweis and Triendl, 2006, 142). However, some have argued 
that sooner or later Hwang’s work would have fallen under suspicion in any case, if nobody 
could repeat it. But on the other hand, if others had succeeded in cloning human embryonic 
stem cells before the authenticity of Hwang’s results were called into question, the credit 
would still have gone to Hwang. As science journalist Nicholas Wade concludes:  
“But for the whistle-blower, Dr. Hwang might well be continuing his meteoric career on the 
wings of his reports in Science and Nature” (Wade, 2005). 
As so often in fraud cases, however, things did not end well for the whistle-blower:  
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 “Ryu resigned in December [2005] from his residency at the Korean Cancer Center in Seoul 
as the scandal was reaching its frenzied peak. […] the head of the hospital said Ryu had to 
resign because he had stopped coming to work and couldn’t fulfil the requirements for the 
residency.” (Demick, 2006b) 
Ronda Hauben praises the ‘netizens’, the young scientists on the online scientific websites: 
“These netizens were willing to challenge the government, the press, the scientific 
hierarchy in Korea, and even a scientific journal with an international reputation.” (Hauben, 
2006)  
 
After the debacle: the national fall-out 
 
Official inquiries by the SNU investigation committee, by the National Bioethics Committee 
(triggered into action by the scandal) and by public prosecutors brought to light that many 
more eggs were obtained from many more donors than the numbers mentioned in the two 
Science papers suggested. In May 2006, the public prosecutors concluded in their report that 
from 2002 until December 2005, a total of 2,236 eggs had been collected from 122 women, of 
whom 71 had been financially remunerated. Payment even continued after 1 January 2005, 
when the Bioethics and Biosafety Act banning such practices went into effect (Wohn and 
Normile, 2006).  
 
It was also found out that Hwang knew about the egg donation by two of his junior team 
members from the very outset. The report of the Prosecutor’s Office concluded that there was 
no direct coercion. Still, obtaining eggs from persons in a dependent position is ethically 
questionable in the light of the Helsinki Declaration. “Dr. Hwang even requested signatures of 
the 15 women researchers in his team on the informed consent form for ova donation and kept 
the form, which suggests that he wanted his female researchers to donate eggs.” (Han, 2006, 
25, note 89).  
 
One striking conclusion from the investigations was that the various Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) involved, those of the MizMedi Hospital and 3 other fertility clinics and of the 
College of Veterinary Medicine, had all failed miserably in their ethical review and oversight 
tasks.  
 
A report by the National Bioethics Committee released on 2 February 2006 established that 
the ova donors had not been given sufficient information about the egg retrieval process, its 
risks and side-effects and the purposes of the research for which the eggs would be used (Kim 
Cheong-won, 2006). Several donors developed ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome. Fifteen 
women from the 79 who donated through MizMedi Hospital were treated for the syndrome 
(Chong, 2006). Several women donated eggs more than twice. “The MizMedi Hospital team 
even collected ova twice from a woman, who was hospitalized for side-effects after each 
donation” (Kim Rahn, 2006). 
 
A coalition of 35 women’s associations including the Korean Womenlink decided to file a 
compensation suit against the government on behalf of the ova donors suffering from side-
effects (Kim Rahn, 2006; Korean Womenlink et al., 2006). Korean Womenlink had been 
among the first groups to raise ethical issues about stem cell research and the egg 
procurement process. “But back then no one listened to us and we received a lot of complaints 
and threats for daring to raise suspicions about Dr. Hwang”, as one organizer of the 
association declared (Weisbart, 2006). One effect of Hwang’s downfall may be that the social 
space for raising ethical issues will be widened. According to the coalition of women’s 
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associations, the problems with ova donation occurred because stem cell research, “the 
nation’s so-called next growth industry”, was allowed to develop “at full speed without any 
consideration of women’s rights whatsoever” (Korean Womenlink et al., 2006). The coalition 
established a reporting centre for egg donors suffering from the side-effects of egg retrieval, 
with a view to pressing charges against the government or the institutions involved:      
“However the major goal of our action is not monetary compensation but to publicize the 
social practices of trivializing women's rights to their bodies - especially the right to make 
informed decisions when it comes to their health. We expect that this action, by shedding 
light on the suppressed truths and holding the people in charge responsible, will lay the 
basis for establishing a system to supervise the use of biological information.” (Korean 
Womenlink et al., 2006). 
 
In the aftermath of the Hwang debacle, many voices have been aired in favour of a thorough 
overhaul of the existing Bioethics and Biosafety Act, so as to introduce tighter controls and 
more effective regulation of stem-cell research and enhance the role of Institutional Review 
Boards (Jin Hyun-joo, 2006). It remains to be seen whether the outcome of new legislative 
initiatives will live up to the expectations. What is not in doubt, however, is that the South 
Korean government is still firmly committed to boosting stem-cell research with a view to 
gaining a competitive edge over other countries in this strategic field of activity. As Professor 
Kim Dong-wook, the leader of a task force installed by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, declared on 30 March 2006: 
“Korea must forge ahead with the medical potential-rich stem cell research despite the 
disgraceful scandal involving Hwang Woo-suk” (Kim Tae-gyu, 2006d). 
The South Korean government intends to spend $454 million over the next 10 years on the 
whole stem cell area (including adult stem cell research), which is even more than had been 
promised when Hwang still reigned supreme (Normile, 2006). All grants will be subject to 
competitive review to prevent that funds are concentrated on a single person (ibid.). The 
government also seeks to revive a “pan-national” stem cell network encompassing Korean 
researchers working at home and abroad (Kim Tae-gyu, 2006d). The difference with the 
failed World Stem Cell Hub is that the new network is less international in orientation and 
mainly aimed at bringing in ethnic Koreans, especially stem-cell researchers working in the 
United States. The network will involve a stem-cell bank in which institutions like Seoul 
National University and MizMedi Hospital are also to participate. Given the government’s 
determination to forge ahead with full speed again, it is to be hoped for Korean egg donors 
that regulatory safeguards will be instituted in time to prevent a repetition of earlier ethical 
shortcuts.     
 
After the debacle: the international fall-out 
 
For the international community of stem cell researchers, the immediate effect of the 
disclosure of Hwang’s fraud was obviously the realization that they had been brought back to 
‘square one’ or the situation of two years ago before the first ‘breakthrough’ was claimed 
(Lauerman and Waters, 2006). A panel of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS) concluded that the Korean scandal would have “no more than a temporary 
effect” on stem cell research (AAAS, 2006). Some feared that “public confidence in science” 
might have been damaged (ibid.). It is not surprising that the debacle has been used by 
opponents of human embryonic stem-cell research to suggest that there is something deeply 
rotten and ethically corrupt in this field of inquiry (Do No Harm, 2006; Doerflinger, 2006a; 
Doerflinger, 2006b). On the other hand, when Hwang’s ethical lapses in egg procurement 
were disclosed in November 2005, the American bioethicists Arthur Caplan and Glenn 
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McGee argued that it was ultimately President Bush’s veto on federal funding of human 
embryonic stem-cell research that was to blame for the problems:  
“A clear majority of Americans favour embryonic stem cell research. Yet there are no 
meaningful federal funds for such research. […] As a result, our best stem cell researchers, 
like Professor Schatten, are going offshore to avoid prosecution or to find research funds. 
This means that ethics can get forgotten as other nations and private companies race to fill 
the void left by the President’s reluctance to fund stem cell research. Only a properly 
funded U.S. stem cell research program will guarantee oversight and the protection of all 
involved. Professor Hwang has gotten too powerful and the Korean government too 
dazzled with his work to allow him to be a sole man in Seoul.” (Caplan and McGee, 2005; 
our italics). 
This indirect accusation of the American president for ethical lapses that occurred in South 
Korea may even be too far-fetched for some of those who do not support his veto on human 
embryonic stem cell research. It is also rather arrogant and chauvinistic to presume that only 
the U.S. government can guarantee that ethical standards will be complied with on a 
worldwide scale.    
 
Another serious issue is the suspicion that the proponents of human embryonic stem-cell 
research may have oversold the potential of this field of inquiry and created extravagant 
expectations among the public (Aldhous, 2006). This charge has been made by an opponent 
(Doerflinger, 2006a and 2006b), but the interesting point is that it was already ventilated by a 
proponent, Professor David Shaywitz, before the Hwang scandal erupted (Shaywitz, 2005; see 
also Shaywitz, 2006a and 2006b). In April 2005, the latter pointed out that science, that is 
‘good’ science, can be “maddeningly slow”: 
“While stem cell advocates have helped voters connect embryonic stem cell research with 
compelling images of patients who might one day benefit from treatment, such therapies 
are unlikely to emerge soon enough to benefit most current proponents [...]. Soon the 
advocacy groups that have been so instrumental in supporting stem cell science will face 
mounting pressure to demonstrate that they have bet on the right technology. From the 
researchers, tremendous progress will be expected, and the science is unlikely to keep pace 
with the eager expectations.” (Shaywitz, 2005).  
At that time he was also urging scientific journals not to accept research articles of 
questionable quality for publication. After the Hwang affair, he continued to hammer on this 
apparent weakness of the entire field, criticizing the spectacle of “even well-respected 
research journals seeming to fall over one another for the privilege of publishing the next hot 
paper” (Shaywitz, 2006a). However, Shaywitz also severely criticized the low quality of the 
research that was cited by the opponents of human embryonic stem cell research to show the 
good prospects of adult stem cell research or other alternatives (Shaywitz, 2006b; Aldhous, 
2006).49 
 
Apart from scaling down its claims and ultimate promises, the international community of 
stem-cell research also had to devise new ground rules for scientific cooperation across 
national borders in a world characterized by cultural diversity and moral disagreement about 
the status of human embryos. In February 2006, a group of 60 scientists, philosophers, 
bioethicists, lawyers, clinicians, journal editors and regulators from 14 countries met in 
 
49 A recent example of ‘hyped’ results was the claim made in Nature by researchers affiliated with Advanced 
Cell Technology, Inc. that they had been able to produce stem cells “using an approach that does not harm 
embryos”, thus evading an obvious ethical objection that is particularly salient in the US. It later turned out that 
this claim had to be retracted, but in the meantime the company had raised millions from investors at heightened 
share prices (Hamilton and Regalado, 2006).  
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Cambridge, UK, to devise guidelines for ethical and legal regulation of stem cell and related 
research and its clinical applications (Hinxton Group, 2006; Weiss, 2006; Giles, 2006; 
Nelson, 2006). The meeting had already been planned two years earlier, but inevitably the 
deliberations took the recent Hwang scandal into account. The guidelines or principles on 
which the so-called Hinxton Group reached a consensus were thought to give humankind “the 
very best chance of realizing the benefits of stem cell research in an ethically acceptable 
manner” (Hinxton Group, 2006). There were, as transpires from this formulation, no 
principled opponents of human embryonic stem-cell research among the members of the 
Hinxton Group.  
 
In its Consensus Statement, the group reaffirmed the requirements that scientists and 
clinicians should conduct research according to ethically acceptable norms; that the well-
being, liberty and rights of cell and tissue donors as well as research participants should be 
protected; and that those donors and participants must provide valid informed consent. Any 
risk should be commensurate with expected overall benefit.  
 
The Hinxton Group also calls on journal editors to support and promote high standards for 
scientific peer review and to require that authors claiming the generation of new embryonic 
stem cell lines submit data verifying the authenticity of such lines. Moreover, the source of 
the cells used in the research should also be clearly specified. For the purposes of oversight 
and ethical review, the donors of human materials in the context of human ESC research are 
to be treated as research subjects.50  
 
To support and promote high standards for ethical integrity, journal editors are further asked 
to require from scientists a statement that their research conforms to local laws and policies 
and has been approved by all relevant oversight committees. On request from editors, authors 
should submit protocols approved by review boards, consent forms, and the information 
provided to tissue donors and research subjects.  
 
Journal editors should also encourage authors to include explicit descriptions of their 
contributions to the published research, in particular in international collaborations across 
countries with more permissive and more restrictive laws and regulations.  
 
Stem-cell researchers are encouraged to submit any stem cells they derive to national or 
international depositories and to make cell lines and data publicly available. This will 
facilitate replication and scientific collaboration. In the words of the Consensus Statement, 
human embryonic cell lines are a “precious resource”.  
 
The Hinxton Group acknowledges that scientists have a responsibility to obey the (national) 
law but also cautions lawmakers not to restrict citizens’ conduct extraterritorially with regard 
to stem cell research:  
“So long as scientifically and ethically defensible hESC research is undertaken in a country 
in which it is legally permissible, scientists should be free to participate in that research 
without fear of being liable to prosecution, restriction, or discrimination in another 
jurisdiction” (Hinxton Group, 2006) 
This problem is especially acute for German stem-cell researchers who move to other 
countries in an attempt to escape from the restrictive legal regime in their homeland, because 
                                                 
50 As many recommendations were directed at journal editors, it should be noted that the Consensus Statement of 
the Hinxton Group was also signed by the editor-in-chief of Nature, Philip Campbell. 
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 the German constitution proclaims “extraterritorial reach” over its citizens (Weiss, 2006). As 
such, the Consensus Statement will not resolve this problem for German researchers.     
      
The Hinxton Group’s initiative to devise some ethical ground rules can be seen as an attempt 
by the international stem cell research community (and its ‘friends’ in bioethics, law, 
regulation and publication media) to put its own house in some minimal order. The backdrop 
of this attempt is still an international patchwork of different laws and ethical rules governing 
human embryonic stem cell research. The differences to be bridged are not simply those 
between East and West. Within the European Union, for instance, there are also notable 
differences between the permissive regime of Great Britain and the restrictive regime of 
Germany which frustrate any overall and effective EU policy in this area. Similar differences 
are discernable in the United States, where in the wake of a presidential veto on federal 
funding the thrust in stem-cell policy has moved to the level of the states: 
“Many states are now engaged in a race to attract stem cell research with laws and 
regulations that defy Bush administration policy. In some cases, states are pushing for 
funding packages to offset the federal funding shortfall and insure that their most promising 
scientists don’t head west [i.e. to California, where attractive conditions for stem-cell 
research have been created due to ‘Proposition 71’]. And in other cases, states are reacting 
strongly in the opposite fashion, considering major restrictions on the sort of stem cell 
research that scientists in their state can conduct.” (Russo, 2005, p. 1168) 
In the aftermath of the Hwang scandal, California passed the Reproductive Health and 
Research Bill (SB 1260) to ensure that women who provide eggs for stem cell research are 
fully educated about health risks and to limit compensation to reimbursing direct expenses 
(Darnovsky, 2006). One author has suggested that a centralized Californian stem cell bank 
could provide an opportunity to create an ethical and legal infrastructure for long-term public 
return, which might set standards with possible relevance for the USA as a whole and the rest 
of the world (Winickoff, 2006). His ambitious proposal also recommends including egg 
donors in a more participatory form of governance (e.g. by representing them on IRBs and 
priority-setting committees).  
 
For the moment, however, the scene is dominated by centrifugal tendencies in the USA, the 
European Union and other regions of the world. The Consensus Statement of the Hinxton 
Group can hardly be expected to halt these centrifugal tendencies. At the most, it can be seen 
as an articulation of the minimal ethical ground rules for those countries, regions and areas 
with sufficiently permissive regimes (especially with regard to the status of the embryo) to be 
able to engage in in human embryonic stem cell research at all (for an updated version of the 
Hinxton statement, see Daley et al., 2007). 
 
As a consequence of the Hwang affair, the requirement of informed consent has been 
strengthened and reaffirmed on an international scale. This does not mean that liberal self-
determination (or respect for autonomy) should be seen as the alpha and omega of the ethics 
of stem cell research. Some feminists plead for a new culture of inalienability. Given that the 
“harvesting” of egg cells involves an invasive, painful and medically risky procedure, they 
argue that oocyte extraction for stem cell research can never be justified as part of clinical 
practice and biomedical research bound by the Hippocratic principle ‘Do no harm’ (for an 
exposition of this view, see Schneider, 2003). The rights of women are surely violated when 
informed-consent procedures are being flouted, but the problem is that such rights may even 
be said to be violated when such procedures are properly followed! Thus the procurement of 
egg cells remains the bottleneck and the ethical heel of Achilles for human embryonic stem 
cell research.    
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Conclusions 
 
In European public debates, East Asian countries like South Korea, China and Singapore have 
often been depicted as countries with permissive ethical standards with regard to human 
embryonic stem cell research, which would allow them to gain a decisive edge in the 
worldwide competition around a new, biology-based industry of the future (Sentker, 2004; 
critically: Joung, 2004). In this context, laxer rules are considered ‘Standortvorteile’ 
(‘locational advantages’) in the worldwide ‘Standortkonkurrenz’ (Ingrid Schneider in 
Stollorz, 2005). This could ultimately lead to a “competitive downgrading of ethical 
standards” (Döring, 2005), also known as the infamous race to the bottom. East Asian cultural 
backgrounds are somehow thought to explain the more permissive ethical standards.  
 
The Hwang affair is interesting in this connection, because what was supposed to be a definite 
advantage in the international competitive struggle − lax ethical rules and standards − turned 
out to be a definite disadvantage or at least a mixed blessing. In this sense, the case of the 
Korean stem cell debacle forms a counter example to the standard analysis.  
 
It would be inappropriate, however, to consider South Korea as an ethically underdeveloped 
country (see also Bogner and Menz, 2006). Intense moral debates about the prospects opened 
by the life sciences and about the possibilities of cloning have not been absent and legislative 
initiatives to regulate these issues have also been taken. It was just that moral doubts and 
objections concerning Hwang’s research projects could be too easily marginalized in an 
atmosphere of heightened techno-nationalism.   
 
The national and international effect of the Korean stem cell scandal has been a tightening of 
the ethical-legal rules for egg donation. In this sense, there has been no race to the bottom. 
Rather, the level of the international playing field has been heightened. This does not alter the 
fact that the procurement of egg cells still constitutes the ethical heel of Achilles for human 
embryonic stem cell research.  
 
In the course of various debates and controversies around egg donation and other aspects of 
stem-cell research, differences between “western” and “Korean” (or “Eastern”) values were 
often invoked. It would be wrong, however, to attribute much descriptive value to such 
invocations. Playing the culture card was primarily done for strategic reasons, e.g. to boost 
nationalist fervour or to deflect criticism of ethically problematic procedures.51 On the other 
hand, Korean bioethicists and civil society critics could appeal to ‘international’ standards, 
because despite all its virulent nationalism South Korea also wanted to impress the rest of the 
world with its scientific performance.          
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: We wish to thank Dr. Phillan Joung and Dr. Ingrid Schneider 
for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. Of course, they are not responsible 
for any of the mistakes, fallacies and errors of judgement which the above text may still 
contain.  
                                                 
51 On some occasions, playing the culture card may be seen in a more sympathetic light.  In the 1980s, South 
Korea attempted to resist American pressure to tighten up the protection of copyright and other intellectual 
property by arguing that the tradition of freely copying artistic and literary works was part of Korean culture. 
The U.S. government did not buy the ‘culture argument’ and switched to economic diplomacy by threatening 
trade retaliations. See Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002.  
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Chapter 4 
  
East Asia and the “GM Cold War”:  
The international struggle over precaution, labelling and segregation 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Draft Monitoring Report on Gene Technology and Globalization issued by the COGEM 
(The Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification) remarks that the stringent regulation 
requirements introduced by the EU to safeguard the freedom of choice of European citizens 
can have a restrictive effect on non-European producers due to the high costs of admission 
and certification (COGEM, 2005). The Draft Monitoring Report also cautions against 
transferring European regulatory concepts to other parts of the world in a top-down manner. 
Confronted with the enormous extension of the cultivation of GM crops outside Europe, it 
also raises doubts about whether the EU regime of labelling, traceability and coexistence can 
be sustained in the longer term. In one passage, the report suggests that the choice for the 
present regulatory regime may be unduly ‘Eurocentric’ and fails to do justice to the interests 
and values of developing countries: 
“The COGEM asks for attention to the worldwide – intended as well as unintended – 
effects of national and European regulations. One example is the restriction of the freedom 
of choice for producers in other countries, which may possibly lead to stagnation of GM 
agriculture and the failure to realize potential economic benefits. A strong preoccupation 
with one’s own (national or European) values and interests may conflict with other values, 
like solidarity and justice. An approach which also takes the international dimension into 
account and which makes choices based on all arguments is definitely preferable, according 
to the COGEM.” (COGEM, 2005, 8) 
 
We think that the Draft Monitoring Report is based on an incomplete and therefore rather 
one-sided analysis.52 It is indeed correct to point out that stringent EU regulations may act as 
trade barriers and thereby restrict the freedom of choice for countries outside Europe, 
especially those countries intending to introduce GM crops. On the other hand, however, the 
possibility to choose between GM and non-GM food may be valuable enough to warrant a 
deliberate (and perhaps costly) effort for maintaining it as an effective option. The report 
seems to assume that European consumers are peculiarly unique in setting great store on such 
freedom of choice. However, many countries outside Europe have also introduced or 
announced mandatory labelling rules for GM crops and food products (Carter and Gruère, 
2003a; see also Center for Food Safety, 2006, for a recent overview). In Asia the list includes 
countries such as South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Pakistan, India, Sri 
Lanka, The Philippines, Taiwan and even China. In some cases, as with China, governments 
may have decided to introduce mandatory labelling primarily on strategic grounds, but in 
others Asian consumers may have insisted on their right to make informed choices. Of course, 
it remains to be seen whether and to what extent these regulations will be effectively 
implemented. At any rate, it seems that safeguarding freedom of choice and promoting 
consumer autonomy are more than just European idiosyncrasies. One of the issues that we 
 
52 In our view, one can rightly criticize EU import policy on specific points, e.g. the fact that it requires a zero 
threshold and does not allow a 0.9 % threshold for GM ‘traces’ in imported raw materials (Huib de Vriend, 
personal communication). However, it seems to us that the criticism contained in the Draft Monitoring Report is 
not aimed at such details but is more generally directed against any comprehensive regime of labelling, 
traceability and coexistence.  
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therefore need to examine more thoroughly in this chapter is the ethical case for mandatory 
labelling.    
 
The Draft Monitoring Report also betrays some partiality in another respect. In highlighting 
the ‘unintended’ effects of European regulations for developing countries, the report fails to 
point out that these effects are severely compounded by the effects of U.S. regulations and 
U.S. trade policy. It therefore does not get at the root of the problem. What in fact causes most 
trouble for many developing countries is precisely the ‘regulatory polarization’ (Bernauer, 
2003; see also Prakash and Kollman, 2003) between the two economic superpowers, or in 
other words the fact that the United States and the European Union have adopted 
diametrically opposed regimes for regulating biotechnology. While the US chose a ‘product-
based’ system in the mid-1980s, the EU opted somewhat later for a ‘process-based’ system. 
All the other characteristics of the two regimes – invocation or rejection of the so-called 
Precautionary Principle and the adoption or rejection of mandatory labelling and segregation 
(traceability and coexistence) – are intimately related to the initial framing decisions 
(Jasanoff, 2005; see also Chapter 2). Now both superpowers attempt to ‘export’ their 
regulatory regimes to the rest of the world using various carrots and sticks.53 Each offers 
developing countries support for ‘capacity building’ in terms of its own regulatory model. In 
world trade, the clash between “the two Goliaths” (Thorpe and Robinson, 2004) has resulted 
in a virtual “GM Cold War” (Meijer and Stewart, 2004). Developing countries are “caught in 
the cross-fire of this GM Cold War” and are left with “serious legal uncertainty as to the role 
of GMOs in their national agricultural policies” (ibid., p. 247). It would seem that an 
exploration of the strategic options that are open to developing countries has to take full 
account of the nature of the international situation. By the same token, to demand special 
concessions from the European Union with a view to relieve the difficulties for developing 
countries may actually be a covert call for unilateral disarmament.      
 
In its monitoring report the COGEM further notes that regulation may be ‘foreign’ to 
developing countries. It therefore advocates a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down 
approach in which we simply transplant (and thereby ‘impose’) our own regulatory concepts 
and models: 
“Aid for capacity building must always fit regional needs and consider those locally 
involved. Top-down methods, which ignore the co-evolution of technology and society and 
simply impose the social, normative codes (scripts) connected to gene technology, do not 
deserve support. Instead, within the EU and other international agencies, attention should 
be drawn to the kind of bottom-up approach that is already practised in Dutch development 
cooperation.” (COGEM, 2005, 10) 
It is not entirely clear what exactly the COGEM is driving at here. Perhaps the concern is that 
developing countries will prove unable to set up regulatory structures allowing them to 
implement an effective segregation between GM and non-GM product flows and thus to 
ensure continued access to the European market. Of course, there are good reasons to doubt 
                                                 
53 About the USA: “The USA has also used trade negotiations as a leverage instrument by making acceptance of 
pro-GMO policies a factor in negotiations over bilateral free trade agreements. Further, the USA consistently 
provides food aid in the form of GM food and last year [2003] it enacted the ‘United States Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act’, which ties funding to fight AIDS in developing countries to the 
acceptance of GM food. The Act embodies a ‘sense of the Congress’ that this condition is appropriate to 
overcome ‘fears of benign genetic modifications to food’ and help feed those infected with HIV/AIDS.” (Meijer 
and Stewart, 2004, 253). About the EU: “The EU has imposed stringent regulatory requirements on foods 
containing or produced from GMOs. A country or firm can export food products to the EU only if the country or 
firm is listed by the European Commission as compliant with EU food safety rules.” (Meijer and Stewart, 2004, 
253).  
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 the effectiveness of ‘top-down’ methods, but sadly enough the success of ‘bottom-up’ 
methods in this regard is hardly more assured. Developing countries cannot simply design 
regulatory structures with a view to their ‘local’ or ‘regional’ needs only; they also have to 
take into account their export interests and thus the regulatory requirements of the regions to 
which they intend to export. Would the COGEM advocate a relaxation or suspension of EU 
requirements if exporting developing countries prove unable to meet them? Such a move, 
however, would clearly undermine the position of the EU in the ‘GM Cold War’ with the 
United States. [In the quoted passage, the ‘co-evolution’ argument is also used somewhat 
asymmetrically. It is applied to the transfer of the regulatory models (codes, scripts) 
connected with gene technology, but apparently not to the transfer of gene technology itself. 
One could perhaps make an equally strong case that gene technology is being transplanted to 
(and thus ‘imposed’ on) developing countries with utter disregard for the co-evolution of 
technology and society. In other words, use of the normatively charged term ‘imposing’ 
(opdringen) in connection with the transfer of regulatory models may warrant further 
reflection. For an example of a ‘co-evolutionary’ approach to biotechnology, which 
regrettably also lacks full symmetry, see Juma (2005).]  
 
The Draft Monitoring Report rightly notes that “in Asian countries like China and India” 
dependence on other countries is much smaller “thanks to a large internal market”. Even in 
these countries, however, domestic regulatory regimes for the biosafety assessment of GM 
crops and foods are set up and regulatory decisions are taken also with regard to their 
potential international repercussions. As is well-known, over the years both countries 
(especially China) have invested huge R&D funds to build up their own biotech capacity and 
have also devoted extensive areas to the cultivation of GM crops. Their experience, and the 
experience of other Asian countries, with the development of biotechnology and with 
biosafety regulation, is highly relevant for a prognosis of the probable outcomes of the ‘GM 
Cold War’ and thus also of the long-term sustainability of the EU regime of labelling, 
traceability and coexistence. After all, as publicist John Feffer wrote, “Asia holds the key to 
the future of GM food” (Feffer, 2004). Three agricultural economists speculate more 
specifically about the effects of China’s expected decision to release the commercial 
production of GM rice: “China’s decision may start a domino effect that could cascade around 
the globe” (Rozelle, Huang and Hu, 2004). Needless to say, the expression ‘domino effect’ 
rhetorically fits the imagery of a ‘Cold War’ on GM crops and foods. So far, however, this 
allegedly impending decision has been announced several times, only to be postponed anew 
on each occasion. We will look more closely into the experience of China and other Asian 
countries later in this chapter.    
       
The case for mandatory labelling 
On the face of it the matter looks simple enough. The argument for mandatory labelling is a 
straightforward case of “the consumer right to know” (Leiss, 2003, 4). Yet the ‘product-
based’ system of assessment that was adopted in 1986 as the basis of the US regulatory 
regime made it virtually inevitable to deny this basic right to the American consumer. This 
apparent anomaly in a liberal democracy and free-market economy has inspired the biotech 
industry and the regulatory authorities to come up with some rather sophistic attempts at 
justification.   
The so-called Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology that was set up in 
1986 reflected the de-regulation agenda of the Republication administration (remember 
President Reagan’s popular mantra of “No new rules!”) and its wish to clear the way for a 
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nascent industry that was expected to help restore American competitiveness in world markets 
(Jones, 1999, Chapter 9; Prakash and Kollman, 2003). The ‘Framework’ posited that the risks 
of biotechnology were not specific to this technology and that its products should not be 
treated any differently from similar products created by traditional agricultural or chemical 
processes. Hence biotechnology was to be regulated under existing rules and laws and 
supervised by existing agencies like the FDA, EPA and USDA (Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, 1986). The USDA, with its business-friendly reputation, was chosen as 
the lead regulatory agency (Prakash and Kollman, 2003, 624). 
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA is charged with regulating foods 
and food additives, including food labelling. In May 1992, however, the agency decided it had 
no active role to play in the supervision of GM foods. Companies were free to market newly 
developed GM foods without conducting pre-market safety studies (although they were 
advised to conduct them as a matter of prudence). Nor did the FDA require these novel foods 
to be labelled. Under the pretext that GM foods were not inherently different from their non-
GM counterparts, any safety concerns were dismissed a priori as insignificant.54 The same 
consideration militated against mandatory labelling of GM foods: “Labeling was ruled out as 
potentially misleading to the consumer, since it might suggest that there was reason for 
concern.” (Eichenwald, Kolata and Petersen, 2001). Indeed, the FDA put formidable obstacles 
in the way of those producers who wanted to advertise and label their products as ‘GM-
free’.55 Other than safety and health concerns were tacitly assumed to be illegitimate reasons 
for labelling.  
Investigative journalism has brought to light that in those years the regulatory policy of US 
government agencies was heavily influenced by the biotech industry: “What Monsanto 
wished for from Washington, Monsanto – and, by extension, the biotechnology industry – 
got” (Eichenwald, Kolata, Petersen, 2001). This also holds true for the position taken by the 
FDA in the early 1990s. In retrospect, several U.S. business executives express surprise and 
astonishment about Monsanto’s insistent clamour to bypass the need for labelling: 
““Monsanto forgot who their client was,” said Thomas N. Urban, retired chairman and 
chief executive of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, a seed company. “If they had realized 
their client was the final consumer they should have embraced labeling. They should have 
said, ‘We’re for it.’ They should have said, ‘We insist that food be labeled.’ They should 
have said, ‘I’m the consumer’s friend here.’” (ibid.)    
Indeed, in following years the American rush to put GM foods on the store shelves without 
prior safety testing and without labelling was just the perfect ammunition anti-biotech NGOs 
needed to organize a worldwide opposition against the industry. Even Monsanto executives 
have meanwhile deplored their past ‘arrogance’ (ibid.). 
                                                 
54 “As discussed above, FDA believes that the new techniques are extensions at the molecular level of traditional 
methods and will be used to achieve the same goals as pursued with traditional plant breeding.  The agency is not 
aware of any information showing that foods derived by these new methods differ from other foods in any 
meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or 
greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.  For this reason, the agency does not 
believe that the method of development of a new plant variety (including the use of new techniques including 
recombinant DNA techniques) is normally material information within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 321(n) and 
would not usually be required to be disclosed in labeling for the food.” (Food and Drug Administration, 1992, 
22991). 
55 “In fact, the FDA created hurdles for voluntary labeling. It requires that dairies wanting to label their milk as 
free of bovine growth hormone have to include a disclaimer on the label that no significant difference is shown 
between hormone treated and hormone free milk. Similarly, it requires grocery stores wanting to make this claim 
to provide verifiable paper trails that the milk suppliers did not use any hormones.” (Prakash and Kollman, 2003, 
p. 625, footnote).  
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Nonetheless, the US Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) still clings to the same 
argument for rejecting mandatory labelling:  
“The biotechnology industry supports accurate and informative product labeling that 
communicates to consumers material information relevant to health, safety and nutrition. 
Misleading label information makes informed consumer choices harder. BIO believes that a 
system of mandatory labeling of biotech products would confuse consumers by 
inaccurately suggesting that these products are inherently different or pose safety concerns 
when compared with traditional foods.” (Biotechnology Industry Organization, n.d.)   
The US biotech organization continues to hide behind the policy statement the FDA issued in 
1992: 
“The FDA’s 1992 policy states that there is no reason to conclude that bioengineered foods 
differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way or that they present a greater 
safety concern than foods developed using traditional methods. Its position is that foods 
should be labeled according to their characteristics, not their method of production. 
Therefore, FDA does not require special labeling of biotechnology foods or the products of 
animals fed these foods.” (ibid.) 56 
 
For many consumers, however, there is an eminently “meaningful” difference between GM 
foods and foods made with traditional methods, even if there would be no difference at all in 
the physical characteristics of the end product (although in many cases the difference in the 
method of production also results in more or less significant physical differences of the end 
product). This difference in method of production could be “meaningful” and important to 
consumers/citizens for a great variety of underlying beliefs and values, yet the FDA and the 
US biotech industry wilfully deprive them of the crucial information that would enable them 
to incorporate their values in their purchasing decisions on the market.       
 
The irony is that some of the underlying attitudes of American consumers on the issue of GM 
food labelling transpire clearly enough from the focus group interviews that the FDA itself 
commissioned in 2000: 
“Virtually all participants said that bioengineered foods should be labeled as such so that 
they could tell whether a given food was a product of the new technology. What is striking 
about participants’ initial discussion of their reasons for wanting biotechnology labeling is 
the widespread perception that the information they want the label to provide is how the 
food product was produced, rather than the compositional effect of the process on the food 
product. Virtually no one mentioned wanting to know the specific effects of bioengineering 
on the product as a reason for labeling. Instead, participants wanted to know whether the 
food was a product of biotechnology because they were concerned about the potential for 
unknown long-term effects of the technology, in particular health effects.” (Food and Drug 
Administration, 2000).  
 
56 Compare the passage from the FDA 1992 policy statement quoted in note 54. In a draft guidance for industry 
on voluntary labelling issued in early 2001, the FDA interpreted the meaning of the expression ‘material 
information’ occurring in section 201(n) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in a particular way: 
“While the legislative history of section 201(n) contains little discussion of the word ‘material’, there is 
precedent to guide the agency in its decision regarding whether information on a food is in fact material. 
Historically, the agency has generally interpreted the scope of the materiality concept to mean information about 
the attributes of the food itself.” (Food and Drug Adminitration, 2001). Streiffer and Rubel (2004) argue 
persuasively that this restrictive interpretation is unfounded and distorts the whole tenor of the FDCA. One 
provision in this act requires that labels on packaged foods disclose “the name and place of business of the 
manufacturer, packer, or distributor”. Clearly, this information goes beyond the “attributes of the food itself”.   
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Another paragraph of the report indicates that focus group participants wanted labelling of 
GM foods not just because of possible (long-term) health effects but also for other reasons: 
“Many participants recognized symbolic value in choosing not to buy products of 
biotechnology. They felt mere disclosure labeling gave them an opportunity to register their 
view about the wisdom of food biotechnology, i.e., to support or not support the 
dissemination of the technology, apart from their views about the health and safety 
characteristics of the individual product. They said they wanted to ‘send a message’ to the 
company.” (Food and Drug Adminitration, 2000). 
The category ‘symbolic value’ is clearly a residual category. It would not have been difficult 
to expand this category into a long list of possible reasons why consumers might want to 
know about the process by which foods are made, if the researchers had been less constrained 
by the FDA’s official focus on the product. People who follow religious bans on food from 
certain sources, for example, might also wish to know whether genes from those sources end 
up in other foods. Vegetarians might want to know about the presence of animal-derived 
genes in vegetable foods. Still others might be concerned about the effects of genetic 
engineering on animal welfare and wish to avoid foods from genetically modified animals. Or 
people may view GM foods as ‘unnatural’. Or people may oppose the big biotech companies, 
distrust regulatory agencies, or want to express their solidarity with small-scale family farms 
or organic farming. Or people may think that GM crops present unknown environmental risks 
while offering no direct consumer benefits. Some technophiles might insist on labelling 
because they want to consume foods produced with the latest technology. Many would value 
autonomy as such and strongly resent being denied the chance to exercise it. There is a 
virtually endless list of possible reasons (cf. Streiffer and Rubel, 2004).57 Some of the reasons 
may be based on mistaken beliefs, but that does not imply that they should be dismissed as 
irrelevant for the exercise of consumer autonomy.      
 
The participants in the focus group discussions commissioned by the FDA were also 
presented with factual information about the extent to which GM foods had entered American 
food stores and supermarkets: 
“[M]ost participants expressed great surprise that food biotechnology has become so 
pervasive in the U.S. food supply. […]. The typical reaction of participants was not one of 
great concern about the immediate health and safety effects of unknowingly eating 
bioengineered foods, but rather outrage that such a change in the food supply could happen 
without them knowing about it.” (Food and Drug Administration, 2000)  
This sense of “outrage” is quite understandable given that the autonomy of consumers has 
been violated by companies and regulatory authorities implementing and allowing massive 
changes in the food supply without their knowledge.58 In this connection an interesting and 
consistent finding from the series of public opinion polls that the Pew Initiative on Food and 
                                                 
57 Compare Susanna Hornig Priest: “No one has been able to rule out consequences for human health entirely. 
[…]. But for the most part, it is the great range of economic, regulatory, environmental, and ethical issues, rather 
than food safety or human health issues of the type science can eventually resolve, that biotechnology’s critics 
are raising.” (Priest, 2001, 8; italics in original).  
58 Among the FDA focus group participants there were some who exhibited even more extreme disaffection and 
distrust in their reaction: “Some participants remarked that bioengineered foods have been ‘snuck in’ to the food 
supply. They were mainly disturbed by the lack of public information and public input to a major development 
in the quality of their food supply. This information about prevalence served to reinforce the most negative and 
cynical views some participants held about food biotechnology. Some participants saw this as evidence of a 
conspiracy to keep consumers in the dark, that is, the rationale for not informing the public must be that there is 
something to hide.” (Food and Drug Administration, 2000). Many proponents of biotechnology oppose labelling 
on the grounds that it could be ‘misleading’ and ‘confusing’. Perhaps they should reflect more seriously on the 
possibility that the absence of GM labels could also be ‘misleading’ (even from their point of view), in that it 
might nurture the suspicion among consumers that there must be definitely ‘something to hide’.   
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 Biotechnology has published over the years is that a considerable percentage of American 
consumers actually believe that they have never eaten GM foods (in the November 2006 
report this was 60%), while an estimated 75% of processed foods in grocery stores are GM 
foods or contain GM ingredients. Most, if not all, Americans must have eaten GM foods in 
one form or another, but only 26% say they believe to have eaten them (Pew Initiative, 2006, 
2). 
 
The exclusive focus of the FDA labelling policy statements on the health and safety effects of 
GM foods and the consequent restriction of relevant information to the “attributes of the food 
itself” rather than the “method of production” are largely beside the point. As the Canadian 
philosopher William Leiss declares: “This isn’t about food safety. It’s about the rights of 
citizens in a well-ordered democracy to have their freedom of choice respected by their own 
governments.” (Leiss, 2003, 15). 
 
Streiffer and Rubel (2004) argue that the FDA is in no way constrained by the provisions of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to exclude mandatory labelling of 
information that goes beyond “the attributes of the food itself”. This is rather an arbitrary 
restriction the FDA imposes on its own policy. In fact, the FDA’s legal remit can be best 
construed as the protection of consumer autonomy (which includes the protection of health as 
a derived value). The FDCA’s requirement that labelling information should be truthful and 
non-misleading also fits this rationale. It is particularly interesting in this connection that the 
FDCA explicitly says in section 343(n) that omitting information can also render a label 
misleading. Thus the deliberate withholding of information that foods have been produced by 
using modern biotechnology might be considered utterly misleading and therefore unlawful in 
view of the fact that so many American consumers wrongly believe they have never eaten 
GM foods.        
 
In the focus group discussions commissioned by the FDA, “virtually all participants said that 
bioengineered foods should be labeled as such” (Food and Drug Administration, 2000). This 
outcome is consistent with the results of a large number of polls done by various groups 
(industry, news organisations, academics, etcetera), which all point to the overwhelming 
public support for mandatory labelling among the American population (Streiffer and Rubel, 
2004). In a democratic society, such a strong public opinion should be a weighty prima facie 
reason to provide labelling. In the absence of convincing reasons for ‘justified paternalism’ to 
overrule these citizen preferences, Congress should therefore require the FDA to provide 
mandatory labelling for GM foods (Streiffer and Rubel, 2004). 
 
However, there is no chance at present that Congress or the US government will act upon this 
strong ethical case for labelling. American biotech companies continue to oppose mandatory 
labelling, largely on the grounds that they fear that GM labels would induce the public to buy 
GM-free foods, thus threatening the further growth of the industry (a GM label is said to 
represent a ‘warning signal’). While this reasoning might explain their opposition to 
mandatory labels for reasons of economic self-interest, it hardly makes a strong case as an 
ethical justification and fails to respect consumer autonomy. The economists Colin Carter and 
Guillaume Gruère have attempted to add some ‘ethical’ spin to this naked economic 
justification. They argue that mandatory labelling of GM food, while aiming to provide 
consumer choice, in actual fact restricts consumer choice. Such labelling would induce food 
processors, in anticipation of negative reactions from consumers and retailers, to switch to 
non-GM ingredients. The final result will be less choice for consumers, because GM foods 
will disappear from the market (Carter and Gruère, 2003b). In a critical reply, however, 
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Robert Streiffer and Alan Rubel claim that this argument does not address the central issue in 
the debate. They point out that Carter and Gruère fail to distinguish between choice and 
informed choice: “Because the loss of choice that Carter and Gruère predict is a loss of 
uninformed choice, that loss is irrelevant if the justification for mandatory labelling is that it 
facilitates informed choice” (Streiffer and Rubel, 2003).     
 
It cannot be denied, however, that GM labels are often perceived by consumers as negative 
signals. Carter and Gruère suggest that this view also informs the position of anti-biotech 
groups: 
“Most environmental activists who are opposed to GM foods strongly support mandatory 
labeling policies. Why should they do so if they knew that it would insure a place for GM 
food at the retail level? To the contrary, these groups may be using mandatory labeling as a 
type of Trojan horse: they support mandatory labeling for the sake of consumer choice, 
knowing full well that this policy will lead to no choice in practice.” (Carter and Gruère, 
2003b).59 
Following this (social) logic to the end would lead to an extreme polarisation of opinion: 
either one is in favour of biotechnology and therefore against mandatory labelling or one is 
against biotechnology and therefore in favour of mandatory labelling. Conversely, on this 
polarised logic, arguing for labelling would also be interpreted as arguing against 
biotechnology. Ideally, however, the case for mandatory labelling should be independent of 
one’s position pro or contra the technology in question. 
 
In the long run, it would probably be also in the interest of the biotech industry to escape from 
this lock-in effect of social polarisation. To pin one’s future on the continued need to keep the 
general public ignorant is hardly more than a counsel of despair. As Susanna Hornig Priest 
observes, “appearing to have something to hide is such an extraordinarily poor public 
relations strategy” (Priest, 2001, 96).60 Perhaps the prevalent negative consumer perception of 
GM labels should be seen as a contingent fact that has much to do with ‘arrogant’ actions of 
some biotech firms in the past and the circumstance that the first generation of GM products 
offered few if any direct consumer benefits. Things may change when the industry mends its 
ways or when the follow-up generation of GM products offering direct consumer benefits 
arrives on the market. Drawing on the literature of communications research, Priest points out 
that labelling might also work out in a positive way for the biotech industry: 
“Labels certainly also convey that risks are being openly communicated in a 
straightforward way, which is known to be an important component of public reactions to 
risks. In the long run, the availability of this information will very probably have a 
desensitizing effect on people’s general concerns about bioengineering.” (Priest, 2001, 96).  
William Leiss refers to an interesting empirical study done in the USA about the effect of 
labelling rBST milk on consumers’ perception of risks, which supports Priest’s speculations. 
The study’s conclusions are as follows: 
“The results indicate that greater availability of labeled milk would not only significantly 
increase the proportion of consumers who purchased labeled milk, its availability would 
also reduce the perception of risk associated with rBST, whether consumers purchase it or 
                                                 
59 Huib de Vriend comments that in their campaigns environmental activists anticipate risk-averse reactions of 
retailers, rather than the possible rejection of GMOs by consumers (personal communication). This is in line 
with the economic argument put forward by Carter and Gruère (2003b), to the effect that it is food processors 
and retailers that will make strategic decisions in case of mandatory labelling, thus depriving consumers of their 
choice options ex post.  
60 Remember that some participants in the focus groups commissioned by the FDA concluded that “the rationale 
for not informing the public must be that there is something to hide” (see note 58).  
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not. In other words, availability of rBST-free milk translates into lower risk perceptions 
toward milk produced with rBST.” (Zepeda et al., 2003; quoted in Leiss, 2003, 16)61 
We agree with Leiss that this study holds important lessons for the biotech industry and for 
governments.  
 
 
The WTO dispute and the Precautionary Principle 
 
On May 13, 2003 the Bush administration announced that it would file a WTO case against 
the moratorium on genetically modified crops and foods that was de facto in force in the 
European Union since October 1998, when new approvals were frozen (Office of the US 
Trade Representative/USDA 2003). In the accompanying document to the announcement, 
then US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick called the EU moratorium illegal, in violation 
of WTO rules and ‘non-science based’: “Numerous organizations, researchers and scientists 
have determined that biotech foods pose no threat to humans or to the environment.” (ibid.). 
According to US functionaries, lodging an official complaint with the WTO against European 
GMO policy was also necessary “to discourage other countries, especially those in the 
developing world, from using the EU regulatory approach as the basis for their own 
regulations on agricultural biotechnology products” (Pew Initiative, 2005, 12). Canada and 
Argentina joined the US case against the EU.   
 
The US-EU disagreement over GMOs is just one episode in a longer series of disputes. Since 
the early 1990s, European and American approaches to environmental, health, safety and 
consumer regulation have drifted further apart. Whereas during the 1970s and 1980s the US 
regulatory regime was generally much more strict and risk-averse than the European regime, 
the situation was reversed during the 1990s. In David Vogel’s imagery, the hare and the 
tortoise changed places (Vogel 2003). After 1990, America started to move like a tortoise 
when a sizable conservative pro-business majority in the Republican Party blocked further 
regulatory initiatives, helped by the fortunate absence in the States of major incidents such as 
the mad cow disease and a number of food scares which in Europe undermined the 
confidence and trust of citizens and consumers in their regulatory authorities. The creation of 
a single European market necessitated the strengthening of regulatory standards: a high level 
of health and environmental protection was critical to the legitimacy of a growing 
bureaucracy in Brussels. Issuing directives and regulations is the most important vehicle for 
shaping public policy in Europe. Simultaneously, the process of policy-making became more 
open and accessible to non-business constituencies. Already the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
declared the so-called Precautionary Principle (henceforth to be abbreviated as PP) to be a 
key principle of Community environmental policy; in due course, this very principle would 
become the avowed cornerstone of EU regulation in the areas of food safety, environment, 
human health, animal health and plant health. A well-known formulation of the PP is to be 
found in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration: “Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. There are, 
however, over twelve different definitions of the PP in international agreements (Shaw and 
Schwartz, 2005, 4).    
 
 
61 The Dutch Consumer and Biotechnology Foundation (Stichting Consument en Biotechnologie) advocated 
labelling not just with a view to securing the freedom of choice of consumers, but also as an instrument of trust 
and as a ‘just in case’ option  (Huib de Vriend, personal communication).  
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All the while the US government has been sceptical of the PP, suspecting that it may be used 
too easily as an excuse for protectionism. The European Union had indeed invoked this 
principle to defend the ban on hormone-treated beef imports from the United States, which 
the latter successfully challenged before the WTO (Charlier and Rainelli 2002). The US 
government is prone to counter any invocation of the PP with a mantra-like appeal to “sound 
science” and to the fairly narrow provisions of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures.62 The implied suggestion is that the PP goes beyond sound 
science and is therefore arbitrary. In February 2000, the Commission of the European 
Communities issued a communication on the PP to strengthen its policy position in order to 
better defend the EU from future legal challenges by other WTO members (CEC 2000). The 
Commission argued that, regardless of divergences in the used terminology, the PP has 
already become a rule of customary international law in the areas of health and environmental 
protection. The Commission referred, inter alia, to the North Sea Declaration (1987), the Rio 
Declaration (1992), the preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), the 
Convention of Climate Change (1992) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000). In the 
communication, the Commission declined to give a precise definition of the PP, arguing that 
the meaning of the concept will be fleshed out by decision-makers and courts of law.  
 
The Protocol on Biosafety (2000), which is annexed to the Convention of Biological Diversity 
(1992), regulates the transboundary movement of GMOs (or LMOs - ‘living modified 
organisms’, in the terminology adopted by the Protocol) for the sake of protecting biodiversity 
and human health. The key provision laid down in Article 7 is the so-called Advance 
Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure, which allows importing countries to require prior 
notification from parties intending to export GMOs and to demand that shipments be 
appropriately labelled. The importing country may also demand documentation on extensive 
risk assessments to be conducted by, and at the expense of, the exporting firm. In accordance 
with the PP, Articles 10.6 and 11.8 give the importing country discretionary room to take 
precautionary decisions (e.g. prohibiting imports of GMOs) in cases of scientific 
uncertainty.63 The Cartagena Protocol went into force in September 2003. At this moment, the 
Protocol has been ratified by 137 countries. The United States has neither signed nor ratified 
the Protocol (it has signed but never ratified the Convention on Biological Safety). As a major 
exporter of GM crops, the country had been granted observer status during the talks leading 
up to the Protocol, a position which allowed it to exercise some influence over its outcome 
(Falkner, 2000).        
 
As a defence against the charges made by the USA, Canada and Argentina before the WTO, 
the European Union construed Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement as a ‘precautionary’ 
provision and also invoked the Cartagena Protocol to claim that the PP was a recognized 
                                                 
62 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement is sometimes interpreted as reflecting the PP, but this interpretation is highly 
controversial because it only allows provisional measures in case of an insufficiency of scientific evidence that is 
supposed to be no more than a temporary affair. The article runs as follows: “In cases where relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of 
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.” 
63 Article 10.6: “Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge 
regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall 
not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified 
organism in question […] in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.” 
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 principle in international law. This defence was bound to fail. The long-awaited final WTO 
ruling, issued in May 2006 and published in September 2006, condemned the EU and 9 EU 
Member States for having violated WTO rules by causing ‘undue delay’ in the approval of 
GM crops and products (for the full text of the more-than-2000-pages ruling or the 21-pages 
findings and conclusions, see World Trade Organization, 2006). The WTO panel rejected the 
‘precautionary’ construal of Article 5.7 and decided to refrain from expressing a view on 
“whether or not the precautionary principle is a recognized principle of general or customary 
international law” (World Trade Organization, 2006, p. 341), noting that the legal status of the 
PP remains unsettled. The panel also decided not to take the Protocol on Biosafety into 
account, arguing that this Protocol is not ‘applicable’ in the relations between WTO Members 
that are party to the Protocol and WTO Members that are not (ibid, p. 336). Since the US have 
neither signed nor ratified the Cartagena Protocol and Canada and Argentina have signed but 
not ratified it, none of the three complainants is a party to the Protocol.  
 
Some pro-environmentalist commentators are worried that the precedent set by the WTO 
ruling may completely undermine the Cartagena Protocol:  
“In effect, the panel makes domestic measures based on the protocol, including the 
protocol’s articles on risk assessment and risk management, indefensible if they are 
challenged by a non-party or free rider to the protocol under the definition of risk 
assessment in the WTO SPS agreement. Not becoming a party to the protocol, while 
intervening to prevent its implementation – as the United States, Canada and Argentina do 
through their participation in the so-called Miami Group at the Protocol negotiations – is 
apparently a bullet-proof litigation strategy against any attempt by WTO members who are 
also protocol parties to defend their environmental regulation of GMOs with reference to 
fulfilling their protocol commitments.” (Suppan, 2006) 
There is indeed a danger that a huge schism opens up between international trade law 
underpinned by effective sanctions on the one hand and international environmental law 
without effective sanctions on the other. It might actually undermine the long-term legitimacy 
of the WTO agreements, if the latter are perceived as putting narrow trade interests before 
everything else. Abandoning the post-war economic regime of “embedded liberalism” is 
likely to be a suicidal course. As a recent report from the United Nations University Institute 
of Advanced Studies stated, “the WTO cannot and does not stand for free trade at any cost” 
(Shaw and Schwartz, 2006, 11). Hence the need, as the report argues, to bridge the differences 
on the application of the PP in order to “uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system that 
ensures secure and predictable market access, while respecting health and environmental 
concerns” (ibid.).  
 
However, bridging the differences on the application of the PP is easier said than done (see 
also Gerstetter and Maier, 2005). The international debate is characterized by a sterile 
polarization between an inflexible commitment to the PP as if it were a religious dogma and a 
disingenuous insistence on “sound science”. One side tries to conquer the moral high ground, 
while the other attempts to ensconce itself on the scientific high ground. A more thorough 
analysis shows that strong versions of the PP are logically incoherent and untenable, while 
weaker versions are so ill-defined as to offer hardly any guidance for practical action 
(Sunstein, 2005; Van den Belt, 2003). Similarly, the clamour for “sound science” fails to 
recognize that any risk assessment is necessarily permeated by value judgements, if it were 
only for the need to strike a particular balance in the inevitable trade-off between type-1 and 
type-2 errors in statistical testing (Winikoff, Jasanoff, Busch et al., 2005; Thompson, 2003; 
Ravetz, 2005). Despite these conceptual weaknesses, both parties are reluctant to abandon 
their entrenched positions in the face of the ongoing “GM Cold War”.         
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In its actual consequences for GMO policy in the European Union, the effect of the WTO 
ruling may be rather limited as it refers to the de facto moratorium between 1998 and 2003. In 
2004, a new system of labelling, traceability and coexistence was put into place. The WTO 
ruling has no bearing on this new system. Labelling rules that have been introduced in other 
parts of the world also remain unaffected. Some critical NGOs therefore claim that the WTO 
ruling does not make much difference: “Regardless of the outcome of its current WTO case 
against Europe, the U.S. will face increasing global resistance to its GE [GM] food exports for 
the foreseeable future” (Center for Food Safety, 2006). It is for the same reason that two 
recognized neoconservative libertarians call the WTO decision a “hollow victory” (Conko and 
Miller, 2006). However, some American producers’ organisations already take courage from 
the last verdict to urge the US government to initiate a new case against the EU before the 
WTO. In a press release applauding the recent ruling, the American Soybean Association 
(ASA) stated:  
“While welcoming this WTO ruling against Europe’s flawed and non-science based 
approval process, ASA is also calling on the Bush Administration to mount a WTO 
challenge against Europe’s discriminatory traceability and labeling laws that apply to 
biotech crops. […] This favorable WTO ruling should only be seen as ‘step one’ of the 
actions against Europe’s unjustified and unscientific policies toward biotechnology.” 
(American Soybean Association, 2006).  
Several years ago a coalition of 60 European and American consumer organisations united in 
the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue already sounded the alarm that national labelling laws, 
both in Europe and in the USA, may not be immune to a WTO challenge (CSPI International, 
2000). One can hardly imagine, however, that any US government would be so reckless as to 
hazard mounting a WTO challenge against the European labelling and traceability 
regulations. Such an initiative would most likely boomerang on the home front when 
American consumers were to find out that their right to know has been deliberately ignored. 
But it may not be the first time that something hardly imaginable nonetheless becomes reality.  
 
Worldwide GMO momentum: irresistibly advancing or losing steam? 
 
The doubts of the COGEM with regard to the sustainability of EU regulations concerning 
agricultural biotechnology are informed by the view that the spread of GMOs is irresistibly 
advancing on a worldwide scale. In its Draft Monitoring Report, the COGEM refers to the 
figures assembled by the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech 
Applications (ISAAA), which show impressive increases in recent years of arable areas 
grown with transgenic crops in North and South America and Asia (James, 2004). The 
COGEM points in particular to the examples of China and India, where large internal markets 
have allowed the initiation of domestic development of knowledge and technology on a 
relatively independent basis (COGEM, 2005). All in all, the COGEM report evokes the image 
of a ‘Fortress Europe’ shutting itself off from rapid developments in the field of agricultural 
biotechnology occurring in the rest of the world. The attempt to shut out GMOs developed 
elsewhere is the more pathetic as it will eventually turn out to be futile. Or so the COGEM 
report strongly suggests. 
 
The rise of China and India as new biotech powers is sometimes also invoked by politicians to 
argue against the stringent environmental, social and ethical requirements in the EU, which 
supposedly put European countries at a severe competitive disadvantage. A case in point is 
the speech of British Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Royal Society in 2002: 
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“The idea of making this speech has been in my mind for some time. The final prompt for it 
came, curiously enough, when I was in Bangalore in January. I met a group of academics, 
who were also in business in the biotech field. They said to me bluntly: ‘Europe has gone 
soft on science; we are going to leapfrog you and you will miss out.’ They regarded the 
debate on GM here and elsewhere in Europe as utterly astonishing. They saw us as 
completely overrun by protestors and pressure groups who used emotion to drive out 
reason. And they didn’t think we had the political will to stand up for proper science.” 
(Blair, 2002) 
James Wilsdon and his colleagues at the Atlas of Ideas project have appropriately dubbed this 
type of argument the ‘Wild East’ argument: “The rise of Asian science is sometimes used as 
an argument for a more relaxed stance on social, ethical or environmental concerns in Europe 
– the suggestion being that squeamish Europeans may lose out at the expense of the ‘wild 
East’.” (Demos, 2006; see also Wilsdon et al., 2005, p. 58-60). It is a characteristic type of 
argument that is also used with regard to other areas of the modern life sciences, for instance 
in embryonic stem cell research64 (Dennis, 2002; see also Chapter 3 on the Hwang affair), and 
with regard to nanotechnology.65 As Wilsdon and his colleagues are in favour of “socially 
responsive and accountable forms of science and innovation”, they take some trouble to 
confront the ‘Wild East’ argument. First, they state that this type of argument, when 
generalized, is actually a counsel of despair because it invites a race to the bottom with regard 
to environmental and ethical standards and the protection of labour rights. Moreover, they 
state, “[i]t is also misleading, not to mention deeply patronising, to pretend that people in 
India and China don’t share many of these same concerns – albeit expressed in a variety of 
ways” (Wilsdon et al, 2005, 59). Finally, they hold that moral concerns are not necessarily a 
barrier to economic development; sometimes ethical ‘upgrading’ can be used as a deliberate 
innovation strategy with good prospects of success (Demos, 2006). It would be worthwhile to 
investigate whether these counter arguments can be elaborated and shored up further to find 
out if in the end a robust case can indeed be made against the ‘Wild East’ argument.  
 
Here we simply note that the Indian biotech scientists in Bangalore must have conveyed a 
much too placid picture of their country when the British Prime Minister paid them a visit in 
January 2002. It is true that in the preceding decade India had built up an impressive research 
capacity of its own in the field of biotechnology and that the country was on the eve of 
approving the commercialisation of the first GM crop: Bt cotton, developed by the American 
 
64 “Those in favour of therapeutic cloning argued that the United States risked losing the lead in an important 
field, whereas anti-cloning activists sought to portray China as a morally bankrupt ‘Wild East’ of biology” 
(Dennis, 2002, 335). Interestingly, a Chinese scientist in the US ‘diaspora’ made the following argument: “China 
has a cultural environment with fewer moral objections to the use of embryonic stem cells than many Western 
countries, and, if it can provide a supportive funding and academic environment, it could take a leading role in 
this field. These technologies offer unprecedented research and commercialization opportunities for China.” 
(Yang, 2004, 210). Of course, lower ethical standards in other countries are also characteristically invoked by the 
proponents of a promising technology to argue for the relaxation of ethical standards at home.  
65 Richard Jones, who addresses the ‘Wild East’ argument in relation to nanotechnology, provides a nice 
characterisation of this type of argument: “There’s a developing conventional wisdom about the way science and 
technology in general, and nanotechnology in particular, is developing in Asia. This comes in two parts: firstly, 
it’s noted that the Asian countries - particularly China - are set to overtake the west in science and technology, 
and then it’s suggested that what will help these countries gain their new supremacy is the fact that there, 
technology will be developed without moral scruples, in contrast to the self-inflicted handicaps that Western 
countries are suffering. These handicaps, conventional wisdom further asserts, take the form, in the United 
States, of opposition from the religious right to the entire secular, scientific worldview, while in Europe anti-
growth, left-wing environmentalists are the major culprits. The idea of a lawless, wild east, where technological 
stuff just gets done without agonising about social and environmental consequences, is becoming a bit of a 
bogeyman for western politicians […].” (Jones, 2005). 
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company Monsanto in a joint venture with the Indian seed company Mahyco, was released for 
sale in March 2002. However, India is also home to a powerful anti-GM grassroots movement 
and the decision on Bt cotton was only taken after long and acrimonious debates. Many 
people in India share indeed the same or similar concerns as many Europeans. As American 
social anthropologist Glenn Davis Stone writes: 
“Of the developing countries involved in the global biotechnology debate, probably none 
are as important and hotly contested as India. This country is home to what will eventually 
be the world’s largest population of farmers, to a vast and talented scientific establishment, 
to a vigorous biotech-entrepreneurial sector [ref.], and to some of the world’s most savvy 
green activists.” (Stone, 2004). 
The existence of a vibrant civil society in India is proven by the fact that the country has 
around 1.5 million active non-governmental organisations (NGOs), many of them highly 
professionalized and specialized (Bound, 2007, 41).  
 
Agricultural biotechnology in general and Bt cotton in particular continue to generate fierce 
controversy in India. Proponents of agri-biotech claim that this genetically modified crop has 
turned out to be a big success, citing the rapid spread of GM cotton seed (even and especially 
of unapproved varieties that are marketed illegally!) among eager Indian farmers as proof.66 
However, critics assert that the introduction of Bt cotton has proven an utter economic and 
ecological failure and even attribute the massive waves of suicides among cotton farmers that 
occurred in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra in 2002-2003 and 2005 to increased 
rates of indebtedness and insolvency after the inflated expectations around the new varieties 
had turned sour (Padma, 2006; for an early anthropological comment on the first suicide 
wave, see Stone, 2002). Indeed, the controversy continues unabated. In the war of claims and 
counterclaims, it is extremely difficult to uncover the truth about the actual performance of Bt 
cotton (moreover, regulatory transparency and monitoring leave much to be desired).67 As a 
result of the on-going furore, further approvals for new GM crops (especially GM food crops) 
that were in the pipeline have been stalled. The first crop to meet this fate was GM mustard:  
“It was expected that the GM-mustard developed by ProAgro/PGS-India (a subsidiary of 
the German TNC Bayer) was next in line of approval, but a final decision by GEAC 
[Genetic Engineering Approval Committee] has been shelved, apparently indefinitely, for 
                                                 
66 When the Bt cotton variety of Monsanto/Mahyco was officially released in March 2002, at least 10,000 
hectares in India were already planted with unapproved versions of Bt cotton developed and marketed by 
NavBharat Seeds based in Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat. In all likelihood the Gujarat firm had originally 
imported cotton with the Bt gene (the intellectual property of Monsanto) from North America and backcrossed it 
with local Indian varieties. When it became known that illegal biotech cotton was planted across India, the owner 
of NavBharat Seeds was sued, but calls to destroy the illegal crop without compensation were resisted by 
farmers, who received political support from the state government of Gujarat. Hence the spread of illegal and 
unapproved seed goes unimpeded. In 2004, the estimated area planted with illegal Bt cotton was 800,000 ha 
(Pray, Ramaswami, Huang et al., 2006, 152). Rumour has it that some of the illegal varieties are actually 
superior to the officially approved Bt variety of Monsanto/Mahyco, because they are better adapted to local 
conditions in India. The reality of large-scale illegal plantings makes a mockery of the Indian regulatory system. 
There is no chance at all that the stringent requirements attached to the release of Bt cotton (refugia plantings, 
monitoring, etc.) are going to be met. For more information on these illegal plantings and the actual 
implementation of regulatory requirements in the cotton fields, see also Scoones (2003) and Newell (2003).     
67 In a methodological review paper on the applied economics literature about the impact of GM crop varieties in 
developing countries, Melinda Smale et al. remark about the case of India: “Given the context of agro-ecological 
and social heterogeneity, an active civil society that is vocal for and against GM seed has polarized perspectives. 
Polarization is evident even in the peer-reviewed literature. Perhaps more significantly, the debate in civil society 
is carried into government decision-making fora. Thus, methods limitations, which occur in any applied 
research, take on particular significance.” (Smale, Zambrano, Falck-Zepeda et al. , 2006, p. 21-22). For more 
background information on the “active civil society” in India, both for and against GMOs, and the resulting 
pressures on biosafety regulation, see Ian Scoones (2003).  
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reasons that are not quite transparent. One credible theory is that the fierce controversy 
surrounding Bt-cotton has made the authorities very cautious, in particular about approving 
a GM-food crop.” (Indira et al., 2005, 119).  
A lot of research work in the Indian public sector has been done to develop insect-resistant 
and pest-resistant GM rice varieties, but the authors of a recent evaluation study do not expect 
these newly created varieties to be released in the foreseeable future (Indira et al., 2005, 118, 
132). In May 2004, an official taskforce on the application of agricultural biotechnology 
under the chairmanship of the well-known M.S. Swaminathan urged researchers and 
companies not to jeopardize India’s trade interests: “Transgenic research should not be 
undertaken in crops/commodities where our international trade may be affected, e.g., Basmati 
rice, soybean or Darjeeling Tea” (Swaminathan, 2004, point 3 in the executive summary). 
India is the only country in the world which can certify its soybeans to be GM-free, and 
thanks to this fortunate circumstance it can claim a niche market in Japan and South Korea 
(Sahai, 2006).68 
 
As an allegedly rising biotech power, India does not at present confirm the general picture of 
a relentless and irresistible advance of GM crops; rather the momentum for agricultural 
biotechnology seems to have run out of steam, at least for the moment. The most one can say 
is that the picture is decidedly ambivalent. Some leading Indian biotechnologists are highly 
frustrated by the extent of the domestic resistance and fear that India might be overtaken by 
China (Indira et al., 2005, 121; Newell, 2003, 6-7). Ironically, their worries mirror those of 
Tony Blair, except that for them the ‘wild East’ is located even further eastward.69 
 
A closer look at a particular case may thus reveal a more ambivalent and complicated picture 
than is suggested by the figures and the reports issued by the International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA). As a matter of fact, the numbers 
published by this agency have been challenged by environmental NGOs. They point out, not 
too subtly, that the ISAAA is a lobby organisation supported by the biotech industry: 
“‘No one has any idea where they are getting their numbers from,’ said David MacDonald 
of the Polaris Institute, a Canadian NGO. Where there is solid independent government 
data, such as the United States, the ISAAA numbers are inflated by five to 10 percent, he 
charged. MacDonald told IPS [International Press Service] that the group’s reports do not 
cite any sources or references, nor would most governments have this kind of information. 
‘We and other NGOs have been trying to get independent confirmation of this data for 
years, without success,’ he said. [Clive] James [chairman and founder of ISAAA] 
 
68 Some soybean farmers in Canada, especially in the province of Ontario, have been able to retain their markets 
in Japan and South Korea by further developing their Identity Preservation systems, as East Asian customers 
demanded that food-grade soybeans remain GM-free (McLean, 2004). In his study on ‘the moral economy of the 
non-transgenic soybean’, social anthropologist Gavin Whitelaw shows that the relationship between these 
Canadian soybean farmers and their Japanese buyers is a highly personal one, which is reinforced by annual 
visits to farms in Ontario that are conducted according to highly ritualized scripts (Whitelaw, 2004).   
69 A clear example of such frustration about India’s alleged lagging behind China in the field of agricultural 
biotechnology is provided by the views aired by the biochemist G. Padmanaban of the Indian Institute of Science 
in Bangalore. In 2002 he complained that China was “at least six years ahead of us” and bemoaned the situation 
in India in the following terms: “Democracy, liberalism and religious moorings have led to a plethora of arm-
chair scientists without a background in the methods of science, activists who freely misinterpret science and 
bioethicists who question any research on genetic make-up.” (Padmanaban, 2002, 620). In 2005 he wrote with 
respect to the expected release of GM rice: “We are at least 5 years behind China before any of our indigenous 
GM rice can reach the preproduction trial stage – that is, if ever these efforts are allowed to see the light of the 
day.” (Padmanaban, 2005, 427). There was even the looming danger that the big neighbour might already be 
working on India’s own heritage of germplasm: “Who knows, China may be working on GM indica variety for 
export purposes!” (ibid.).  
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responded that, ‘We spent 10 years getting key contacts in business, industry associations 
and governments to compile our data.’ ‘We don’t identify sources because our database is 
proprietary,’ he added” (Leahy, 2006).70 
Nonetheless, the ISAAA numbers are widely cited by many other institutions, including the 
FAO, “since no other global figures are available” (ibid.). The COGEM also used the ISAAA 
figures in its Draft Monitoring Report on biotechnology and globalisation.  
 
Even if one ignores the precise numbers that may or may not be inflated (who can say?), it is 
well-nigh impossible to miss the upbeat message for the future of agricultural biotechnology 
when reading the verbal text of the ISAAA report. After designating China, India, Argentina, 
Brazil and South Africa as the “five lead biotech crop countries from the South”, Clive James 
went on to write: 
“The collective experience and voice of these five key countries represent a coalition of 
influential opinion from the South re biotech crops that will also influence acceptance of 
biotech crops globally” (James, 2004, 11).  
However, the highest hopes for the global future of agricultural biotechnology were pinned on 
the pending decision to approve the commercialization of genetically modified rice in China, 
for immediately after the just quoted passage the text continues: 
“In the near term, the one single event that is likely to have the greatest impact is the 
approval and adoption of Bt rice in China, which is considered to be likely in the near term, 
probably in 2005. The adoption of biotech rice by China, not only involves the most 
important food crop in the world but the culture of Asia. It will provide the stimulus that 
will have a major impact on the acceptance of biotech rice in Asia and, more generally, on 
the acceptance of biotech food, feed and fiber crops worldwide. Adoption of biotech rice 
will contribute to a global momentum that will herald a new chapter in the debate on the 
acceptance of biotech crops which will be increasingly influenced by countries in the 
South, where the new technology can contribute the biggest benefits and where the 
humanitarian needs are greatest – a contribution to the alleviation of malnutrition, hunger 
and poverty.” (ibid.) 
 
It is notable that the expected decision to release Bt cotton in China is not simply judged on its 
own merits, but is placed within the wider perspective of the global future of agricultural 
biotechnology. If China approved GM rice, this would presumably have huge implications for 
“the acceptance of biotech food, feed and fiber crops worldwide”. This view on the strategic 
role of GM rice in the worldwide acceptance of biotech food and crops echoes the report 
written in 2002 by Graham Brookes and Peter Barfoot of PG Economics, UK, and 
appropriately entitled GM Rice: Will This Lead the Way for Global Acceptance of GM Crop 
Technology?, of which ISAAA published an abridged version in 2003 (Brookes and Barfoot, 
2003).71 The authors gave a positive answer to the question raised in the title of their report. 
They expected several varieties of GM rice with both agronomic and consumer benefit traits 
to be released for commercial use in around 2004 and to be widely available in the developing 
world thanks to low intellectual property restrictions (a consequence of the high public sector 
involvement in the development of these varieties in China, Vietnam and, partly, India). 
Consumer preferences for non-GM rice would be largely confined to the developed countries 
in the EU, Japan, and some other parts of South East Asia like South Korea, Singapore and 
                                                 
70 The ISAAA figures are based on information provided by seed companies, not on agricultural statistics (Huib 
de Vriend, personal communication). For NGO criticism of the most recent ISAAA figures, see Burcher (2007). 
71 Graham Brookes is paid by the biotech industry. In his earliest reports the sources of funding were properly 
disclosed, but later on this crucial information has apparently been suppressed (Huib de Vriend, personal 
communication). 
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Hong Kong, but these would not block the development of GM rice as they represented only 
2-2.5% of global rice consumption and 4% of global rice trade in 2004. In other parts of Asia, 
that is, in the mainstream rice producing and consuming countries, the question of GM versus 
non-GM was supposed to be of minor importance compared to the much more urgent issues 
of food security and welfare for rising populations. In the years from 2004, as a consequence 
of continuous yield improvements in biotech varieties and increasing price differentials 
between non-GM and GM rice, the balance would gradually shift in favour of the latter, until 
by 2012 the proportion of non-GM rice would be no more than 0.5-1% of global production 
and 1-1.5% of global trade. It is clear that such a rapid worldwide uptake of GM rice would 
also help to overcome the widespread opposition against biotech foods and to break the 
present stalemate.      
 
Against the background of this scenario it is understandable why the proponents of 
agricultural biotechnology look forward to a decision in China on the commercialization of 
GM rice with so much expectation and hope. Earlier in this chapter we quoted a few 
agricultural economists who expressed a similar view: “China’s decision may start a domino 
effect that could cascade around the globe” (Rozelle, Huang and Hu, 2004). 
 
To this date, however, the allegedly pending decision on the commercialization of GM rice in 
China has not yet been taken (although it has been announced several times), so the predicted 
domino effect has so far had no chance to materialize.72 Apparently, Chinese policymakers 
are struggling with serious doubts and hesitations. As the President of Monsanto in China, the 
only foreign company with a GM licence, John L. Killmer stated, ‘[China has] one foot on the 
accelerator, which is funding biotech research and development, and they have one foot on 
the regulatory brake” (quoted in Loppacher and Kerr, 2004, 9). In the remainder of this 
chapter we will look more closely into the backgrounds of Chinese biotechnology policy.  
 
Biotechnology policy in China  
 
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the subsequent fall of the so-called Gang of Four, 
Chinese political leaders realized at the end of the 1970s that a decade of political struggle 
and turmoil had left their country in a deplorable state of economic and technological 
backwardness. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership (1978-1989), the People’s Republic of 
China embarked on a long-term course of economic reforms and opening to the outside 
world, which was ideologically legitimated by the stress on ‘building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ (Deng, 1984). Rather than engaging in permanent class struggle and 
continuous mass mobilisation, Deng held that “the fundamental task for the socialist stage is 
to develop the productive forces” (ibid.). This overall task was captured in the slogan of the 
‘four modernisations’ (industry, agriculture, defence and science and technology).73 Foreign 
investments were welcomed as a useful supplement in this task. The ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’ 
supplied the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party with an ideology that seemed 
flexible enough to reconcile its strongly nationalist pretensions with the economic 
requirements of attracting foreign capital and technological know-how, resulting in “a 
peculiar globalisation of nationalism” (Hughes, 2006). Sometimes, the balance would be tilted 
towards ‘techno-nationalism’, at other times towards ‘techno-globalism’ or a more 
 
72 The ISAAA report for 2005 simply states: “China has already field tested biotech rice in pre-production trials 
and is expected to approve biotech rice in the near-term.” (James, 2005, 4).  
73 Political dissident Wei Jingsheng famously argues that a fifth modernisation should be added, namely 
democratisation. Without this latter modernisation, he claims, the other four will remain ineffective.  
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cosmopolitan approach towards innovation (Wilsdon and Keeley, 2007). China’s participation 
in the World Trade Organization since 2001 may restrict its room for manoeuvre, but the 
Chinese policy-makers also attempt to impose their own restrictions on the commerce of 
China with the rest of the world (e.g. on the Internet).      
 
As one of the ‘four modernisations’ that were adopted as overarching policy goals in 1978, 
science and technology were also given high priority alongside the transition towards a 
(nominally still ‘socialist’) market economy. In response to the American Strategic Defense 
Initiative (‘Star Wars’) and other initiatives among western countries in the early 1980s to 
concentrate their research efforts on a few areas of strategic importance, the Chinese 
leadership started the famous National High Technology Development Programme, also 
known as the ‘863’ programme − where ‘86’ refers to the year 1986 and ‘3’ to the month of 
March, when the programme was adopted. This programme singled out biotechnology, 
information and communication technology, aerospace, laser technology, robotics, energy and 
new materials as strategic fields requiring preferential support for the next fifteen years (1986-
2000). The place of biotechnology at the top of this list is quite remarkable and shows China’s 
strong commitment to achieve international pre-eminence in this particular area of 
technology. The field was to receive 1.5 billion RMB in funding against a total budget of 10 
billion RMB for the entire high-technology programme over the 15-year period (Huang and 
Wang, 2002 and 2003). As Craig Smith commented in the pages of the New York Times: 
“Beijing called in its top scientists from around the world and set them working on seven 
broad areas. Genetic engineering was at the top of the list. Since then, the double helix has 
replaced the atom as the symbol of the modernization drive” (Smith, 2000).  
Biotechnology, or life sciences more generally, is also one of the key areas of support in the 
more recent ‘973’ plan initiated in March 1997 to promote basic science and technology 
research (Huang and Wang, 2002 and 203). 
 
The specific area of plant biotechnology within this larger field of biotechnology has also 
seen substantial increases in funding and investment. Huang Jikun and Wang Qinfang, two 
leading Chinese agricultural economists, estimate that annual research expenditures for plant 
biotechnology have jumped from 14 million RMB (or 4.2 million US $) in 1986 at the formal 
start of the ‘863’ high-tech programme to 322 million RMB (or 38.9 million US $) in the year 
2000 at its end, and the number of research staff almost tripled from 740 to 2128 over the 
same period (Huang and Wang, 2003). More recent years and investment plans for the near 
future indicate that expenditures for agricultural biotechnology will show further impressive 
increases.   
 
Chinese research in plant biotechnology focuses on traits like insect resistance, disease 
resistance, stress tolerance, quality improvement and herbicide resistance in a number of 
crops such as cotton, rice, wheat, maize, soybean, potato, rapeseed, cabbage and tomato 
(Huang and Wang, 2003). By 2004, numerous GM varieties of 60 different crops had been 
approved for field-testing and 181 varieties of four crops (cotton, tomatoes, sweet peppers and 
petunias) had been approved for commercialisation (see Pray, Ramaswami, Huang et al., 
2006, Table 1 on p. 144).74 Several varieties of transgenic Bt cotton, some developed by 
scientists working at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) and a few 
developed by Monsanto and the seed company Delta and Pineland were first approved for 
commercialisation in 1997 (the Monsanto varieties were approved for four provinces). The 
                                                 
74 This leaves the ill-fated attempt in the early 1990s to commercialize transgenic tobacco out of account: “In the 
early 1990s, virus-resistant tobacco variety had been commercialized before being removed from production 
because of pressure from an international tobacco importer” (Huang, Rozelle, Pray, Wang, 2002, 675).     
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case of Bt cotton in China has been trumpeted as a big success story: it has spread rapidly 
across the cotton-growing area along the Yangtse and Yellow River and led to higher yields, 
much lower pesticide use, higher incomes and fewer health complaints among smallholder 
farmers (Pray, Huang, Hu and Rozelle, 2002). Despite continued increases in research 
funding for plant biotechnology, however, it seems that approval procedures have slowed 
down to some extent. As Pray et al. observe in 2006: “No new crops have been approved 
since 1999” (Pray, Ramaswami, Huang et al., 2006, p. 140; our italics).75 Given the fairly 
wide range of China’s research in plant biotechnology, there must by now be a considerable 
backlog of already field-tested but still unapproved transgenic crops.  
 
As the first signs of a slowing-down in the approval process became apparent, many 
commentators and professional Beijing watchers speculated that China had changed course 
and shifted away from its former enthusiastic embrace of agricultural biotechnology and its 
ambition to be a world leader in this area. Agricultural economists Huang and Wang 
explicitly repudiated this view in 2003: 
“We argue that while there has been a slight adjustment of GM strategies for 
commercialisation policy in the short run, the overall goal of China’s biotechnology 
development has not been altered. The growth of China’s public investment has not slowed, 
but instead accelerated.” (Huang and Wang, 2003, 2). 
The latter may be true, but this does not necessarily imply that the slowing-down in approvals 
signals no more than a “slight adjustment” of Chinese biotechnology policy in the short run, 
without affecting its long-term commitments. It is also possible that tensions are gradually 
building up because Chinese policy-makers see themselves confronted with unexpected 
dilemmas and conflicting demands in the international and domestic arena. Huang and Wang 
remark that “China is badly in need of institutional and capacity building for GMO biosafety 
management” (ibid., p.15) and they also notice a mismatch between the limited capacity for 
biosafety management and the extensive research capacity, especially at the local level (p. 
19). They also refer to international trade concerns as a contributory, though not the dominant 
factor to the temporarily slowing pace of GMO commercialisation in China.  
 
For those observers who take the official U.S. point of view on biotech regulation, what is 
surprising and also rather disappointing is that China seems to have moved a long distance in 
the direction of the EU regime of biosafety regulation (Kogan, 2005). In the run-up towards 
becoming a full member of the WTO in December 2001, China had also been actively 
involved in the negotiations leading up to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which it 
signed in August 2000 and ratified in May 2005 (Xue and Tisdell, 2002). In May 2001 the 
State Council issued more stringent safety regulations on GM crops and in July 2001 the 
Ministry of Agriculture passed regulations on labelling transgenic organisms (Ho and 
Vermeer, 2004, 162). In April 2002 China also promulgated new rules prohibiting foreign 
companies to invest in the domestic seed development business (Dow Jones Newswires, 
2002). The labelling regulations were not immediately implemented on the domestic market, 
but they caused interruptions for North American exports of soybeans into China because of 
the time needed to obtain the required import certificates. At first China imposed a 
moratorium on imports of unlabelled GM soybeans. Under strong diplomatic pressure from 
the U.S. government, however, the country acquiesced in interim rules which allowed the 
continuation of North American soya exports (Keeley, 2003b, 15-17). China’s own export 
interests were also severely hit because in 2001 South Koreans refused to purchase Chinese 
soy sauce made from American transgenic soybeans − a loss of an export market of 10 
 
75 NB: New transgenic varieties of previously approved crops, e.g. new Bt cotton varieties, have been approved 
since 1999.  
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million RMB or $1.2 million (ibid.). Already in 2000 the EU had banned imports of Chinese 
soy sauce containing GM ingredients. To recover and protect its own export markets for soya 
products in Europe, Japan and South Korea, China prohibited the domestic cultivation of GM 
soybeans and instituted a segregation system. American GM soybeans were henceforth to be 
used only as a source for animal feed (Falkner, 2005).76 As an importer of soybeans and 
exporter of soy products, China seems almost literally to have been caught in the “cross-fire” 
of the “GM Cold War” (cf. Meijer and Stewart, 2004, 247).    
 
It thus seems understandable that ‘public concerns’ about GM foods in Europe, Japan and 
South Korea might be important reasons for Chinese authorities to adopt a more cautious 
approach to the commercialisation of GM food crops. For many sceptical commentators, 
however, this is not the entire explanation and not even the most important part of it. A news 
article in Nature aptly paraphrases their view: 
“But circumstances suggest an alternative explanation: that the Chinese government is 
exploiting the biosafety issue to frustrate the commercial ambitions of Western agribiotech 
firms, because it realizes that its own research programme needs more time to catch up” 
(Macilwain, 2003, 111).77  
Hence the resulting paradox of a country strongly committed to promoting agricultural 
biotechnology putting one of its feet on the regulatory brake. In other words, China has not 
given up the ambition to be a world leader in this particular field, but it has introduced 
temporary measures to allow its own technology the protected space in which to become 
equal to the challenge of foreign competition. Or so the explanation runs. It is interesting to 
note that this particular interpretation is also endorsed by Monsanto’s employees in China 
(Dow Jones Newswires, 2002; Keeley, 2003a, 24).78  
 
There is an important kernel of truth in this explanation, although it may not be the full story. 
After the decision to release transgenic cotton for commercial use in 1997, Monsanto was 
allowed to sell its Bollgard® version of Bt cotton in China (through two joint ventures with 
local seed companies), but its operations are also subjected to significant restrictions. Its 
                                                 
76 See also Cookson (2006): “[…] GM soya, one of the key biotech crops in the Americas, is not likely to be 
planted commercially in China for a long while. While the country imports large amounts of GM soya, the 
agriculture ministry perseveres with its policy of growing only non-GM soya, for export at premium prices to 
Europe, South Korea and Japan.” 
77 Although costlier, Monsanto’s Bt cotton varieties are said to cover about the same cultivated area as the 
‘Chinese’ transgenic varieties. This is held to indicate their “superior quality” (Macilwain, 2003, 112). Zhao and 
Ho (2005) provide numerical estimates of Monsanto’s share in total Bt cotton acreage in successive years. It rose 
from 37.3 % in 1997 to 65.9 % in 2000, only to drop again to a share of 15 % in 2004 (the latter figure is based 
on an oral communication from a Monsanto representative). This drop is explained by a flooding of the market 
by domestically developed Bt cotton seeds and by (pirated) hybrid seed varieties (Zhao and Ho, 2005, 382). 
Perhaps these estimates have to be taken with a large grain of salt, precisely because of the widespread pirating 
of seeds both from Monsanto and from Biocentury (Keeley, 2006, 301). In any case, it seems extremely 
hazardous to use data about acreage shares for conclusions about superior quality. Pray and his co-authors argue 
that the availability in China of approved alternative transgenic varieties with much lower royalties than 
Monsanto’s cotton made biosafety enforcement there more effective than in India, where farmers either had to 
pay the high royalties demanded by Monsanto or take recourse to illegal varieties (Pray, Ramaswami, Huang et 
al., 2006, 154).      
78 This interpretation is also endorsed by others: “According to Wang Weirong, a scientist with Fudan Xinyang 
Biotech (Shanghai, China), most GM-related products in China are currently made from imported material. He 
says the regulation is thus likely to form trade barriers to foreign competition, but ‘When China’s own 
biotechnologies become mature, the labelling rule might be loosened’ “ (Hepeng Jia, 2003). Some also see a 
‘techno-nationalist’ motive in the decision not to grow GM soybeans in China for the time being: “Although 
research is underway, GM soya will not be commercialised until China has its own varieties, Mr. Huang says, 
‘Biotech crops in China depend on what technology is developed in the country’.” (Cookson, 2006).   
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biosafety approval is only valid for the four cotton-growing provinces along the Yellow 
River, but the company has no licence to sell in the Yangtse watershed area. Monsanto is also 
barred from access to local germplasm and is therefore unable to engage in seed breeding. 
These (and other) restrictions are not imposed on its main Chinese rival, a company called 
Biocentury (Chuangshiji in Chinese) that was set up in 1998 by Guo Sandui and other 
researchers of the Biotechnology Research Institute under the Chinese Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) in Beijing. Sandui and his colleagues had created the ‘Chinese’ 
versions of transgenic cotton, using the pollen tube pathway technique that they patented in 
1998. Biocentury is notionally a private company, but receives much support from the 
Ministry of Agriculture. It competes with Monsanto on terms that are carefully managed by 
the state. As James Keeley writes: 
“In many ways the Bt cotton story in China can be read as a nationalistic battle between 
Biocentury, the Chinese company with Chinese technology, and Monsanto, the US 
multinational, operating through joint-ventures with foreign technology.” (Keeley 2003a, 
19). 
 
Pride about national technological achievements and the desire of the state to free itself from 
dependence on western technologies fit the pattern of techno-nationalism (Kang and Segal, 
2006), which is also characteristic of other Asian countries like South Korea as is illustrated 
by the Hwang affair (see Chapter 3): “Techno-nationalism places a priority on science for 
national economic development and uses science to project national power and status” 
(Leadbeater and Wilsdon, 2007, 39). In the era of globalisation there is a quasi-permanent 
temptation to turn inwards. Yet techno-nationalism seems almost a self-defeating strategy:  
“Techno-nationalists see innovation as a means to promote independence. Yet investing 
more in science-based innovation – as Korea found through the Hwang affair – requires 
greater openness to foreign ideas and international scrutiny” (ibid.).  
In a statement before the U.S. Congress, Richard Suttmeier explains why the Chinese 
authorities are currently so much enamoured by techno-nationalist prospects (Suttmeier, 
2005). Despite the long-term success over the past 25 years of turning China into “the 
workshop of the world”, the present leadership is also increasingly frustrated about the fact 
that the Chinese economy has largely failed to break away from the model of extensive 
growth (with enormous environmental costs) and has become ever more dependent on foreign 
technology. These frustrations can be captured in the notion of the “technology trap” (ibid., p. 
75). Suttmeier points out that despite the increased funding for science and technology, 
“China’s patenting activity is disappointing and it is rare that Chinese products incorporate 
indigenous intellectual property” (see for confirmation also the comparative statistics on the 
growth of U.S. patents in the period 1992-2005 from the UK, India, China and South Korea in 
Leadbeater and Wilsdon, 2007, 10). As a result, “Chinese firms wind up paying substantial 
licence fees for [foreign] know-how, payments which cut into already rather slim profit 
margins” (ibid.).79 Since China’s accession to the WTO, dependence on foreign technologies 
seems to have deepened.  
 
Suttmeier’s diagnosis finds confirmation in the prominence of the new key phrase 
“independent innovation” (zizhu chuangxin) at China’s Fourth National Conference on 
Science and Technology held in January 2006, where the long-term programme for science 
 
79 Incidentally, in the case of Monsanto’s Bollgard® cotton, the Chinese authorities are also particularly unhappy 
about the height of the technological fee farmers have to pay for the use of Monsanto’s Bt construct, to wit a 
fraction of 18.5 RMB of the total price of 42 RMB per kg for the major Monsanto variety sold in China (see 
Keeley, 2003a, 21-22). As a matter of course, this fee accrues not to the two joint ventures in China, but to the 
U.S. parent company. 
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and technology development for the next 15 years (2006-2020) was set out and discussed. To 
finally become a truly “innovation-oriented country”, President Hu Jintao explained that 
China would embark upon a new path of “innovation with Chinese characteristics” (echoing 
Deng’s older phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics”). Other authorities like Premier 
Wen Jiabao used the supposedly equivalent phrase “independent innovation”. Professor Bai 
Chunli, Executive Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, explained the 
meaning of the latter phrase as follows:  
“Enhancement of the independent innovation capability is key to success in the effort to 
develop China into an innovation-oriented country. Scientific and technological personnel 
must be confident in their ability of making original innovations. On no account must we 
limit ourselves to following what has been done outside China and dare not to do things not 
yet done by foreign countries.” (Chinese Academy of Sciences. 2006).  
Interestingly, in subsequent international forums, as if to compensate for their own audacity, 
Chinese authorities have made soothing gestures to the rest of the world that this new 
emphasis on ‘independent innovation’ will benefit the whole world and not be a threat to any 
particular country. Nonetheless, there are still many unresolved tensions and it remains to be 
seen where exactly the balance between techno-nationalism and cosmopolitan innovation will 
be struck (see also Wilsdon and Keeley, 2007, 12).  
 
Biosafety regulation, bureaucratic politics and ‘civil society’ in China 
 
The Chinese government may be exploiting public concerns about GM foods in Europe, 
Japan and South Korea to give domestic agri-biotech businesses more time to catch up on 
their foreign competitors, but this is probably not the only reason why it puts one foot on the 
regulatory brake. Admittedly, the ‘techno-nationalism’ of the Chinese leaders is strong 
enough to induce them to promote their own agricultural biotechnology at the expense of the 
technology developed and ‘owned’ by foreign companies. However, they have also other 
means at their disposal to pursue this aim. The operations of Monsanto in mainland China are 
actually subject to various restrictions, which are partly imposed to protect the viability of its 
main national rival, agri-biotech champion Biocentury. The government has still many levers 
in its hands to steer and manage competition in the ‘socialist’ market economy. 
 
Many western observers once thought that the absence of a vibrant civil society in a still 
rather authoritarian state like China would have tempted Chinese leaders in pursuit of higher 
productivity and competitive advantage to rush through GM crops without much regard for 
ecological and other risks, a scenario that Jennifer Zhao and Peter Ho refer to as the 
‘developmental risk society’ (Zhao and Ho, 2005). As Craig Smith wrote in 2000 in the New 
York Times:      
“Enthusiasm for the new science abounds. There is no public debate to stir up the 
opposition that has brought the development of genetically modified crops to a near 
standstill in India.” (Smith, 2000) 
Yet, despite the absence of organized public opposition to agricultural biotechnology, Chinese 
authorities have been very cautious in approving the commercialization of new transgenic 
crops.  
 
There is no lack of dedicated advocates who promote the cause of agricultural biotechnology 
in China. Naturally, this group includes biotechnological scientists working at various state 
research institutes and universities. Quite a few of these researchers also occupy other roles 
such as company director or government advisor. Jia Shirong, for example, combines the 
various functions of scientist at the Biotechnology Research Institute, company director of 
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Biocentury, funding advisor and reviewer of biotech research programmes, member of the 
Biosafety Committee, and public spokesperson (Keeley, 2003b, 7). Another influential 
member of the pro-biotech ‘discourse coalition’ (Keeley, 2006) is agricultural economist and 
policy analyst Huang Jikun, director of the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy at the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Huang is leading author or co-author of a large 
number of articles in international journals extolling the economic, ecological and health 
benefits of Bt cotton and transgenic rice varieties in China. The latter’s publication in Science 
(Huang et al., 2005 ) on GM rice also aimed to “contribute to the approval of the crop for 
commercial release” (Xun Zi, 2005, 637). 
 
There is, however, also an emerging ‘counter discourse coalition’ on GMOs, still rather 
fragmentary but rising in importance. This coalition reflects the increasing importance of 
environmental discourse in China and consists of civil servants at the State Environmental 
Protection Administration or SEPA (an administrative unit that in 1998 was promoted to the 
rank of a ministry), the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences (which falls under SEPA) 
and, curiously enough, ‘activists’ of Greenpeace China. A large and growing number of 
environmental ‘non-governmental organisations’ are active in the People’s Republic, but they 
do not completely fit the western definition of an NGO because their activities are severely 
restrained by the state (Schwartz, 2004). These groups generally tread very carefully and 
avoid confrontational tactics, concentrating their campaigns instead on ‘research’, education 
and environmental awareness building. In many cases, the state has in a top-down manner 
allowed NGOs to form in order to advance state-approved agendas. Many of these agendas 
have to do with the salient tension in the Chinese political structure between the central 
government and provincial and local governments. The central government and the general 
population are increasingly concerned about the serious environmental problems to which 
China’s relentless production drive gives rise, yet in most cases these problems are not taken 
seriously by the provincial or local governments to which decision-making responsibilities 
have devolved in the wake of administrative de-centralisation. As a counter move, the central 
government promotes the formation of NGOs to compensate for their own declining influence 
and to put pressure on sub-national governments to take environmental concerns into account. 
The reopened Beijing office of Greenpeace, with a staff in 2005 of 20 persons that is still 
growing, seems to fit this pattern.80 Commenting on a campaign of Greenpeace against illegal 
deforestation in Yunnan province, activist Lo Sze Ping declared:  
“Our friend-versus-foe strategy is: with the Forest Act and the central government against 
the provincial government and the wood-logging company” (Yamamoto and Blume, 2005). 
The structure of biosafety regulation of GMOs in agriculture has been an object of frequent 
inter-departmental rivalry and bureaucratic infighting. To date the Ministry of Agriculture 
(presiding over the Biosafety Office and its subordinate Biosafety Committee) has been able 
to maintain the central coordinating role, but this role is contested by SEPA. The 
environmental ‘ministry’ endorses its claims by referring to its role as executing agency for 
the drafting of the National Biosafety Framework under the Cartagena Protocol. SEPA is also 
the main Chinese recipient and focal point for European attempts to transfer regulatory 
models to China, both on a bilateral basis such as in workshops co-organized by the German 
GTZ or Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (see Liu and Xue, 2004) and in the 
 
80 “The office was reopened in spring 2002 after being closed down in 1995 because of an incident in August of 
that year when public security personnel arrested six foreign Greenpeace demonstrators, detained for one day, 
and expelled them from China for unfurling an antinuclear banner in Tiananmen Square” (Zhao and HO, 2005, 
394). The Greenpeace International branch in Hong Kong is subject to fewer restrictions, owing to the special 
political position of this city, but has less access to mainland China.  
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multilateral context of the UNEP/GEF (United Nations Environmental Program/Global 
Environmental Funds) support for capacity building for the implementation of the National 
Biosafety Framework of China (UNEP/GEF, 2003, 2004, 2005). In these various meetings 
and workshops we see the Chinese ‘counter discourse coalition’ in full action, as Greenpeace 
very often also takes part in them and Xue Dayuan of the Nanjing Institute of Environmental 
Sciences regularly assumes the role of chief coordinator on behalf of SEPA. It seems that at 
least these Chinese partners are very eager to learn about European experiences with GMO 
regulation; they do not at all complain that the EU is trying to impose its regulatory concepts 
and models in a top-down manner. Of course, according to some Americans this EU-Chinese 
cooperation actually amounts to a conspiracy against US trade interests and disloyalty to 
WTO obligations (Kogan, 2005).    
The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture resists SEPA’s claims to the central coordinating role for 
biosafety regulation on the grounds that they can mobilize the greatest amount of scientific 
expertise available in the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and its affiliated 
research institutes. Yet the composition of the Biosafety Committee has been criticized as 
rather one-sided, because most of its members are biotechnologists. In 2003 only 10 of its 56 
members were environmental scientists or ecologists (Keeley, 2003b, 6).81 Moreover, there 
are also apparent conflicts of interest because several of the biotechnologists involved (like 
the aforementioned Jia Shirong) have a direct stake in the commercialisation of GM crops. 
“[I]t’s like being boxer and referee at the same time”, as one Chinese ecologist commented: 
“You can’t have biosafety just to promote biotech.” (Keeley, 2006, 300). Some of this 
common criticism has even travelled beyond the confines of bureaucratic politics and reached 
the public media. Thus the executive editor of China Features, Xiong Lei, made a remarkable 
argument that Chinese citizens are actually denied the right to know what they eat:  
“In theory, it seems obvious that we should have the right to know about and choose the 
food we eat. In reality, however, this cannot be guaranteed. 
First, in China, the decision to release GM crops for commercial use is often made behind 
closed doors, where biotechnologists tend to have the most say. Indeed, an investigative 
report in Southern Weekend last November (2004) disclosed that two-thirds of the 58-
member biosafety committee under the Ministry of Agriculture are biotechnologists. 
Second, although regulations require food products containing GM products to be 
identified, the rules only cover 17 foodstuffs.” (Xiong Lei, 2005) 
Interestingly, this plea for ‘informed choice’ is combined with criticism of decision-making 
behind closed doors and insufficient implementation of labelling regulations. At least some 
Chinese consumers seem to have similar concerns with regard to GM foods as European or 
Japanese consumers. 
 
In China, however, conflicts over biotechnology and biosafety generally assume the form of 
intra- and inter-bureaucratic quarrels, unlike in countries such as India or Brazil “where the 
battles are also in the courts, media and even farmers’ fields, and often between civil society 
and the state” (Keeley, 2003b, 8). But sometimes even in China such battles reach the public 
sphere.  
 
One event that caused quite a national and international stir was the presentation of a critical 
report on the environmental impacts of Bt cotton in China by Xue Dayuan of the Nanjing 
Institute of Environmental Sciences on a meeting of the Chinese Biosafety Research Society 
that was sponsored by Greenpeace and opened by a senior official of SEPA. In other words, 
                                                 
81 In 2005 the number of committee members was increased to 74, with also a larger representation of food and 
environmental safety experts (Nakanishi, 2005) 
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 the event showed the ‘counter discourse coalition’ once again in action. The report was 
published by Greenpeace in both Chinese and English (for the latter version see Xue, 2002). 
There was also a press conference attended by the Chinese press agency Xinhua, which on 4 
June 2002 summarized the report as follows: 
“A genetically modified cotton plant, which makes up 35 percent of China’s crop, is 
damaging the environment despite its success in controlling the bollworm, according to a 
report released in Beijing Monday. The plant, Bt transgenic cotton, harms natural parasitic 
enemies of the bollworm and seems to be encouraging other pests, according to the study 
by the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences (NIES) under the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA).” (quoted in Keeley, 2003b, 20).  
The next day the report was on the front page of China Daily and circulated throughout the 
world on the internet. 
 
Representatives of the pro-biotech ‘discourse coalition’ were outraged. In a critical response, 
the aforementioned Jia Shirong and his colleague Peng Yufa called the report a “garbled and 
biased report” and stated that “the context of many research data is garbled in accordance with 
the author’s own interest and will” (Jia and Peng, 2002). Apparently, having a connection 
with Greenpeace gave the report’s author an ‘interest’ that spoiled his scientific objectivity 
(what about having a financial interest in a biotech company?). In fact, Xue had done little 
more than summarizing some research work done by Chinese entomologists and drawing a 
number of conclusions from it about possible ‘adverse’ environmental impacts of Bt cotton. 
 
In the same month of June of the year 2002 an article was published in The Plant Journal 
under the title: ‘Five years of Bt cotton in China – the benefits continue’ (Pray, Huang, Hu 
and Rozelle, 2002). 
 
The ‘counter discourse coalition’ has been able to bring the biosafety conflict out in the open 
but it has not succeeded in halting the further advance of Bt cotton in China: 
“Individual scientists may have reservations about Bt cotton, or doubt some of the evidence 
showing how successful it has been, but there is no grouping of people making a serious 
case that China should reverse its position on Bt cotton and restrict its continued use. The 
number of provinces in which it is being used has increased, more varieties have been 
approved, giving the overall impression that it is a fait accompli. Even Greenpeace no 
longer concentrates on Bt cotton in China: its efforts are now focussed on stopping the 
commercialisation of GM rice […]” (Keeley, 2006, 303).  
These words were published in April 2006. On 25 July 2006, however, dramatic news on the 
fate of Bt cotton in China came in from a source that is above suspicion. Three researchers 
from Cornell University − PhD candidate Shenhui Wang, Assistant Professor David Just and 
Professor Per Pinstrup-Andersen (a well-known advocate of agri-biotech) −  presented a paper 
on an agricultural economics meeting in Long Beach in which they showed that the benefits 
of Bt cotton did not continue indefinitely (Wang, Just and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2006). Using a 
household survey from 2004, the authors observed that by the third year from the first 
adoption farmers who had planted Bt cotton reduced pesticide use by more than 70 % and 
earned incomes that were 36 % higher than farmers planting conventional cotton, but by the 
seventh year (2004), these advantages had been completely eroded! By that year, due to the 
unanticipated emergence of secondary pests, they had to spray just as much as conventional 
farmers but they earned 8 % less because of the higher costs of Bt seed. In a comment on 
these findings Pinstrup-Andersen declared: 
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“These results should send a very strong signal to researchers and governments that they 
need to come up with remedial actions for the Bt-cotton farmers. Otherwise, these farmers 
will stop using Bt cotton, and that would be very unfortunate” (cited in Lang, 2006). 
This sounds very much like a desperate call for a rescue operation to save the success story of 
Bt cotton. The results of the Cornell study surely give ample food for thought. Perhaps policy-
makers should also ponder the fate of transgenic cotton when they have to decide about the 
release of GM rice for commercial use.  
 
Consumers, Greenpeace and GM rice 
 
What do Chinese consumers think of GM foods and how would they react to the introduction 
of transgenic rice? One can imagine that these questions are of some importance to the 
Chinese authorities when they have to decide on the commercialisation of GM rice. Several 
surveys and economic studies have been conducted to probe somewhat deeper into the 
attitudes of Chinese consumers towards GM foods, their awareness of them and their 
willingness to buy such foods should they appear on the market (for an overview, see Smale 
et al., 2006, 35). Unfortunately, the findings often point in different directions. It seems that 
consumer research itself has become part of the psychological warfare on GMOs and 
transgenic rice. This would not be entirely surprising, as the outcomes of such research may 
have a direct bearing on the decision to commercialize.  
 
One outcome on which there is general agreement is that awareness of, and knowledge about, 
agricultural biotechnology is still rather limited among Chinese consumers. Most studies also 
endorse the conclusion that a large majority of consumers are in favour of labelling GM 
foods.82 The latter outcome is not without political significance. In 2003 two exponents of the 
pro-biotech discourse coalition, economists Huang and Hu, presented a paper before the State 
Council of China in which they made the case for the commercialisation of GM rice. Their 
economic analysis of the benefits of commercialisation was predicated on the removal of the 
labelling requirement (as labelling was said to reduce the economic benefits of GM rice) (see 
Keeley, 2006, 303). This raises the fundamental ethical question whether the right to informed 
choice, which also in China seems to enjoy widespread support, should be overruled in the 
name of greater economic benefits. 
 
A survey commissioned by Greenpeace and conducted in 2005 among 600 consumers in the 
big cities Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou showed that a majority of 57 percent said they 
would choose non-GM food over GM food. As far as rice is concerned, this share would even 
rise to 73%. These figures were higher than the outcomes of a similar survey conducted in the 
previous year 2004. This shows, according to Greenpeace, the effect of consumers becoming 
more aware of GM foods. Rejection of GM food is also highest in Beijing (72 %), where 
awareness is also highest (AP-foodtechnology, 2005). 
 
It should come as no surprise that the highest rates of GM non-acceptance are found in studies 
commissioned by Greenpeace. Much depends, of course, on the precise framing of the 
questions and other ‘technical’ details. A survey of households in urban centres pointing in 
the opposite direction has been conducted by Huang Jikun and three co-authors (Huang et al., 
                                                 
82 See for instance Zhong et al. (2002): “When asked whether they thought GM foods should be labeled, nearly 
all of the 454 interviewees answered yes (95%), regardless of whether they were willing to buy GM foods or not. 
Such a strong response is a clear indication that consumers require the right to be informed of important and 
sensitive information regarding their welfare.” (p. 142). See also Lü (2006): “In our interviews, all participants 
approved of the labelling of GM foods” (p. 263). .  
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2006). They present their findings in the perspective of the expected decision to 
commercialize GM rice: 
“China, the world’s most populous nation, is likely soon to authorize commercialization of 
GM rice, the largest food crop in the world.” (ibid., 150). 
The same prediction had been made by Huang in previous publications. He apparently acts on 
the assumption that if he repeats this prediction often enough it will automatically turn into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Huang and his co-authors summarised the findings of their survey as 
follows: 
“The results show that the percentages of the consumers’ approval of and willingness to 
buy GM foods in China were high. In general, the acceptance rates were much higher than 
[in] all other countries that have been reported in the literatures” (ibid.). 
So there appears to be no major problem of consumer acceptance standing in the way of GM 
rice commercialisation. However, Huang et al. also observe that two thirds of urban 
consumers in China have a very limited knowledge about biotechnology (in a philosophical 
mood one might ask what ‘acceptance’ means if it is not well-informed). They therefore add 
what seems to be a special advice on “information management” to their substantive findings:  
“New information could probably influence [consumers’] opinions rather easily. This 
implies that the media and the government’s provision of information can play a vital role 
in determining consumers’ acceptance of GM foods. Based on the findings of this study, we 
conclude that the commercialization of GM foods in China will receive limited resistance 
from consumers unless there are major information campaigns against biotechnology.” 
(ibid., our italics).  
The italicized phrase at the end of this passage sounds a bit ominous. It seems to be a covert 
invitation addressed at the Chinese government to push through the commercialisation of GM 
rice while simultaneously reining in the media and NGOs like Greenpeace in order to nip 
possible “information campaigns against biotechnology” in the bud. Needless to say, in an 
authoritarian state like China, the media and NGOs have already been reined in to a large 
extent. It would be highly regrettable if the commercialisation of GM rice could only be 
carried through at the price of further restrictions on public debate. 
 
From a broader social science perspective, ‘acceptance’ or ‘non-acceptance’ of GM foods 
should not be considered as a reflection of inherent characteristics of individuals, but rather be 
seen as the outcome of a social process involving the exchange of views and arguments. This 
simple consideration obviates the need for technically sophisticated estimations of consumers’ 
presumed ‘willingness-to-pay’ (as they are performed by many economists) and shifts the 
focus of analysis to the quality of the public debate as a key variable.   
 
In an earlier study, Peter Ho and Eduard Vermeer also reported high GM acceptance rates 
among Chinese consumers, but they discussed more openly and with more sophistication the 
effects of the existing restrictions on freedom of the press and freedom of speech (Ho and 
Vermeer, 2004). They put the finger on a major and politically sensitive cause of limited 
consumer knowledge:  
“The poor understanding of biotech and its potential risks can in large part be attributed to 
the state reluctance to allow the emergence of uninhibited public debates about genetic 
modification. This reluctance is not just driven by a fear of social unrest, but most likely 
also by a felt need to protect the domestic biotech industry against potential consumer 
resistance.” (Ho and Vermeer, 2004, 169)83 
 
83 “According to Xue Dayuan, former deputy director of the Biosafety Office of the State Environmental 
Protection Agency, in 2004 the State Council had issued a confidential notice to concerned state institutions, 
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The Chinese state does not discourage all media discussion about GMOs, they add; “[r]ather, 
it is a matter of state-guided, “well-balanced” reporting about biotech.” (ibid.). Ho and 
Vermeer argue that precisely because of the inhibition of public debate the seemingly high 
‘acceptance’ of GMOs Chinese consumers currently display may turn out to be rather 
unstable. Moods can switch easily when incidents occur or new information comes in. The 
basis for this expectation is their own experimental result indicating that initially quite high 
acceptance rates can be brought down substantially by presenting extra information (both 
positive and negative).  
                
Yet the inhibition of public debate is not complete. There are still possibilities for initiating 
‘awareness-raising’ actions and some of the intra-bureaucratic conflicts also seep through into 
the media. The governing elite seem to be internally divided about the commercialisation of 
GM foods in general and of GM rice in particular. This gives an NGO like Greenpeace some 
room to manoeuvre.   
 
An article appearing in China Daily in December 2004, on the occasion of a meeting of the 
Biosafety Committee assessing GM rice, was remarkably critical in tone:  
“[GM food’s] impact on human health, the environment and bio-diversity has not yet been 
thoroughly studied under current levels of science and technology. […]. When it comes to 
rice specifically, things are more complicated. Rice is a traditional staple food for the 
Chinese. It is already eaten every day without much alteration. Experiments on animals for 
months or even several years are not enough to convince consumers that GM rice is safe for 
humans in the long run. […] People should not be used as guinea pigs with food they eat 
every day. The authorities must treat the matter with more caution.” (China Daily, 2004; 
our italics) 
Thus, although the pro-biotech lobby in China is strongly pressing for the authorisation of 
GM rice commercialisation, there is also significant resistance to this pressure. Expectations 
had been raised that the decision to approve commercialisation was imminent, but in 
December 2004 the Ministry of Agriculture “denied […] the possibility of an approval of 
commercial production in the near future” (People’s Daily Online, 2005).   
 
Greenpeace was able to capitalize in its strategy on some manifest failures in the Chinese 
regulatory system. As the last step required before commercialisation, farm-level ‘pre-
production trials’ had been conducted with a number of insect-resistant GM rice varieties in 
Hubei province during the years 2002-2003. Huang et al. (2005) reported in Science about the 
positive effects of these trials in terms of higher yields and lower uses of pesticides. However, 
it appears that GM rice seeds from such trials have leaked into regular rice production.84 This 
illegal spread of GM rice among Chinese farmers was detected in April 2005 when 
Greenpeace sent samples of rice bought in Hubei province to a testing laboratory in Germany: 
19 of 25 samples tested positive for the presence of ‘transgenic’ proteins that are 
characteristic of one of the Chinese GM rice varieties (see also the response of two 
Greenpeace campaigners to the article of Huang et al. in Science: Sze and Cotter, 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                        
which called for a halt to discussions about biotechnology in the media (Xue Dayuan, personal communication, 
September 2004)” (Ho and Vermeer, 2004, 169).   
84 A more ominous possibility was raised by Beijing-based journalist Lin Gu in an article appearing in the South 
China Morning Post (an English-language newspaper published in Hong Kong). He suggested that the GM rice 
seeds were deliberately distributed among farmers by (or on behalf of) Professor Zhang Qifa, the researcher who 
developed these varieties, to create a fait accompli and thus enforce a positive decision on commercialisation (to 
match legal formality with the reality in the farmers’ fields). See Gu, 2005. This version is confirmed in a 
Greenpeace press release citing a government statement on the GM rice issue in Hubei province, published in 
Hubei Daily, 10 August 2005 (see Greenpeace, 2006).   
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 Understandably, this finding caused great embarrassment to Chinese authorities as it 
suggested that the regulatory system was woefully inadequate, or as Sze Pang Cheung of 
Greenpeace Hong Kong declared, that the “GM industry” was “out of control” (China Daily, 
2005a). The first reflex of the Ministry of Agriculture was to deny these findings and to reply 
that “the testing of GM rice seeds should be based on China’s technical standards” (ibid.). 
This reply did not reassure all Chinese, as transpires from a comment published in China 
Daily:  
“Agricultural experts and Ministry of Agriculture officials immediately denied the 
Greenpeace claims and cited China’s own ‘technical standards’ for testing GM products. 
But their answers do not lessen the public’s worries over the safety of GM rice. The 
Greenpeace findings have sounded a warning bell.” (China Daily, 2005b; our italics) 
As the Chinese authorities could not immediately handle the situation, they took recourse to a 
well-tried and old-fashioned remedy:  
“In May [2005], the potential for negative media coverage was such that the Chinese 
government banned all media coverage of the GM rice leak until further notice.” (Xun Zi, 
2005). 
However, Greenpeace and other NGOs have kept up the pressure and continued to act as 
gadflies to the Chinese authorities by also targeting European rice imports from China as 
“contaminated” with GM rice, thus raising the stakes against imminent commercialisation 
(Friends of the Earth International, 2006b). Traces of the illegal GM rice were also detected in 
food products on grocery shelves in Chinese cities, including Heinz’s Baby Rice Cereal sold 
in Beijing (Greenpeace, 2006). Reportedly, the Chinese government has meanwhile punished 
seed companies and destroyed GM rice grown on the fields, while taking steps to tighten 
control over field trials (ibid.).  
   
Greenpeace also undertook actions that were targeted at foreign companies selling food 
products to Chinese consumers, thus indirectly raising the latter’s “awareness” about GMOs. 
The organisation aimed in particular at Kraft and Campbell, whose branded products were 
found to have GM ingredients: 
“The international brands were accused by Greenpeace of having ‘double-standards’ in 
their GM food policy. ‘Kraft and Campbell’s Soup have committed not to use GM 
ingredients in Europe, but have not done so in China. We are demanding these companies 
not to sell GM food in China, as consumers deserve the same rights and safety standards 
everywhere,’ [Greenpeace campaigner Ma Tian Jie] said.” (AP-foodtechnology, 2005; 
italics in original). 
This emphasis on ‘double standards’ appears rhetorically powerful, as Chinese consumers 
might resent being treated as less than European consumers. However, it makes a lot of 
difference whether European or American consumers are taken as the standard reference for 
comparison. 
    
A decision to commercialise GM rice is, of course, a political decision in which a variety of 
factors have to be weighed against each other. GM rice has been ready for commercialisation 
since 2000 (Huang et al., 2006, 144). In the past couple of years seemingly firm forecasts 
have been made repeatedly that a decision would be imminent. To date, however, such a 
decision has not occurred. Chinese policy-makers must have great difficulty in balancing 
considerations of science and technology policy, international trade, environmental and food 
safety, and consumer acceptance. On the eve of the Biosafety Committee meeting in 
December 2006, one insider, Xue Dayuan, confided his personal views to the press: 
“Xue, the Nanjing Institute researcher, said China’s leaders remained divided, with those 
responsible for food safety and the environment wanting to go slower and those responsible 
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for productivity, science and technology pushing to go more quickly. The committee that 
will make the licensing decision meets this month [December 2006], but its agenda is not 
public. Xue said it might take as long as two years for an announcement.” (Fields, 2006) 
Of course, Xue Dayuan is hardly a disinterested external policy observer, as he belongs to the 
side that wants to go slower. We do not dare to make a specific prediction about whether a 
decision by the Chinese authorities to commercialize GM rice is imminent, soon to be 
expected or perhaps will be postponed indefinitely. What is significant, nonetheless, is the 
fact of this apparent ‘procrastination’ itself. One cannot say that the commercialisation of GM 
rice, or of any other GM food crop for that matter, is being pushed through in China.  
 
China’s experience with biotech and biosafety policy, like India’s experience, does not at all 
confirm the general picture of a relentless and irresistible advance of GM crops on a world 
scale. The partial exception is the story of Bt cotton, but even this ‘silver bullet’ has recently 
been ‘tarnished’ (we are alluding to the title of the paper by Wang et al., 2006). Although the 
release of GM rice for commercial use, on which many biotech proponents inside and outside 
China had set their hopes, has not occurred so far, one might even suspect that a positive 
decision on commercialisation would in the end not change the global acceptance of GMOs as 
dramatically as the proponents expect. Conflict and controversy would almost certainly 
continue. It is quite possible that GM rice would become, perhaps after a few successful 
years, a new tarnished silver bullet. The optimistic scenarios presented by Graham Brookes 
and Peter Barfoot and by the ISAAA about the worldwide consequences of the commercial 
release of GM rice are probably based as much on wishful thinking as on hard-boiled 
economic reasoning.  
 
Afterthoughts: rice and culture from an anthropological perspective 
 
In this final section we will look at the cultural meaning of rice in Asia from an 
anthropological perspective. Some commentators have drawn attention to this aspect of the 
debate, stating that “China’s internal debate over gene-altered rice treads on hallowed ground” 
(Fields, 2006) or claiming that “rice defines who we are” (Schuman, 2006). The Asian debate 
on the genetic modification of rice has been likened to “France debating whether to modify 
grapes” (Fields, 2006).   
 
It is indeed highly plausible that in several Asian countries transgenic rice will arouse 
resistance among consumers which has deep cultural roots. This is certainly true for Japan 
and South Korea. Historical anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney recounts in her book Rice 
as Self that rice has defined Japanese national identity throughout the centuries (Ohnuki-
Tierney, 1993; for a shorter version, see Ohnuki-Tierney, 2004). The cycle of growing rice 
determined the transitions between the seasons. The rice plant growing on Japanese soil was 
always the symbol marking the differences between the Japanese and strangers. In South 
Korea, the cultural significance of rice for national identity is hardly less (Feffer, 2005). Both 
countries protected their own rice production behind high tariff walls and fiercely opposed 
attempts to reduce this kind of protectionism. When in 1993 Japan’s rice harvest was 
extremely low, Japanese consumers persisted in preferring rice grown in their own country, 
despite skyrocketing prices, and vehemently resisted the government’s plans to mix Japanese 
and foreign rice in order to overcome shortages. According to the ‘urban legends’ circulating 
at that time, imported rice was contaminated with vermin and chemicals – undoubtedly a 
projection of the symbolic pollution offending the purity of the Japanese soul (Ohnuki-
Tierney, 1995). International negotiations on the liberalisation of agriculture always have to 
reckon with protesters from Japan and South Korea. In 2003, during the ministerial summit of 
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 the WTO meetings in Cancún, Mexico, Korean farmer Lee Kyang Hae even went so far as to 
take his own life by way of political protest (Wallach and Tucker, 2006). Against this 
historical background it will cause no surprise when surveys show that consumers in Japan 
and South Korea reject genetically modified rice. Soya too, a crop that is processed in 
numerous traditional food products, must also be ‘GM-free’ (Severson, 2002). The legal 
obligation to label GM foods, which consumer organisations in Japan and South Korea have 
obtained through lobbying, is not just the effect of high incomes per capita, as Brookes and 
Barfoot (2003) suggest in their report, but derives from deeply rooted cultural determinants.  
 
The question is whether it is only Japan and South Korea that have to be written off as 
potential markets for transgenic rice. There are indications that cultural resistances against 
GM rice, though perhaps less strong, also exist in other Asian countries. Or at least such 
resistances might be slumbering, ready to be aroused and activated by NGOs if only they 
know how to strike the right chords. After all, rice is at the basis of Asian civilisation. It is a 
powerful symbol and is woven into religious ceremonies and civil rites. This stark symbolic 
meaning is even echoed in the proclamation of 2004 as the international rice year by the FAO: 
“A symbol of cultural identity and global unity, rice is the world’s most popular food. It 
shapes religious observances, festivals, customs, cuisines and celebrations” (FAO, 2004). One 
could add that it might also become a symbol of global division, if conflicts about genetic 
modification are going to run high. The Indian NGO Thanal already deploys the force of the 
symbolic power of rice for political action in its campaign ‘Save Our Rice’. According to this 
NGO, “rice has become an inherent part of our life, culture and value systems. Rice is more 
than agriculture and commerce: rice is life for us” (Thanal, n.d.). Greenpeace International is 
conducting a similar ‘Rice is Life’ campaign. It is hardly possible to determine in advance 
how strong the cultural potential is that can be mobilised for effective opposition, but any 
decision to release transgenic rice in Asia for commercialisation must surely count on a strong 
backlash. 
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